When is it Justifiable to Ascribe Mental States to Non-Human Systems? by Stuart, Susan Alice Jane
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
When is it Justifiable to Ascribe Mental States to
Non-Human Systems?
Thesis
How to cite:
Stuart, Susan Alice Jane (1993). When is it Justifiable to Ascribe Mental States to Non-Human Systems?
PhD thesis. The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 1992 Susan Alice Jane Stuart
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
When is it justifiable to ascribe 
mental states to non-buman 
systems?
Susan Alice Jane Stuart
Submitted for examination for the degree of PhD, from the Human Cognition Research
Laboratory,
1 November 1992
'  .
txsçm o p  - 5fcK
ProQuest Number: C359718
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest C359718
Published by ProQuest LLO (2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
A b s tra c t
In this thesis I shall attempt to show when it is, and when it is not, 
justifiable to ascribe mental states, of the type that we associate with the 
complex cognitive behaviour of human beings, to non-human systems. To 
do this I will first attempt to give a fundamental explication of some of the 
problems that underlie our ascription of mental states to other human 
beings, non-human animals and machines, after which I will tackle the 
problem of whether or not any ascription of mentality can ever be 
completely vindicated.
Then I will look at the issues of complexity and the distinctions that hold 
between the capabilities of various systems, both natural and artificial. The 
result of this will be a more comprehensive understanding of what 
characteristics are necessary for the possession of such capabilities. I will 
go on to argue that a positive relation exists between a system's architecture 
and its capability to behave or act in ways that can be classed as one of a 
number of mental states such as 'knowing', 'understanding' or 'believing'.
I shall look at the ways in which machine states and mental states have been 
examined using hierarchical stratifications for these can offer us some 
indication of the correlation that exists between simple systems and the low 
level actions of which they are capable, and the more sophisticated actions 
of which only progressively more complex systems are capable. However,
I shall put forward arguments to demonstrate that this is a feasible strategy 
when dealing with the innards of a machine but not for dealing with the 
innards of the mind.
Throughout the thesis I shall try to clarify the inexplicit or clouded notions 
of subjectivity and intentionality, for one of my aims is to demonstrate that 
the notions of subjectivity and awareness are more important than 
intentionality in the distinction between human and non-human systems.
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P reface
I will say here a few words in defence of my idiosyncratic use of certain 
words that will appear frequently in the following thesis.
To begin, I use 'organic' and 'inorganic' to distinguish between living or 
natural entities and those that are made artificially. My decision to do this is 
largely based on the amount of unnecessary trouble that I have seen other 
writers create for themselves when using 'machine' to cover all types of 
system. I think that even when 'machine' is used to describe biological 
systems, as Searle uses it, there is still the underlying connotation of 
something mechanical which is at best unhelpful if we are to maintain any 
distinction.
The second defence I will make concerns my use of the term 'system'. I use 
system' to describe any process that is not necessarily a living and 
breathing entity but which can exhibit similar behaviour; that is, to cover 
both organic and inorganic entities. For instance, in the wodr that follows I 
will be arguing that there are some machines, such as thermostats, that can 
react to changes in their environment, yet there are some lower order 
animals, such as sea-cucumbers, that behave in a similar manner; I will use 
the generic word 'system' to describe both types of entity.
XU
A lexicon
Analogue - A term adopted by Dretske to describe any and all informational input 
before any selection has been made and processing carried out
Analytic - By 'analytic' is meant that the concept of the predicate is contained in 
the concept of the subject as analysis of the terms would disclose.
Asymptote - A line that continually approaches a curve but never actually meets 
i t  Asymptotic is the adjectival form.
Command-line - An instruction typed in by the user, usually in a formal 
language, to direct the computer.
Conceptualisation - Dretske's term for the analysis of incoming information to 
form a concept from which knowledge is attained and beliefs formed about the 
world.
Contingent - Something that is 'contingent' may exist and also not exist, which 
is to say that for its existence it is empirically dependent upon the world being in a 
particular state at a particular time.
Database- A corpus of information stored in a computer which can be processed 
by the computer and information retrieved when required.
Digital - Another of Dretske's terms, this time referring to the focusing in on one 
specific object or event in the visual field from which the semantic content is then 
reached and extracted by the process of 'digitalisation'.
Nomic - A term adopted by Dretske to mean that which is dependent upon 
empirical laws that hold in the world.
Transition Graph - Most closely resembling a flowchart, consisting of labelled 
circles that represent 'states' and a series of arrowed lines that either loop or go on 
to another 'state' or circle. The input state is indicated by an input arrow and the 
final state by two concentric rings.
xm
1. Setting the scene
1.1 An introduction
In setting the scene I will attempt to justify my woik in three of the most pertinent 
areas: philosophy of mind, psychology/cognitive science and artificial intelligence. The 
issues that I shall be dealing with are not just contemporary ones, but matters about 
which there has been a great deal of controversy and debate for many decades.
In the philosophical areas of epistemology and the philosophy of mind scholars 
have been absorbed for centuries in disputation about the mind/body problem. A 
distinction between mind and body has been posited, disputed, withdrawn but never 
finally settled. It is a distinction that has found its way into Artificial Intelligence (AI) in 
the form of how physical systems can be described using mentalistic terms.
Specifically my concern is with the nature of the internal states of the system. Both 
the 'carbonists' and the 'siliconists' agree that mental properties exist and that they are 
the properties of physical systems. The distinction between carbonism and siliconism is 
simply that the former believe that only organic systems can possess mental properties, 
whilst the latter believe that these types of properties can be instantiated in mechanical 
systems. For the carbonist it is the fact that the organic system is composed of carbon 
molecules that is sufficient to set it apart from inorganic or mechanical systems. On the 
other hand, siliconism, or functionalism, states that anything that exhibits the 
appropriate 'understanding' behaviour can be said to "know' what is happening, and in 
this way there can be no real distinguishing features between organic and inorganic 
systems.
One of the main reasons for embarking on this work is that in AI there have been 
many attempts to simulate or reproduce mental states, whether in the von Neumann 
machines or the neural networks of connectionism; the positions have been staked out, 
weapons raised in anger, but the war has only just begun. Whatever position we decide
to adopt, any simulation of mental states will be sadly lacking if we have only an 
incoherent or 'half-baked' idea of what 'mental life' is all about
Because our picture of the brain or mind is incomplete it follows that our models 
will be lacking in some element or elements, that are essential. It is this area, this 
essential element that marks the difference between the simulation and the duplication 
of a mental state, which will be the subject of my work. What follows is intended to 
reduce the fuzziness that is notoriously associated with this area.
1.2. Mental life, mental states and intentional behaviour
In this section I shall offer a brief explanation of the central ideas that underlie the 
main body of the thesis. I will also set out the method that I intend to follow and what 
detailed work will be entailed in the attempt to reach my final proposed end.
One of the main objectives that first needs to be resolved is to create some sort of 
holistic view of what 'mental life' is considered to be. This is of the utmost importance 
since it is 'mental life' and in particular the mental action of organic systems that will 
count for at least half of the subject matter of the thesis.
One of the main problems with mental life is figuring out just what sorts of things 
go to make up the mental aspect of the system that is to be examined. Many things can 
be subsumed under the vague title of mental life; and most commonly we think of the 
ability to recall past events, having perceptual skills, solving problems, having ideas 
and being able to entertain abstract notions. For our purposes now we will be 
concentrating on particular mental occurrences within each of these vast areas. These 
occurrences have, perhaps somewhat unhelpfully, been described as 'mental states'. I 
say 'unhelpfully' because when the word 'state' is used there is a tendency to think of 
some sort of mode of existence, and, as I shall now explain the 'existence' that mental 
states manifest is a most unusual one.
To define the characteristics of a mental state is probably easier if I first say what it 
is noL Foremost, mental states are not objects or ostensible states of affairs; however, 
for their manifestation they do require a world of objects and events.
There are two definitions that I will look at in detail. The first is of mental states in 
terms of 'experience'. I am looking for a less interactive term than mental attitudes 
because the word 'attitudes' suggests that the system has processed its information to 
the extent of having formed an opinion about the world and itself in relation to that 
world and to have a mental attitude is to have a more active interaction with the world 
than I wish to demonstrate here.
What I want to claim is that it is possible to have mental experience without 
necessarily having any self-reference in that experience. For example, the experience 
had by X when it stands in a relation Y to events Z. So to have a mental experience of 
something simply requires that the system is in a set of circumstances, for example, 
where the weather is changeable and John has to venture outside then he might without 
much thought pick up an umbrella before he leaves his house. Quite simply his 
experience of looking out the window and observing inclement conditions urges him to 
carry protection against the elements. It was not necessary for him to go through all the 
mental states connected with that particular state of affairs. This kind of notionally 
interactive experience might be equated to running on 'auto pilot'.
The second definition I will turn to is one offered by Myles Brand in 'Intending and 
Acting' that states that all mental states or 'events' are characterised by mental attitudes 
for which there is some object. As he states "I take a mental attitude to be a mental event 
that has an objecL....The objects of mental attitudes, I will argue, are properties....That 
is, all attitudes....can be analyzed in terms of attitudes that take properties as their 
objects. All mental attitudes are reflexive, that is, all propositional attitudes, like 
"intendings are self-referential''.2
I will be arguing in a similar vein that a mental state becomes a mental state when a 
mentally active system, that is, one that is assumed to possess mental life, perceives 
itself to be in relation to events that are external to i t  In the language adopted by Brand 
a person attributes a property to something else when he attributes to himself the 
complex property of standing in a unique relation to that person or thing which has that 
property.
If mental states are the reflexive relation between the system and its environment, 
and the environment is continually changing, then the mental states possessed by the 
system must respond at a similar rate if it is to deal with the change successfully. This 
notion of changing mental states can be helped by further defining 'state' as that which 
is 'affected'. Being in a relation to changing events in the external world will affect the 
internal mental states and cause them to change. But it must be borne in mind that this is 
only one possible definition of mental state that uses reflexiveness as a property.
The agent or perceiver is the system with the mental state and the mental state can be 
of the form 'believes that', 'hopes that', 'longs for' or any similar phrase that describes 
a mental state. Terms such as these are classed as 'intentional' which means that they 
describe the intentional relation of an agent to some particular state of affairs. In 
Chapter 2, which is a critical review of some of the most pertinent literature, I will be 
examining intentionality in relation to a number of influential writers.
Intentionality is certainly one of the most significant mental properties that indicates 
a link between the system and its environment With the action that is consequent on 
intentional thought it can be assumed that the system has interpreted the information that 
it has coming in. This interpretation is called 'processing'. Processing of information 
and the occasion of action suggests that the system has had to do something more than 
just process the information. It has moved through a perceptual phase, an information 
processing stage, and on to some selected course of action.
1.2.1. Understanding and knowing - epistemic states
The selection of an action requires that the system be capable of manifesting some 
state that might be called 'epistemic'. It is a state that has been reached by having 
processed the information, 'understood' it to some degree and, on the basis of this 
Tcnowledge', either acted or formed a belief and used that new belief to reform its 
framework of interpretation for future use.
This is a complex procedure and the problems being addressed are difficult ones 
that would each by itself merit extensive discussion. This will be carried out, first in
brief, in sections of the literature review as an overall look at what other theorists have 
concluded count as mental states, and then in more detail throughout the third chapter 
with an examination of the notion of the ascription of mental states, and specifically 
'intentionality', to other human beings and other non-human systems.
The opening sections of chapter two examine mental states, mental acts and 
intentionality. This is followed by an examination of understanding as an instance of 
intentionality in relation to the works of Searle, and in particular with reference to the 
Chinese Room argument, after which I will take a more general look at what behaviour 
has to do with the possession of certain types of mental properties by a system.
Quite simply what Searle says is that it is not possible to understand symbols by 
virtue of their being symbols. In his Chinese Room Searle receives Chinese symbols 
but because he has no knowledge of Chinese he is unable to understand the symbols. 
He has, however, the capacity to match symbols to other symbols in the book and hand 
the matched symbols out of the room. Searle argues that this is not understanding even 
though there is still all the associated understanding behaviour: the symbols are matched 
correctly with other symbols and the appropriate response is elicited from the room. "A 
program merely manipulates symbols, whereas a brain attaches meaning to them."^
I agree with Searle, and I would also wish to argue that the exhibition of 
intentionality, in the form of understanding behaviour, is not a clear indication that the 
system Tcnows' what is happening in its environment. I shall set out arguments to 
demonstrate this. Briefly, then, what I am saying is that it is not possible to say what 
properties of the class of intentional behaviour are made known to us by that behaviour 
alone.
A closer examination of the possession of mental properties in relation to the 
exhibition of certain kinds of action might reveal that because it is not possible for us to 
look directly at mental states or mental attitudes we are left with the fact that the 
behaviour of a system is the only real indication of what properties a system might 
possess. As we shall see from the discussion of the recent work of Stanley 
RosensChein that although the type of 'knowing' he refers to is very basic it is still
suggestive of the inorganic system, being in possession of 'primitive epistemic states'.
I shall assess the validity of this claim in relation to other similar claim.
As mentioned above the functionalist response to my claim is that the right sort of 
'understanding' behaviour is all that is necessary for the machine to be said to 
understand. Using this tactic the ascription of epistemic states to inorganic systems 
ceases to be a problem and the success or failure of this strategy will be assessed 
critically. Involved in this will be an examination of the proposal that these terms have a 
metaphorical use in AI due to an over-extended use from organic to mechanical 
systems. If this is the case they have no place in the literature of AI that deals with 
inorganic systems.
1.2.2. Selectivity
Moving on from this another significant topic is the role that 'selection' plays in 
what a system is capable of doing. For instance, systems vary quite substantially from 
those that have no selective capabilities and which inhabit a fixed environment to those 
that can select the events in their environment that they will attend to and those that they 
will choose to ignore. To have selective capabilities of this sort the system has to be 
aware that it is part of a continually changing environment
To be able to select these events the system must be able to see itself in relation to 
those events and the possible advantages or disadvantages they will have for it  There 
must be some way in which the system can assign priorities to the information it 
receives and respond to it in the most appropriate manner that will maximise its own 
chances of survival.
1.2.3. Subjectivity
Another significant aspect of mental life is subjectivity, and two things come to 
mind that are important when first considering it. Firstly the subjective nature of the 
interpretation of incoming information; and secondly the subjective aspect that 
necessarily accompanies the action of the system. Once the role of subjectivity has been 
further clarified in relation to mental life it ought to be possible to evaluate to what
extent it is necessary for the adoption of an intentional stance towards objects in the 
environment It should also be possible to assess whether subjectivity is a necessary 
criterion for the possession of mental states, or whether it is a matter of the complexity 
of a particular type of mental state. For example, "knowing" might be a simpler mental 
state than "believing", and it might be that it is only when encountering the issue of 
belief, that the ability to interpret information subjectively becomes necessary before it 
is possible to move from "knowing that 'x'" to "believing that 'x'".
A problem that arises directly from this is whether or not the action of a system is a 
reliable source for the ascription of a particular mental state. There seems to be a leap of 
some kind between the action that takes place and the ascription of the 'state of mind' 
the system was in when the action took place. It is hard to assess what this missing link 
could be except perhaps some sort of interpretive process.
When addressing this question there are several other things that will have to be 
taken into account, such as whether or not the system is complex enough to occupy 
such a state or to be capable of deception, that is, that it might behave one way whilst 
concealing that it is occupying an inconsistent mental state. The behaviour is 
inconsistent with the mental state or intention that the system has - unless, of course, 
the systems intention was solely to deceive.
The issue of what behaviour is most advantageous to the system, and that some 
complex systems are capable of selecting the course of action that is most suitable to 
them, is an i%ue for both subjectivity and self-reference. In one sense we could be said 
to have come full circle to an indication of the advantages that subjectivity can offer a 
system.
I shall be arguing that subjectivity must exist for some reason and I shall examine 
the advantages that it offers the organic system over the mechanical one. These 
advantages can be both ecological and evolutionary. The emphasis at this stage will be 
on what in particular the complex system is offered by being in possession of a high- 
level of awareness that I will equate with self-consciousness.
There has been a great deal of discussion about self-consciousness but very little 
concise and quotable work has yet been produced. In my thesis I prefer to think of 
consciousness, and self-consciousness in particular, not as an 'on/off switch, that is 
applied to organic entities such as frogs, cats and human beings but not to televisions, 
plants and tea-cups, and more like something that can be applied to any system that 
occupies a higher level awareness. This requires that I clarify the notion of awareness, 
which will then permit me to relate different degrees of awareness to a range of 
functions that can be carried out by a system.
If we accept a notion of intentionality as being attributable to a variety of systems, 
and we realise the importance of subjectivity in the actions and potential actions of the 
system, then the most natural assumption to make is that the distinction between 
organic and inorganic systems resides in the fact that some organic systems are capable 
of possessing a high-level of intentionality, a high-level of awareness, that is self- 
consciousness, and a subjectivity with which it has the flexibility to respond to changes 
in its environment.
I will be arguing that subjectivity, in a way similar to self-consciousness, is a high 
level capability that requires not only that the system can be self-referencing, but also 
that it is self-aware, which when examined more closely may turn out to be a more 
complex notion than just being capable of reflexiveness. A related ability of which I 
will maintain a subjective system needs to be capable is the creation of symbols, the 
arbitrary assignment of meaning to those symbols and the use of those symbols in 
shared communication.
1.2.4. Intrinsic meaning
The arbitrary assignment of meaning to symbols is a much more complicated area 
that I will begin to look at by analysing what is entailed in the notion of 'intrinsicality' 
of meaning. The latter deals with the construction of symbols and whether their 
meaning is attributed by the designer of the system or simply intrinsic to them. In a 
more detailed argument I will argue against Hamad's claim that meaning can be
grounded in the sense data or sensory information of the symbol; and as a starting point 
my first argument will be that common sense alone suggests that the meaning of a 
symbol is something that is attributed to the symbol system since it will be constructed 
by a reflexive organism that uses symbols/ In brief my second argument against 
intrinsic meaning is that symbols are constructs and the semantics of a construct cannot 
be 'made' intrinsic; something is either intrinsic or it is not. If it is not intrinsic it is, per 
se, attributed. I shall also refer quite closely to Rosenschein's work on 'interpreted 
symbolic systems'. His work states that the interpretation of a program is dependent 
upon the designer attributing it; so that without the programmer the program would 
have no meaning.
1.3. An interim summary - "The central ideas"
To recapitulate, I have explained the need for more work in the area of possible 
mental properties of inorganic systems, and I have opened up the debate so that we can 
now look forward to the notions of philosophy, cognitive psychology and the recent 
work in AI being placed in an academic setting.
The next step is to ask what information is necessary for a more complete picture of 
mental life, since it is 'mental life' that AI, in particular, is interested in. The first 
prerequisite was that I take a careful look at what constitutes mental life. The conclusion 
was 'mental states' and the enquiry was then developed to an examination of the 
properties of those states. The most obvious next step was to define such states and 
then to relate them to the observable behaviour of the system.
In an attempt to do this successfully it is necessary to consider the organic system in 
totality, that is, to look at the importance of subjectivity in relation to two things; the 
first was how it sees itself in the environment it occupies with which it interacts, and 
the second was how being subjective allows the system to create and assign a meaning 
to the symbols it is to use. The aim is to show that it is a definite advantage for a system 
to be subjective, and that for complex cognition, that is, the sort of cognition we 
associate with the human system, a system also needs to be self-conscious, flexible
enough to select appropriate information, and create and assign a meaning to symbols, 
and then use those symbols to communicate in the form of a shared language. This last 
requirement is arguably the most important for it is only through the possession of it 
that any system would be at all capable of expressing its self-conscious capabilities and 
the subjectivity of its judgements.
1.4. Outline of the thesis
In this section I will set out briefly the procedure that I wül follow chapter by 
chapter. By this stage I hope that I have made clear the nature of the work that will 
follow and the conclusions at which I will be aiming to arrive.
The second chapter will be a review of the literature that is covered in this thesis and 
related texts that have been useful, if in some cases, only indirectly. As mentioned 
above the main concern of the review will be the nature of intentionality, the problems 
that surround it and its relation to the work that has been done with regard to other 
mental attitudes and properties.
In chapter three of the thesis I put forward the claim that the ascription of mental 
states to other systems is done by analogy with our own mental states. The only mental 
states of which we have any truly direct experience are our own and such experience is 
always subjective. No one but me can experience my mental states and I cannot directly 
experience those of anyone else except vicariously through their descriptions of them. 
Thus it is that the only states which any system experiences directly are its own states.
It is possible to ascribe mental states to other systems either linguistically or 
behaviourally. By linguistic ascription I mean using propositional attitude statements to 
describe X's behaviour, for example, that X  believes Y' or that X fears Y'. When 
ascribing mental states to another human being the person to whom the states are 
ascribed can offer corroboration or denial of the ascription by themselves using 
propositional attitude statements. The behavioural ascription of mental states takes 
place, often without the awareness of the ascribing system, when that system perceives 
that 'X' possesses a set of internal characteristics. It is a sort of 'poking and fiddling'
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approach, a brute physical enquiry by which we become aware of the internal state of 
the system.
One example that highlights differences in behavioural ascription is my different 
attitudes to a thermostat and a video recorder. By poking at a thermostat and looking 
inside it I will realise from its simple design that it has only a limited number of 
functions, but I will ascribe a much more complex set of behaviours to a video 
recorder, with all its buttons and its complex array of internal wiring, than I would a 
simple thermostat An example that concerns organic, but non-linguistic systems, 
would be that I might see a snarling dog at the end of a street that I wish to walk along 
and my apprehensive behaviour would act as a tacit ascription of anger to the dog and 
fear on my behalf. In both examples nothing has been expressed using language, and 
our behaviour is only based on what we perceive the state of the other system to be.
We usually ascribe mental states on the basis of consistent human-like behaviour, 
which is to say behaviour that is consistent with how we imagine that we would react 
were we in the context of the behaving system. (Because my states are the only ones to 
which I have access and they are examples of human mental states then the behaviour 
has to conform to my human behaviour.) Thus any system that behaves 'as-though' it 
possesses human mental states is often considered to have such states.
Why do we ascribe mental states to systems other than ourselves in the first place? 
Well we spend a great deal of time interacting with inorganic systems that can perform 
mental-like tasks, and ascribing mental states to them is a useful predictive tool that 
facilitates interaction and communication between them and us; that is, between human 
beings and what are perceived to be 'intelligent' systems. So that even if the system, 
whilst exhibiting signs of mentality, is still known to be inorganic, it is probably best, 
or at the very least useful, to behave towards it as one would towards a human being 
that is known to have a brain and a complex mental life.
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1.4.1. How does the issue of complexity relate to this?
In chapter four I relate complexity to the problem of ascription in three different 
ways; the first is that a system has to be of a fairly high degree of complexity for it to be 
capable of acting in a way that could 'persuade' us that it is sufficiently 'human-like' to 
be ascribed mental states; secondly, the process of ascription itself is complex one, 
whether it is being done linguistically or behaviourally; and thirdly, behaviour is a 
complex relation of architecture and environment, so that the internal design of the 
system and its environment afford the system a variety of capabilities, some of which 
are complex and others not so complex.
A subsidiary element of the first aspect of complexity is that if the ascription is 
made linguistically it must be made by systems that are capable of using language to 
form and express prepositional attitude statements. Systems such as this must be 
'symbolic' in the sense that they are capable of creating abstract symbols and 
subsequently assigning meaning to those symbols. I propose that the semantic 
interpretation of a symbol system cannot be made intrinsic to that system, and it follows 
from this that the meanings that the symbols possess depend entirely upon the choices 
made by the designer or programmer who is assigning their meaning.
1.4.2. The relationship between a system's architecture and its
capabilities
In chapter five using two already established examples I shall put forward evidence 
to show that a relationship holds between the capabilities that a system has [which are a 
function of its mental states] and its internal design or architecture. The first is a 
hierarchy that Chomsky constructed in 1959 to compare the variation in structure of 
four different machines with their related capabilities. One of the limitations of this 
work is that it only deals with machine states. In a more recent work Dretske (1981) 
does the same sort of thing, but this time with mental states. Both hierarchies are 
limited in their own ways; Chomsky's because it does not show that the same hierarchy 
can hold in the case of organic entities with mental states, and Dretske because he does 
not complete his hierarchy by suggesting systems that have capabilities that are
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comparable to his second level of intentionality. These limitations offer me the chance 
to produce a fuller description that relates both to organic and inorganic systems and 
also to mental and machine states.
Towards the end of the chapter I offer an explanation for why hierarchies such as 
Dretske's are bound to fail. For example, I argue that because we are dealing with 
fuzzy concepts, and I include all mental states in this category, it is mistaken to try to 
delineate them into discontinuous, discrete categories of one state or another. 
Chomsky's hierarchy is not in jeopardy in the same way because he is dealing with a 
straightforward set of machine states and tasks that can be described and set out in a 
finite number of discrete steps.
1.4.3. Advantages of cluster diagrams when examining mental states
Having argued in chapter five that hierarchies are not the most useful way of 
envisaging a relationship between a continuous set of mental states, I begin chapter six 
by proposing some alternative ways of exemplifying just such a set On offer are an 
assortment of cluster diagrams which might be used to express the overlapping nature 
of mental states and in which systems such states exist in some form or other. 
Diagrams of this sort are often used as taxonomic devices for decided the category of 
one species or another. One of the main points in this section is that no perfect set of 
axes exists within which we can define the nature of fuzzy or vague concepts; thus 
every graphical interpretation depends upon what is to be plotted and what it is to be 
measured against that appears on each axis.
Towards the end of the chapter I examine Sloman's most recent work which 
concentrates on design and the ‘design space' in which different architectures occupy 
different points. Sloman argues that for a system to be capable of different activities it 
would need to occupy different points in the design space. Thus for a system to be 
capable of more complex things it needs a more complex design space. For Sloman the 
human being has a very rich and complex design space and from this it can be inferred 
that it has also a rich and complex repertoire of possible behaviours. But being rich and
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complex is not sufficient for complex behaviour for in the design space we need also to 
look at what the system needs to sustain its existence in the environment it occupies. So 
how something is capable of doing what it does matters and not just that it can do it.
1.5. Conclusion
Bearing all of this in mind the thesis is concluded in chapter seven with a look at the 
advantages that the human system has over all other non-human systems. These 
advantages range over a great many ^ n g s  and I shall describe only the most significant 
in this present document One advantage is that the human system is the only one that 
can create and arbitrarily assign meaning to a set of symbols. A second is that from the 
wealth of incoming perceptual information the human system has the flexibility to select 
the piece that is most appropriate to it whilst ignoring or storing other pieces for future 
use.
A third and very important advantage that the human system possesses is to be 
capable of the subjective interpretation of its incoming information. This subjectivity is 
personal and infinite in nature, whether that infinity is of the human being's potential 
environment or of its forms of communication that can either be linguistic, as we have 
seen in the creation and use of formal symbol systems, or non-linguistic in the form of 
body language. That human beings are subjective in their judgements is more 
significant than their having intentionality for even plants, thermostats and moles can 
behave intentionally in their own ways. The plant, for instance, is heliotropic, geotropic 
and hydrotropic, and its process of homeostasis is like a control centre that directs the 
plant to its sources of nourishment.
This chapter is brought to a close with an examination of what sort of architectural 
requirements are necessary for such a highly developed and complex cognitive system 
to exist and behave in the ways that it does, and how it would be best to show that a 
system's capabilities are related to its architectural complexity and the extent of its 
perceptual domain. In its graphical form it is finally possible to show that the human 
system is the only system that can possess a state of 'full blown' self-conscious
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awareness, and that although lots of other systems can occupy states of varying levels 
of complexity, none, but the human, language using, system is capable of the full 
gamut of known mental states.
Endnotes:
 ^Brand, M (1984) Intending and Acting, MIT Press, p.85 
2 Ibid. p.92
 ^ Searle, J. (January 1^90) Scientific American, Vol 262, N o.l, p. 20 
 ^Here 'reflexive' is intended to mean the sort of system that can be self-referring.
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2. Literature review
2.1. Introduction
This chapter consists of a review of some of the literature, from a huge library of 
work, in the area of intentionality, mentality and mental states. My overall aim will be 
to address the problem of what counts as mental life and I will begin by examining 
wliat we consider mental states, in their variety, to be. This will bring me to an 
investigation of the difference between mental and physical acts, and how mental 
actions, such as intentionality, can be expressed using prepositional attitudes. From 
here I will introduce intentionality by examining the philosophical work of Brentano, 
which, although written in the last century, is still the subject of much inquiry today. A 
great many of his points, notably, the directedness toward the objects of intentional 
behaviour and the 'immanent objectivity' of the objects, the mind as a faculty of 
awareness and the human mind's capacity for reflexive awareness, have not been 
adequately resolved and these wiU be issues that arise throughout this chapter.
The questions that surround the notion of intentionality are of perennial importance 
for as Brentano, and later Pumam^ have said it is a problem that wül not be reduced to 
talk of functional states, nor will it just go away if it is confined to the realms of folk 
psychology. Those philosophers who side with eliminative materialism dismiss folk 
psychology as being unworthy to describe the natural world. With the advent of 
computers there was the hope that, through analogy with the functional states of a 
computer, the mental states of the mind, that is its intentionality, would be explained. 
However, the problem has remained with us.
There are two new hypotheses that arise in more contemporary work, one 
physicalist, that of Jerry Fodor's Language of Thought, and the other, the reductionist 
view of Daniel Dennett's Intentional Stance. Both of these are considered at length 
because they lead a way into the discussion of what criteria we generally expect for the 
ascription of intentional states to systems other than ourselves.
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I will also look at Husserl's work because of the importance he gives to both the 
context and experience of the system in its attitude or stance to the world. The relation 
of experience to understanding will then be extended to the question of how we see 
ourselves in our world as individual human systems; and from this I will proceed by 
looking at Searle's notion that the perception of the self in relation to a particular aspect 
of the world is of the utmost importance for any kind of understanding. Accompanying 
this is the notion that it is because we can see ourselves in the world, and in so doing 
are reflective, that makes the human system distinct from non-human systems.
I will go on to confront one of the central issues in this area: that of identifying the 
conditions under which we are likely to attribute mental states to other systems. I shall 
examine whether or not there is a way of grading mental states so that we might say that 
being capable of processing information requires a lower order mental state than 
actually knowing what information is being processed. I will then look at the 
circumstance under which some people have been willing to attribute mental states to 
machines, and following that I will examine a hierarchical stratification that Dretske has 
drawn up for differentiating between the intentional states of information processing, 
knowing and believing. Only in the third case, of believing, does Dretske admit that the 
system is capable of true understanding. At this stage with the concepts of mentality, 
intentionality and understanding under our belt I will move on to look at the Chinese 
Room argument and some of the responses that have been made to it; most notably by 
Paul and Patricia Churchland, by Steven Hamad and by Margaret Boden.
Throughout this chapter the notion that intentionality and mental state theorising is a 
fairly tangled web will not fail to come across; thus the next feasible step will be to look 
at intentionality in relation to Aaron Sloman's work on the complexity of the internal 
architecture of the system to which we are making a particular attribution. In this vein I 
will conclude the chapter with a look at the implications that the structure of a system's 
architecture has on its capability to exhibit a variety of actions.
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2.2. Mental states - an introduction
In the introductory chapter I was able to narrow the problem of mentality down to 
what have been variably described as 'mental states'. Of these states we know there to 
be a great number; some of which are significant only to the individual* some when 
considered in relation to other systems, whether organic or inorganic, and some only 
when interacting with another mental system. I will briefly analyse mental states as 
having two parts, one as experience and the other as reflexiveness. Or, more simply, 
the qualitative or experiential and the cognitive, such as having beliefs, knowing a fact 
and so on.
I shall consider here these two most prominent aspects of mental life and the 
question of which mental states are relevant to the abilities of the systems that have 
them. My overall proposal will be that the system that has the most obvious mental 
states, that is, that we assume to possess an active mental life, will also have the 
greatest capacity to act or behave. Thus the systems that I am mainly concerned with 
will be those that occupy the higher levels of the phylogenetic scale, and in particular 
those that exhibit what is usually described as 'intelligent' behaviour.
Descartes was writing in the seventeenth century about this problem and I will open 
up this discussion by looking at one of his most significant passages^; a passage that 
might even be read as 'a proto-refutation of the Turing test!',^
Descartes was certainly keen to contrast the essential human traits with those he 
considered 'merely mechanical'; indeed he did wonder "if there were machines which 
had a likeness to our bodies and imitated our actions, inasmuch as this were morally 
possible"^ would we be capable of telling them apart from 'real men'. He argues that 
for two reasons it would be impossible. The first is that "they could never use words or 
Other signs, composing them as we do to declare our thoughts to others".  ^and 
secondly, "although they (machines) might do many things as well as, or perhaps better 
than, any of us, they would fail, without doubt, in others, whereby one would discover
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that they did not act through knowledge, but simply through the disposition of their 
organs".^ It is certainly an interesting, and perhaps even prophetic, passage.
It is possible to infer from this excerpt that the difference between the merely 
mechanical and human beings is that the former is not in possession of mental states. I 
shall now look more carefully at what definition is attributed to mental states; what they 
are; how they are manifest and in what way they can be attributed to other systems. 
This will require an examination of how propositional attitudes are used to express the 
way in which a linguistic entity sees itself in relation to its world and an analysis and 
assessment of some of the recent work in Al/philosophy that deals with epistemic 
states, the manipulation of symbols and the creation and attribution of semantic content 
to symbols.
At this stage it is useful to point out that in this section the use of the terms 'mental 
life' and 'mental action' will be reserved for use solely in relation to organic systems. It 
is only later in the major body of the thesis that I will look at whether or not it might be 
justifiable to extend such notions to inorganic systems.
There are a great many reasons why mental states might strike the inquirer as 
unusual; for a start, although there has been a great deal written about them very little of 
this writing tends to be in any sort of agreement Then there is the difficulty 
surrounding the nature of a 'state' that has a content which cannot be isolated and 
specified. And finally, there is the problem with whether or not the content of the 
mental state is a concrete entity or something completely abstract. In this chapter I shall 
endeavour to straighten out some of these problems.
The first of these reasons can be easily dealt with by looking at the variety of 
writing that there has been and comparing them to identify instances of overlap and the 
areas over which there is most conflict To begin with I will briefly look at mental states 
and how they relate to what are commonly describe as 'mental acts'. Then I will 
examine what P.T. Geach says about mental acts and their relation to propositional 
attitudes and intentionality. In this explication 1 shall take for granted that the behaviour 
of the organism is both mental and physical, and I will adopt the Bishop/Dennett line
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that states that behaviour 'counts as action only if it is explicable in a special kind of 
way, namely, in terms of the agent's reasons for performing the behavior 
explained'(Bishop)2 or that we have what are described as intentional explanations 
(Dennett).*
Intentional explanations of behaviour offer the reasons behind a particular 
behaviour, that is, 'showing the point or meaning of what happens'^ rather than giving 
a scientific explanation in terms of natural laws and probability. An intentional 
explanation is what is required from the agent's point of view when we inquire about 
the reasons behind the actions of an individual. A scientific explanation is what we get 
when we look into the neurophysiology or brain states of the individual.
2.3. Mental and physical acts
By using examples it is possible to make a naïve distinction between mental and 
physical acts. For instance, what counts as a physical action will be something like 
raising your arm, running a hundred metres or going to the opera, whilst a mental 
action can be described as a thought, such as hoping, fearing or deciding. So then, just 
as raising my arm is the precedent to lifting something off a shelf that is above head 
height, so then the mental action of deciding to make a pot of tea for my guests is the 
antecedent to raising my arm so that I can lift the tea-pot down from its shelf.
A mental action can also elicit another mental action. For example, if Amy has the 
feeling of being embarrassed on encountering someone with a moody temperament and 
bad behaviour, she may consequently hope that their paths do not cross very often. In 
this latter case her former feelings, of embarrassment, inform her subsequent mental 
action, that is, to hope that she is fortunate enough not to see the person frequently. Her 
former mental action may also suggest a coincident physical course of action like going 
out of her way to avoid that person in future.
Bishop argues that we have a "coapplication of intentional and natural 
explanations" which means that events can be both agent and event caused. Our 
actions, both physical and mental, are problematic because from a naturalistic point of
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view we want to be able to understand our actions as determined by the agent. The 
action needs to be described as "agent-caused: as determined by an agent through an 
exercise of that agent's control".From  a scientific point of view our enquiries will 
yield reasons that explain something in terms of being 'event-caused.
The sorts of explanations that we are primarily interested in here are intentional or 
agent-caused; and what Bishop means when he presents something as being 
'coapplied' is that the action can have both an event and an agent caused explanation.
So that some natural events can be brought about by the determinism of the agent whilst 
also having a coexistent naturalistic or scientific explanation. Bishop explains that 
holding this opinion affords some difficulty because the naturalistic explanation sees all 
events as happenings but from our intentional position we want to see some events as 
doings. These 'doings' are actions that have an agent, and the agent has chosen or 
decided to do them. So what we have are actions, of one sort or another, that are 
related to the mental states of the organism in a number of ways. They can be related in 
an entirely physical manner, as our scientific explanation would maintain; or through an 
ethical relation of sorts that holds the agent to be morally responsible for his or her 
actions.
It may seem merely tautologous to say that logically our mental states exist prior to 
our mental acts but in fact this also gives us some new information, namely that there 
must be something contamed in the mental states that makes it possible for them to 
inform the mental acts. We might conclude from this that there are different sorts of 
mental action which are dependent upon the system manifesting a certain sort of mental 
state and from this we can infer that mental states are the precursors of mental acts and 
mental acts precede, perhaps even, herald mental or physical actions. It is to mental acts 
that I shall now look for further explication of these intricate notions.
2.3.1. Mental acts
Perhaps the clearest exposition of these issues is to be found in Geach's Mental 
Acts. In his first chapter, 'Act, Content, and Object' he deals briefly and succinctly
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with our two problematic areas. He describes 'content' as the "psychological 
character...of mental acts". And goes on to explain that such 'content' is "expressed by 
the use of psychological verbs, such as 'see', 'hear', 'hope', 'think'". To make 
grammatical sense each of these verbs requires a noun, or "grammatical object", and so 
he describes them as "object-expressions". However, in anticipation of possible future 
problems with the word "object" Geach drops its usage and talks solely in terms of 
"object-expressions". He says that "such-and-such object-expressions are used in 
describing these mental acts; what is the logical role of these expressions?". The 
'logical role' that such expressions play is to avoid making spurious references to 
objects or events that are believed to be actual or physical, when they in fact belong to 
that category of events we describe as being 'mental' or 'abstract' and which have no 
necessary existence in the sense of being physically out there'.
Although Geach is talking specifically of 'mental acts' and not, as I am doing, 
'mental states' his definitions are nonetheless helpful, for a mental act will require that 
the organism has some particular mental states and these states must have both a content 
and an object of sorts. If we reverse the temis 'act' and 'state' the statement will still 
remain true, for being in possession of a mental state will require that the organism is 
acting mentally toward some 'object', whether the 'object' is 'in the mind' or 'in the 
world'.
The mental action being referred to is the intention to commit some action, and it is 
important to point out that this action can also be to ignore or store for later that 
incoming information which is not immediately pertinent 'Intention' in this sense 
relates to the system's will to act, although the action that succeeds the intention may be 
a mental action and not an actual physical action. The area is now open to a discussion 
of 'intentionality' and how a system sees itself in relation to its world. In turn this 
discussion leads to an examination of the selective capability exhibited by a system 
when it chooses those pieces of information in its environment to which it ought to 
respond.
22
2.4. Intentionality and propositional attitudes - how they are related
So that this section can be begun with a broad idea about what is to be discussed I 
will refer to the four most frequently stated examples of what counts as intentionality: 
"(1) the fact that words, sentences, and other "representations" have meaning, for 
example, our words have meaning because we ascribe meaning to them and we then go 
on to use those words in consistently meaningful ways within a linguistic community 
that shares our understanding; (2) the fact that representations may refer to (be true of) 
some actually existing thing or each of a number of actually existing things, for 
example that I want someone to answer a ringing telephone; (3) the fact that 
representations may be about something which does not exist, for example dreaming 
about winning the Derby on the back of a unicorn; and (4) the fact that a state of mind 
may have a "state of affairs" as its object". Examples of the fourth type of intentionality 
would be "Ann believes that her friend is unhappy in her job" or "Arthur hopes that one 
day he will get a mortgage". 2^
Intentional states are described using propositional attitude statements, which 
contain what Geach describes as "psychological verbs".Through statements of this 
type the individual shows itself to be in an expressible relation to the world. (It is 
arguable whether all relations between a subject with linguistic capabilities and an object 
are expressible in language, but this is not a question that I wish to enter into at 
present.)
Any judgement or desire we form will have to be expressed in a proposition with a 
predicate and what Geach calls an 'affair complex' which is representative of the 
relation between the subject and the object. An example would be "I believe that 'x'", 
where the affair-complex is my holding the belief that 'x'. It is this 'affair complex', 
this 'relation' or 'propositional attitude' with which I am primarily concerned here. That 
a system is capable of being reflexive is taken as a provisional requirement or 
fundamental premise of its being able to have propositional attitudes.
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This idea of the affair relation between the subject and the object is by no means 
new, Brentano, and many others both before and after him, have talked of the 
importance of the relation in intentional action. I shall briefly outline and address the 
main themes in Brentano's work and this will open up the arena for a comprehensive 
discussion in relation to the points identified his work.
2.4.1. Brentano’s intentionality
In Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874) Brentano claims that there are 
two sorts of phenomena, 'physical' and 'psychical'. A distinguishing feature of 
psychical phenomena is that they are always directed towards something. This 
'directedness' is another way of describing the action of intentionality. Such acts are 
recognised, with reference to the affair complex above, by removal of the object- 
expression which renders the verb nonsensical. For instance, a wish is nothing without 
there being something to wish for, nor can I have just a hope with nothing as the goal 
of that hope.
However, an important point to note is that it is the relational activity which is a 
mental or psychical phenomena that is important and not the actual relation between the 
mind and an object, since that would entail the necessary existence of the object.
Having mental directedness does not mean that the object of thought has physical 
existence. I can, for example, wish upon a star or wish a friend a successful and happy 
life.
So the focus is on the mental experience of the intentional object and such objects 
have what Brentano describes as 'immanent objectivity' or 'intentional inexistence'.
The upshot of this is that when I wish for something there is an object whether physical 
or psychical that is in effect 'out there' that corresponds to my wish. Such objects have 
a special ontological status all of their own; that is, only they can be directed towards a 
goal or end that may or may not exist Naturally the same can be said about the 
ontology of every object of propositional attitude statements since they express 
intentional relations.
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Mental acts always refer to something and the mind, as a faculty of awareness, has 
the capacity to make judgements and have hopes, beliefs, fears and so on about these 
things. Thus it is a necessary feature of awareness that it always be about something. 
This aboutness' or 'immanent objectivity* can be thought of as the presence of an 
object to an aware subject, where the subject and the object are in an intentional 
relation.
Brentano distinguishes three types of these intentional relations. The first is when 
'x' is present in my consciousness, that is, when I am only thinking about i t  This he 
calls Vorstellmgen (ideas, thoughts or mental presentations). The second relation is 
that of judgements about 'x', an example of which would be 1 believe that all humans 
are bipedal'. And the third relation is that of choosing to pursue or avoid 'x'. In this last 
relation an element of selectivity is present.
I find it difficult to accept these three relations as being entirely distinct. To begin 
with I believe that the second and third naturally rely on the first since it is not possible 
to choose to attend to something unless it is first present to mind. So the first relation is 
assumed by the other two. I also maintain that the third distinction collapses into the 
second because when choosing to respond in a certain way to an intentional object one 
is also, by definition, making a judgement about it  If I judge that a particular action is 
morally correct and I want to live a good life then I will most likely try to pursue that 
course of action. So the judgement seems to be all inclusive.
The difficulties that I have outlined against his three distinct types of intentional 
relation do not detract in any great way from the essential points that are being made. 
Firstly, Brentano has brought to mind the problems about the ontology of intentional 
objects, and he has emphasised the importance of the intentional relation between the 
subject and the intended object. Secondly, and following the philosophy of Kant, is 
that the mind is a faculty of awareness. And, by making the distinctions that Brentano 
does an important point is brought to light concerning the capability of a system with a 
faculty of awareness to exercise its own volition and select the objects it wishes to 
pursue or avoid.
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So 'physical' and 'psychical' phenomena and the objects of 'psychical' phenomena 
have a special ontology. Thirdly there exists relational activity between the subject and 
its intentional object(s). Fourthly there is a directedness toward the objects of 
intentional behaviour which gives the objects an 'aboutness' or 'immanent objectivity'; 
this point could very well constitute part of the second point. Brentano's view of 
intentionality is an "in-the-head" relational view. For it is only through the faculty of 
understanding, that is itself only possible through consciousness, that an 'immanent 
object' is formed. As a result these objects being "in-the-head" only have an intentional 
existence; therefore, they are in esse.
The fifth point is that the mind is a faculty of awareness and I would like to extend 
this to say that the human mind is capable of a reflexive awareness which is unlike that 
which is possessed in any other system, organic or otherwise. This is going to be the 
line that I shall argue in my thesis.
I will now use these issues as sub-headings under which I will introduce more 
contemporary work that is related to the problems of intentionality, mental states, 
rationality, subjectivity and context dependency.
2.4.2. Brand's intentionality: The relation of the mind to its objects
In his Mental Action Theory Myles Brand holds a view similar to that of 
B rentano.It is a theory concerning the relational activity of the mind to its objects and 
in it he states that the mental antecedent of action includes a number of mental states, 
'believing' and 'wanting' to name just two. The one he says that approximates most 
closely to the cause of the action is 'intending'. Having the intention to act is much 
more determined than just wishing or hoping for the intention to act It means that the 
system is now disposed to act, and it is that disposition that makes it possible to get 
over the hurdle that separates action from inaction.
Propositional attitudes can be thought of as the mental attitudes that are associated 
with the system having particular mental states. The ontology of the objects of such 
attitudes is ambiguous by nature as we have already seen in Brentano, but Brand
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overcomes this difficulty by describing the objects of such attitudes as 'properties’. 
This is slightly different from the conventional sense of 'object' and 'property' when a 
property is something that is ascribed or belongs to a physical object In Brand's sense 
it is possible to analyse any of my attitudes in terms of the propositional attitudes that 
take 'properties' as objects.
This is a fairly robust notion, capable of incorporating the complex relations 
between propositional attitudes, mental attitudes, their objects and properties; it also 
allows different types of attitude to be directed towards the same object, and for the 
same attitude to be adopted towards many different objects. These relations are very 
complex but it is possible to see that Brand means that one only attributes a property to 
something when one can first attribute to oneself the position of being in a unique 
relation to the state of affairs which has that property.
2.4.3. Fodor's intentionality: Language of thought
The relational aspect of the affair complex is also of importance to Jerry Fodor. In 
chapter seven of Representations he argues for propositional attitudes "as relations 
between organisms and internal representations". He claims that his view is "probably 
true" because it is both "plausible a priori" and "what's demanded ex post facto". B ut, 
I believe he would also argue that his view is a common-sense one for it is capable of 
explaining a great deal more than any of the other theories that exist to date.
His view is a physicalist one which correlates the mind with the brain so that any 
description of intentionality can be examined by an investigation of the human cognitive 
faculty. The brain has a 'language of thought' in which the intentional state is encoded, 
which means that the cognitive function of the intentional state is literally an encoded 
propositional attitude statement. The brain is a 'semantic engine driven by intentional 
states', so that our beliefs, desires, suppositions and so on can be said to be real 
features of our brains.
In the head there is what counts as first order intentionality since it is the encoded 
propositional attitude, a feature of the brain. Using language to create and utter
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propositional attitude statements is to have second order intentionality and such second 
order intentionality reflects or represents the actual brain states that we have. In this 
way I can think of events that might occur by having representations in my head of 
actual intentional states. All of this is possible, according to Fodor, because of our 
language of thought or 'mentalese' within which the propositional attitudes have their 
first representation. Any single propositional attitude can be applied to a variety of 
situations. For instance, I can say I believe that it is cold outside' on many different 
occasions, and my meaning may vary a little, but the intentional states I have are 
essentially the same. It is only with processing that the propositional attitude becomes 
shaped for a specific circumstance and no other.
It is our brain states that represent and it is these internal representations that are of 
greatest concern in any psychological explanation of human behaviour. The 
representations talked of are those of intentionality or propositional attitudes, and it 
follows that intentionality must be a feature of our brains that has its existence in mental 
states. Fodor has no time for the phenomenology of Brentano that proposed 'immanent 
objectivity’ for the objects of propositional attitudes and what he offers instead is a 
computational or representational theory of mind with 'mentalese' as a descriptive 
language. It states that any propositional attitude is a computational relation between the 
system and its internal representational system. The information being represented is 
the object to which the propositional attitude refers. It is the information or collection of 
mental states that is the 'mentalese'.
It is important to note that in his theory Fodor explains that mental states are related 
causally because of the system's capability both to represent and to process 
information. However, he also states that the brain is capable of operating on both a 
causal and an intentional level; but to explain this I shall have to say a little about his 
conceptual and perceptual learning hypotheses.
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Conceptual hypothesis
To understand and extrapolate from one concept to another, that is, the formation 
and confirmation of new concepts, the system needs to be capable of extracting the 
essential features of the concept and re-apply them to further instances of the concept A 
significant part of this theory is that we use language to talk about our concepts. This is 
an idea very similar to the 'family resemblances' talked about by Wittgenstein in the 
Philosophical Investigations, except that Wittgenstein does not talk of essential 
features, but rather, shared commonalities.
Wittgenstein says that the only way that we can recognise something as an instance 
of one thing and not of another is if we can recognise the features they have in 
common, that is, the ways in which they are similar. This idea prompted him to think 
of a family group and the way that members of the family resemble one another in 
physical features and idiosyncratic behaviours. It is certainly the case that people say of 
a baby that she has her mother's eyes, or his grandfather's smile and so on; and it is in 
just such a way that we learn the concept 'book' or 'cat' or any number of things.
P erceptual hypothesis
Fodor says that we learn about distal objects through an interpretation that is based 
on a complex of proximal stimulations that we receive through our sense organs and 
that we build up our perceptual data through such continuing experience. It is different 
in a significant way from conceptual data because it is not linguistic. It might be said to 
be conscious, or experiential, but not self-conscious or cognitive, in the two senses of 
mental states that I have defined earlier.
The capacity to learn perceptually, being non-linguistic, can be shared by both 
human and non-human animals. But, concept learning is linguistic and for that reason it 
is something for which only humans have the capacity; at least according to both Fodor 
and Kant The shared nature of perceptual learning, through the common feature that 
the human and non-human animals share of being representational systems, ought to 
emphasise that the language of thought is not simply an internal natural language. In
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general the brain is perceptual and the difference between human and non-human 
systems is that non-human systems are only capable of perceptual learning, whilst 
human systems are capable of perceptud learning and also of the language of thought
According to Fodor such languages have to be, in some sense, innate for "One 
cannot learn a language unless one has a language". Here Fodor is following in the 
rationalist tradition often associated with Chomsky for Chomsky claims that different 
languages use the same formal operations, 'universal grammar', for the generation of 
'well-formed' sentences. To make this possible he states that all children have to be 
'endowed with an innate capacity' to use the universal grammar that makes it possible 
for them to learn the language of their environment. Fodor says essentially the same 
thing when he says that to leam a language requires that we have a prior capacity to 
grasp the formal operations needed in order to use a natural language. The difference 
between his view and Chomsky's is that Fodor stipulates that we have at least two 
languages already 'wired in': namely the language of thought and the perceptual 
language that allows us to interpret raw sensory information.
Fodor makes use of a computer analogy
The machine's internal language is a private language, but a programming language 
is a public language for it is the language with which the programmer communicates 
with the computer. For the 'innate' component Fodor offers the machine language 
compiler which gives the computer the capability to interpret the rules and functions of 
the programming language. Fodor then goes on to equate the compiler with the human 
representational system that is present in each potential language user. But this 
argument seems all too easy and I find myself puzzled about such an analogy that freely 
compares the human cognitive capacity, that we know all too little about, with the 
computer's capability to follow rules that it has been given and which cannot after all be 
'innate'. Something fundamental seems to be missing and, I would argue, it is the 
element of understanding that is talked of everywhere from Frege to Searle. Human 
systems are capable of understanding the reasons for their actions and when acting
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consciously they are capable of 'grasping' meanings and applying them abstractly, 
something I think Fodor's computer would find impossible to do.
That Fodor's attitudes have been equated with the theories behind 'folk 
psychology' is due to his maintenance that the actions of the individual can be explained 
by reference to his or her beliefs. From this claim it is reasonable to expect that Fodor 
would also believe that all behaviour can be explained in terms of the totality of the 
individual's propositional attitudes. But once again, there is something missing for 
nowhere does Fodor talk of the consciousness of the organic system. Perhaps then 
Fodor would wish to conclude that the totality of propositional attitudes would be 
enough to explain our conscious behaviour, and if this is so would Fodor also wish to 
accept that the totality of propositional attitudes can also explain our self-conscious 
behaviour? I suggest that he would not for this is a very tall order and not one that he 
can hope to fulfil by simply examining the individual's 'language of thought'. Indeed 
he would encounter a new set of difficulties when he would come to explain the sort of 
animal consciousness that gives all the indications of being reflexive, for which there 
can be no recourse to a 'language of thought'.
2.4.4. Dennett's intentionality: The intentional stance
In this same area, but in contrast with the work of Fodor and Chomsky, Dennett 
has proposed the adoption of the Intentional Stance. This is certainly one of the most 
interesting theories to be proposed in recent years. Very broadly the claim he is making 
is similar to Brentano's in the sense that intentional states are relational but they are not 
'in-the-head' relational in the way that Fodor would argue.
Dennett takes this view a step further and adds that by adopting an instrumentalist 
approach to intentionality, which claims that the behaviour of a system can be 
explained, predicted and controlled solely by the ascription to it of beliefs, goals and 
rationality, one can also ascribe intentionality to systems that are not organic. When 
taken to its logical conclusion this stance permits us to describe some already existing 
computer programs as intentional systems; for anything that can have its behaviour
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predicted by attributing to it both propositional attitudes and rationality, is, per se, an 
'intentional system'.
When manifesting a mental state, that can be described using a specific 
propositional attitude, the sentence or statement of the propositional attitude is not 
somewhere embedded or represented in processes that are in our heads. Beliefs are 
mental attributions that we apply to the propositional attitudes that we use as 
descriptions of states of affairs that we encounter in our interaction with our worlds. 
They are, very simply, abstract notions that we use for predicting the behaviour of 
other organisms and systems that surround us. Dennett's view is a non-reductionist 
account that does not require that propositional attitude notions be reducible to anything 
that can be stated in physicalist or functionalist language. Because of this he fails to 
look at the nature, ontology and causal powers of propositional attitudes. Nevertheless 
it is still a valuable basis from which to begin an examination of propositional attitudes 
and intentionality.
Like Fodor* Dennett makes use of a computer analogy
In Btcdnstûrms Dennett offers a view of extreme functionalism where he states that 
the mind is to the brain as the software of the computer is to its hardware; and so that 
we are in no doubt about his position in this 'battle' he says on page one of chapter 
one. The Intentional Stance, "the brain (which, after all, is the mind)". But the 
computer analogy is not one that Dennett welcomes with open arms for he goes on to 
argue that it is really most unlikely that every human being will share an identical 
"evolutionally-produced program". Clearly, Dennett believes that an objective account 
of both intentionality and consciousness is possible for he asserts a desire for a 
demystification of such notions. This is a view that directly opposes that of Thomas 
Nagel, who states that 'the particular point of view, or type of point of view' is an 
absolute necessity if we are seeking a full account of reality.
It is certainly practical to admit the internal functional states of humans but it is not 
in our best interests, at least according to Dennett, to imagine that a one-to-one
32
correspondence exists between the described state and the mental process or brain state. 
By implication it is easy to link the actions of the individual with his or her brain states, 
but it is not yet possible for us to have any direct empirical evidence of the actual brain 
state at the moment of being in a mental state of having for example, a belief, hope or 
desire.
The convenience of propositional attitude attribution
The sort of functionalism proposed by Dennett allows for the attribution of the same 
belief state to more than one person because the attribution is not done on a 
neurophysiological basis, but rather on a basis of the observation of behaviour in 
relation to a set of events in the world. So from the observation of perceptual input and 
behavioural output it is possible to describe a person as being in a certain state or states 
of mind. In this way it is merely a descriptive convenience for us to attribute mental 
functions like propositional attitudes.
Viewing objects external to us, both organic and inorganic, as having propositional 
attitudes is convenient since it is just an extension of how we deal with our own 
interaction with the world. When I examine my own relation with my world it is 
through my mental model of my environment and my interaction therein; I build plans 
for the future by relating this model to my beliefs, hopes and desires and combining 
this view with a rational approach to what is realistically possible.
The attribution of propositional attitudes is done by observing the perceptual input 
of the system in a particular environment and combining this with the mental states we 
believe it to have. By then associating this with the assumed rationality of the system it 
should be possible to predict its behaviour. Such a stance can be adopted towards non­
human animals, and even towards inorganic systems, and still be seen to woik. For 
instance, it is possible to anticipate the future behaviour of an animal by watching it 
interact with its environment and relating this to its previous action in similar 
circumstances.
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A disposition to rational behaviour
This is a theory that Dennett describes as "holistic logical b e h a v i o u r i s m ^11 the 
intentional language we use is replete with information about the system, its perceived 
relation to the world and the predicted behaviour of that system. It is true to say that 
when an identical piece of information is received by different people it is received and 
processed in many distinct ways so that each interpretation is going to be unique. The 
commonality between each person with that belief is that they will exhibit predictable 
and rational behavioural dispositions. So what we are, in effect, doing is classifying 
systems in accordance with their exhibited disposition for rational behaviour. This, in 
turn, allows us to conform to objective regularities that can be described using 
extensional language whilst avoiding the snags and pitfalls of an intentional language.
In Brainstorms Dennett tells us that by adopting the intentional stance towards 
the objects in our world we are taking, at the very least, the "pragmatic" option. For, as 
he so often reminds us, it is only through such a stance that we can continue to make 
reliable judgements about the prospective action of the things with which we interact. 
The justification for this theory seems simply to be that it happens to work. If we 
choose not to adopt the stance we will be in a continual state of flux because so much of 
our action depends upon the action we think others will take. We would no longer be 
able to plan our actions in accordance with that of other organisms. In the words of 
Thomas Hobbes our lives would be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short" !
To adopt the 'intentional stance', then, is to accept a strategy for attributing 
propositional attitudes to a system and predicting that system's behaviour depending on 
what it would be rational for that agent to do given his or her propositional attitudes.
The system can be organic or inorganic, and as long as its future performance can be 
predicted, and thus explained, it counts as an intentional system.
The influence of folk psychology and folk physics
There are two areas to which we look for an account of our world, namely: folk 
psychology and folk physics. Although Dennett would want to argue that our mental
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States do not have a determinate content, (contrary to both Searle and Dretske), that is 
that we do not possess "intrinsic intentionality "20 or a determinate thought-content, he 
acquiesces in the view that elements of both accounts may be innate. However, he still 
maintains that for the most part they will be learned through experience. Having found 
that there are areas of folk physics that are counter-intuitive it can hardly be beyond our 
comprehension that some areas of folk psychology might be vulnerable to further 
empirical research.
The attribution of belief can be objective or subjective. The latter, an 
interpretationist account, is open to cultural influence and therefore more problematic 
than the former, realist account In Fodor we can see an example of the realist point of 
view for he states that beliefs are objective things in the head and in principle such 
states can be identified by physiological psychology. The interpretationist account 
views the attribution of belief states as being controversial in the same way that one 
would think it contentious to assert that some individual was deceitful.
Dennett attempts to meld both positions by claiming that although belief is an 
objective phenomenon it can be better understood by adopting the interpretationist's 
predictive strategy, the intentional stance. Anything that can be said to have beliefs, and 
be described as a true believer, is, in Dennett's opinion, an intentional system. To adopt 
the intentional stance one must first treat the system whose behaviour is to be predicted 
as a rational agent Given that the system is in the world and that it will want to further 
its goals, by adding the attribute of rationality it should be possible to predict its 
actions. If we simply work from a folk psychologist premise it is possible to extend the 
notion of rationality to other systems if we observe enough of their input and output 
states and compare their interactions in the world with our own rational behaviour in 
similar circumstances. By adopting the intentional stance it is possible to attribute 
propositional attitudes to systems other than ourselves on the very same basis.
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Propositional attitude psychology is troublesome
Because Dennett attempts to draw objective and subjective attribution together we 
can conclude two things: 1) there is no unified, reliable view of propositions and 
propositional attitudes, and 2) language-of-thought psychology yields no worthwhile . 
results. I would like now to say a little more about both these in the light of Dennett's 
proposed notional attitude psychology.
In chapter 5 of The Intentional Stance, 'Beyond Belief, Dennett tries to do away 
with the whole troublesome area of propositional attitude psychology. Propositional 
attitudes can be analysed into three variable components; "X [subject] believes [attitude] 
that p  [proposition]". When enquiring into the nature of the proposition we find that 
three quite distinct views are held. The first says that propositions are like sentences, 
that is, symbols that are held together in a syntactical form. The second view claims that 
propositions are just sets of possible worlds and the third states that propositions are 
ordered sets of objects and properties in the world.
That three views exist is a mark of the number and complexity of conditions that 
they are required to meet. Propositions have to be bearers of truth-value, so that we can 
say of something that it is a true or false statement Next they have to fit the 
requirements of an intensional language, that is, that they have to be able to cope with 
referential opacity;^! and finally they have to have a 'graspable' meaning.
Dennett argues that in the light of the work of people such as Kaplan, Perry,
Putnam and Stich, it is not possible to fulfil all three of these conditions at any one 
time. In the face of such opposition the only retreat would seem to be into sentential 
attitude psychology, which is a language-of-thought hypothesis. Dennett describes four 
approaches that lead to just such an hypothesis.
The first is that sentences 'in the head' are in some sense physically "grasped" 
when we think of an abstract proposition. Secondly, sentences about objects must be 
composed of symbols that represent these objects since they cannot be composed of the 
objects themselves. The third approach is that whatever the sentences are in our heads
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they must be able to account for the problems posed by referential opacity. Lastly, of 
sentences having content and syntax, sentences in the head are supposed to have 
syntax.
By following these four approaches the hope is that more can be learnt about 
whatever prepositional attitudes are held by the system. However, the theory runs into 
a number of problems. To begin with, and as mentioned above, it is more than doubtful 
that any two people could ever have the same language-of-thought^z, and it is therefore 
very unlikely that any two people coiild have precisely the same beliefs. With this in 
mind it is clear that sentential attitude psychology is trying to distinguish too precisely 
between different psychological states. The next problem is that it is already 
presupposing that it is possible to access the syntax of propositional attitudes before 
being able to know their 'semantic' properties. A final criticism is that it assumes that it 
is possible to put semantics into a verbal form and this may turn out not to be the case 
even when we have more information available.
Between the 'language of thought' and the environment
Dennett puts forward a 'coping' strategy that is intermediate between the language- 
of-thought and the external environment of the organism. It is called notional attitude 
psychology and it is not constrained by any hypothesis about internal representations or 
where such representations (if they were to exist) would be located. Notional attitudes 
are the constituents of the system's "notional world"; and the notional world is the 
world at that time and that place that the organism is best equipped to deal with. This 
theory offers one noticeable advantage; namely, were I substituted for a person identical 
to me in a world identical to my present one, then I would possess all the relevant belief 
states without having had any interaction in the "Twin Earth". This eases a small 
proportion of the problems associated with possible worlds. The other advantage this 
theory has is that it does bring to light the difficulties associated with adopting the 
reductionist language-of-thought hypothesis.
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A similar notion can be seen in the "bracketing o ff feature of Husserl's work in 
phenomenology and the phenomenological reduction (1931) - see next section, 2.4.5., 
also in Quine's theory of the indeterminacy of radical translation (1960) and in more 
recent work by Searle on "Aspectual Shape" (1990).
2.4.5. Husserl's intentionality: Our experience is what matters
Initially, Husserl would say that we are aware that the world is 'spread out in 
space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time'.^ Simply said, the 
world and everything we perceive is out there whether we choose to attend to it or not. 
We have, what Husserl describes as, a "natural attitude" which enables us to observe 
our world, have feelings with regard to our world, to make judgements about our 
world and to resolve to act in relation to our world. "Moreover, this world is there for 
me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of 
objects with values, a world o f goods, a practical world'.
Spatially most of my world remains within an area of indeterminacy, a bit like my 
peripheral vision; "my indeterminate surroundings are infinite, the misty and never fully 
determinable horizon is necessarily there". So too with my temporal perception; "this 
world, has its two-sidedly infinite temporal horizon, its known and unknown, 
immediately living and lifeless past and future".^ My natural attitude in the world 
permits me to "change my standpoint in space and time, turn my regard in this or that 
direction, forwards or backwards in time; I can always obtain new perceptions and 
presentiations, more or less clear and more or less rich in content, or else more or less 
clear images in which I illustrate to myself intuitionally what is possible or likely within 
the fixed forms of a spatial and temporal w o r ld " .^ ^
This section alone portrays the whole richness of the human mental ability, for in it 
we can recognise many of our higher cognitive abilities. The individual has a 
continuous array of perceptual inputs that are its source of new information, from 
which it can select the most important things for immediate attention, and with
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consideration of past events through a richness of mental representations, decide what 
future action would be to its advantage.
The world is continually present for me, even when I focus on some abstract 
concept like mathematics or logic. My standpoint to the world is then a logical or 
mathematical one and the background to my consciousness of mathematics is my 
natural attitude to the world. I am said to be in an 'arithmetical' or logical' attitude. 
Being capable of a phenomenological reduction means that a complex system can 
bracket off sections of its world in favour of emphasising other more abstract 
interpretational stances.
I think a word or two ought to be said here about 'bracketing' for it is a complex 
term used by Husserl in the philosophical context of the 'phenomenological reduction' 
and not one that is immediately clear. The best analogy I can think of is with 
parentheses. If I read a sentence from a paragraph and within that sentence there is a set 
of parentheses, I wiU first read the sentence for its meaning by ignoring the information 
that is in the parentheses. When I feel that I have a complete understanding of the 
sentence I will go back and read the sentence again this time incorporating the 
information that is inside the brackets. On the first reading I will have 'bracketed off 
information that is not immediately necessary for an understanding of the sentence. By 
the time I have made a second reading I will have understood the information contained 
in the first sentence and also the non-essential information that was enclosed in the 
brackets.
This example corresponds well to Husserl's meaning of 'bracketing', for what we 
have done in our sentence is select the information that is of immediate interest to us 
and ignore the non-essential or superfluous information stored in the brackets; and what 
Husserl suggests we do in our perceptual environment is select the information that is 
immediately relevant to our situation, attend to it, and 'bracket off or ignore the 
information from our environment that is unnecessary to us at that moment So when 
working with logic or mathematics my experience is structured with the abstract world 
coming to the fore and the natural world receding into the background. Both worlds are
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related to the ego or consciousness whilst still somehow being distinct entities. There is 
an element of choice now evident in choosing what I will or will not attend to from my 
perceptual information.
This type of experiential structure is essentially the same for everyone. But the 
element that will change is the content of our experience that will vary from person to 
person. The one bit that is common to everyone is the objective spatio-temporal world 
to which we belong, that is, our 'natural standpoint' of phenomena or physical things. 
The area of personal experience is the individual's private perceptions.
By bracketing off the belief we have in the totality of objects and events and instead 
concentrating on the private, inner or 'noumenal' experience we have of them we are 
performing what Husserl describes as the 'phenomenological reduction'. We literally 
reduce our world of phenomena until we reach our subjective experience of particular 
phenomena. Things in the world still exist but we consciously refrain from making 
judgements about them. In the sense explained above, we 'parenthesize' phenomena in 
the world and look instead at our experience of the relation between us and the world.
The next step is to try and describe this process of experiencing and look at what 
sorts of structures are left outside the 'brackets'. Structures of this sort, our 
experiences, are called the 'forms of consciousness' and it is only through them that 
mental experiences are possible. A most important point is that these experiences are 
not just of other objects and states of affairs, but also of the personal 'transcendent 
ego'\ the so-called 'Archimedean point'. Such pure consciousness is arrived at after 
bracketing when the phenomenological reduction is complete.
Intentionality as a principal theme of phenomenology
Intentionality is the general theme of 'objectively ', or object-oriented 
phenomenology. It is shared by all systems with mentality since intentionality is a 
characteristic of consciousness. 'Intentionality', then, is the term that Husserl favours 
for describing the experiential or 'phenomenologicaT structures that are left after we 
have successfully bracketed off the way we naturally view our world in space and time.
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However, Husserl admits that the manifestation of intentionality will alter with regard 
to the differences in mental structure of different types of system; 'we cannot say of 
each mental process that it has intentionality in the same sense*. So that the mental 
structure of a dog or cat will influence the character of the intentionality they possess, if 
indeed they possess any at all. In intentional behaviour we are 'conscious of 
something' and regardless of the existence or non-existence of the 'object' there will be 
some correlation between it and our intentional behaviour towards it.
The importance of context in phenomenology
Our intentional attitude to something, i.e. our hoping that x  or believing that y, 
lacks objectivity since it is in our experiencing and not the experience of the physical 
thing. It can only constitute 'intuitive appearances of objects' and not the objects 
themselves. It is our attitude that is important because it dictates the context within 
which our experience takes place and is examined; therefore it is our attitude which is 
intentional.
I would like to place emphasis on a couple of things of importance in Husserl's 
work. The first is the stress that he places on his work being conceptual, or as he 
describes it himself, "eidetic". Husserl's concern is with the notions or acts of 
believing, hoping and perceiving when all else is removed and not with the intentional 
objects that we each associate privately with the notions.
A second aspect which is of significance is that of the 'conceptual attitude' that I 
have towards something, so for instance, when I am conscious of some logical thing I 
will adopt a logical stance for my understanding. Just as with Dennett's theory when I 
am trying to describe and predict the behaviour of another person I adopt the 
'intentional stance', so for example, for Husserl when I am thinking of some ethical 
matter I adopt an 'ethical stance'. I bracket off my natural standpoint and think in 
'ethical' terms about the problem, thus enabling me to give the matter my whole 
concentration. What becomes of importance is the context in which I examine my 
experience. It has been proposed that 'languages-of-thought' other than the two already
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discussed by Fodor^^, might exist, and so too there might be an infinite number of 
'experiential stances' open to a complex system; but to have an understanding of any of 
them we need to look carefully at the experiential context
2.5. Searle's intentionality: Experiential context
In this section I will look at the importance of contextual aspect in a paper by Searle 
in which he examines the notion of 'aspectual shape'. Just as Husserl talks about the 
bracketing off of the natural stance and the adoption of a specific conceptual standpoint 
in dealing with a particular area of enquiry, so too Searle talks of the importance of our 
perceptual, or even personal context in the way we look at the world. Very simply, the 
idea behind 'aspectual shape' is that our perception or thinking is always from one 
particular point of view or aspect whether spatial or contextual. As Searle says 
"Whenever we perceive anything or think about anything, it is always under some 
aspects and not others that we perceive or think about a n y t h in g .  "28
Aspectual features are those that are perceived under a particular aspect, and it is 
they that make an intentional state into a mental state. The aspectual feature can be seen 
as a relation of some type between my experience and the neurophysiology that makes 
up my brain states. Under aspectual shape my experience of a butterfly is a conscious 
experience that I have under a specific point of view. My experience of the butterfly has 
some features which are essential to it and to it alone. "Every belief and every desire, 
and indeed every intentional phenomenon, has an aspectual s h a p e ."29 So what we have 
with aspectual shape is the conscious experience of a thought, an object or a state of 
affairs.
In Husserl's phenomenology the two important features are, first, that there is a 
relational aspect through which we examine our experience of our belief or some other 
form of intentionality; and second, the conceptual attitude under which we interpret our 
incoming information. 'Aspectual shape' encompasses both of these for Searle. Under 
it we have experience of the world and the experience is had from our own particular 
point of view. For instance, my experience is had under an aspect that is specific to me.
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Aspectual shape is, according to Searle, an essential feature of all our intentional 
states; in such a way that intentional states only become conscious mental states because 
they possess these aspectual features. The aspectual shape is important because "it 
constitutes the way the agent thinks about or experiences a subject matter" So 
aspectual shape is the thinking or experiencing of the object of our intentions.
To overcome any spurious ascription of intentionality Searle proposes a bipartite 
distinction between intrinsic and 'as-if intentionality. The former, he claims, is that 
which is applied to those things which we know possess mental states, whilst the latter 
is a form of metaphor attribution applied to those things which have no mentality. An 
example of as-if intentionality is "The thermostat on the wall perceives changes in the 
temperature".The thermostat does not actually perceive but its action makes it look to 
us 'as-if it perceives.
Searle sees Dennett's intentional stance as a denial of 'as-if intentionality because 
Dennett proposes that we adopt the intentional stance with objects that do not possess 
mental states. According to Searle if we accept Dennett's thesis then we must also 
accept that everything in the universe is mental. Under this reading of Dennett the 
adoption of the intentional stance entails that we also accept a position of true 
panpsychism!
Of 'deep unconscious mental intentional phenomena"
A problem arises for Searle, and it is this: unconscious intentional states exist only 
as a matter for "third person, objective, neurophysiological phenomena" even though 
all our intentional states are supposed to have aspectual shape and aspectual shape is not 
meant to exist at the level of neurons and synapses. Searle frees himself from this 
quandary by proposing that all unconscious intentional states are "potentially 
conscious", " they are possible contents of c o n s c i o u s n e s s " .32  "When we describe 
something as an unconscious intentional state we are characterizing an objective 
ontology in virtue of its causal capacity to produce c o n s c i o u s n e s s ." 3 3  What we are left
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with is the fact that "any unconscious intentional state is the sort of thing that is in 
principle accessible to consciousness".34
Searle argues that there are no unconscious intentional phenomena that are not, at 
least potentially, conscious. All intentional states have to possess aspectual shape if 
they are to be mental states at all. So where there is no aspectual shape there can be no 
intentional phenomena; "but where there is no fact of the matter about aspectual shape 
there is no aspectual shape, and where there is no aspectual shape there is no 
intentionality" .35 The conclusion then is that unconscious states, such as Chomsky's 
'innate grammar', which are not 'in principle accessible to consciousness and are what 
Searle describes as "deep unconscious mental intentional phenomena"35, do not exist
What are we left with as notions of unconscious mental states? Firstly we have the 
"as-if metaphorical attributions of intentionality to the brain which are not to be taken 
literally"; then we have "shallow unconscious desires, beliefs, and so forth", like 
"repressed consciousness"; and thirdly there are "shallow unconscious mental 
phenomena which just do not happen to form the content of my consciousness at any 
given point in time".37 All of these sorts of unconscious phenomena are, at least, 
potential states of consciousness.
What evidence is there for intentional states?
For Searle behaviour of a system is not sufficient to demonstrate the relation 
between its neurophysiology and its intentional states. "Behavioral evidence concerning 
the existence of mental states, including even evidence concerning the causation of a 
person's behavior, no matter how complete, always leaves the aspectual character of 
intentional states underdetermined."38 It is always possible to infer from epistemic 
grounds, in this case neuronal firing, that something is present and from that presence 
infer the concomitant existence of something. But, such inference alone does not 
suggest a strong justification for the ontology of a particular mental state. The 
behaviour without reference to the relational aspect of consciousness is not enough. It 
isriot possible to determine that what someone else means by "water" is the same as
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what I mean by "water". They may mean a particular chemical compound of hydrogen 
dioxide and I might mean the liquid I drink to quench my thirst.39
There can be no "lawlike connection that would enable us to infer from our 
observations" of the person and their language that what we are both referring to is the 
same thing. Nor is their any "lawlike connection that would enable us to infer from our 
observations of the neural architecture and neuron firings that they were"'*® the 
conscious realizations of a particular desire for something or a certain wish that 
something else.
Thus Searle concludes that; (i) all intentional states must have aspectual shape,
(ii) that all unconscious mental states are in principle accessible to consciousness, and
(iii) that it is not possible to infer from the knowledge of one thing, in this case 
neurophysiological states, the ontology of another thing, and again in this case that a 
particular mental state exists.
2.6. The ability to understand and how we see ourselves in the world
To summarise our findings so far; according to Husserl we adopt an interpretational 
stance that depends upon our immediate surroundings and our ability to withhold the 
natural standpoint with which we interpret our interactions with our everyday physical 
world. The world within which we adopt a particular interpretation is that world within 
which we have exercised the phenomenological reduction and extracted our sense data 
in favour of a 'return to the facts' of simple experiencing.
In Searle we have the notion of 'aspectual shape' which is necessary for every 
intentional state to become a mental state. It is under this aspectual shape that we have 
thoughts or perceptions under a specific aspect or interpretation. This is just another 
way of saying that our perceptual relation to a particular state of affairs is the one that is 
important for our understanding of our context in toto.
In Husserl we have a contextual standpoint when our natural world is 'bracketed- 
off and Dennett argues that the system's external state of affairs is important because 
the intentional stance relation is not 'in-the-head', but, is instead, related to what we
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interact with in our environment. Searle considers context to be important for our 
mental representations to be able to represent; and anything with intrinsic intentionality 
can understand its context in a way specific to i t
For Wittgenstein, too, context is most important for understanding language. By its 
very nature our language has a public sense since it is used in a public forum. My own 
language can have a private reference but it is of no use for conversing with other 
human beings unless we share a commonality of senses for our words. Words like 
'pain' and 'sadness' have a private reference, for only I can know what it feels like 
when I feel sad or I have a toothache; however, such words have a shared public sense 
from which we can understand the life of another human being.
The context is all important for an understanding of this type of 'private reference' 
word. For example, if a little girl falls, grazes her knee and begins to cry saying, at the 
same time, that she is hurting, then all the circumstantial evidence would suggest to the 
observer, who cannot share in her pain, that she is indeed in pain and that her pain 
behaviour is understandable from her fall. However, of the little girl who says that she 
is too sick to go to school, and we know that she has a spelling test tliat day, the 
evidence, or context, would suggest that her behaviour is in fact a ruse to avoid the 
unpleasant test
Colour words are also subjective, or 'private', but again we share their meanings in 
a common context For if I use the word 'red' to describe a London bus, you can say 
that you know what I mean by 'red'. If I start talking of my favourite shades of colour 
then you might have difficulty understanding exactly what it is I mean. But from both 
examples it can be seen that it is possible to talk of, and understand, another persons 
intentional language by observing their behaviour and in so doing sharing in the context 
within which they are using their language.
Hubert Dreyfus also considers context to be of great importance. In fact he argues 
that context is essential for cognition to occur at all and that contextual considerations, 
along with the appropriate social behaviour, are required for a complete understanding 
of the cognition of the organism. It is, for Dreyfus, more a matter of knowing what to
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do in a particular social context than knowing what proposition is the most appropriate 
given the situation. Our skills, as mental systems, are acquired and leamt through 
repetition within a specific social context and it would, for Dreyfus, seem incredible 
that a non-mental system could acquire the appropriate social skills in just the same 
way. In much the same way as Searle's aspectual shape is seen to exist as an important 
part of our experience Dreyfus claims that in our personal cognition of our world an 
essential role is played by our embodiment of our perception in our interaction with the 
world. What we can see emphasised here is the importance of the experience being 
'ours', i.e. that we can see ourselves in relation to our experience of our world.
So, just as Wittgenstein and Husserl did before them, Dreyfus and Searle argue that 
social and cultural surroundings are of the utmost importance to our understanding of 
the world; "all intelligent behaviour must be traced back to our sense of what we are," 
and we are social animals that have linguistic and non-linguistic interrelations with other 
social animals in our world. What is now of importance is how we move from this state 
of understanding to intentional states, like knowledge and belief.
2.7. The attribution of intentional states
'Understanding' and Tcnowing' are important aspects of mentality that will recur 
throughout this thesis and I would like, for the moment, to examine the relation that 
Wittgenstein sets up between them. For Wittgenstein having, or claiming to have, an 
understanding of a state of affairs is very closely related to saying I can'. "The 
characteristic of words like "understand" and "can" is that they are used alternately for 
(a) something occurring in the mind as a conscious event, (b) a disposition, and (c) a 
translation.''^! Of most interest to us now is (b) for it is the use in this sense that 
"overlaps with 'is able to'"'*2, for this is the sense in which understanding is linked to a 
disposition to perform a particular act or set of actions. An accurate interpretation of 
information is "illustrated by one's being able to do a certain thing when one
understands". 3^
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For instance, in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein explains that knowing 
something is not the same as having certain epistemic states but rather it is a 
demonstration of an ability to 'go on'. We use "Now I know!", "Now I understand!" 
and "Now I can do it!" interchangeably to mean "Now I can go o n ! ".44 Again in 
paragraph 151 in the example of the sequence '1,5,11,19, 29' that A was writing, if 
B knows how to go on he will respond with a statement like "Now I know how to go 
on". What B has admitted is that if required he believes he is capable of giving 
behavioural evidence for his understanding of the sequence.
So understanding in this sense is actually that you know the answer and would be 
able 10 offer an objective account based on previous learning from other like 
experiences. It is only through an exhibition of the correct understanding behaviour, 
that is, that B answers '41', that we can say of him that he has understood in this 
context. When he does respond in the correct way we can say of him that he does 
"know'. It is not possible to say of someone that they know that something is the case 
when they have claimed to understand but failed to show that they know by actually 
'going on' and offering proof. So the criteria for attribution of epistemic states is not 
just that the system offers behavioural evidence but that the behavioural evidence it 
offers is correct. For instance, if B says that he has understood the sequence but then 
he proceeds in the sequence by saying '42' then he quite obviously has not understood 
and it would be wrong to attribute a knowledge state to him.
If we look closely at these criteria they seem to be the same as the ones we use for 
the attribution of mental states, whether rightly or wrongly, to other non-human beings. 
The distinction Searle makes between intrinsic intentionality and 'as-if intentionality 
bears this out, for we say of the lawn that it is 'thirsty' or of the thermostat that it 
'perceives', it is simply the attribution of intentional states based on what seems to be 
appropriate and correct behaviour in the system's context
The attribution of 'as-if intentionality is the result of our treating other non-human 
systems as though they had a mental life similar to that possessed by human-beings. It 
is a sort of silicon or mechanical anthropomorphism that allows me, without too many
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raised eyebrows, to say of a non-mental object like my computer that it 'runs quickly' 
or 'plays up' when it knows I am in a hurry. It is an over-extension of metaphors or 
use of simile that we understand, from Searle, to be used in connection with non­
mental systems. He would argue that once we go beyond realising this specific use and 
exaggerating the capabilities of these systems, in other words attributing to them a 
mental life that they do not possess, our use is erroneous and we are misleading 
ourselves.
2.7.1. Intentional states attributed to machines
McCarthy's views
McCarthy gets into deep water in just such a way; for instance, he says "To ascribe 
certain 'beliefs', 'knowledge', 'free will', 'intentions', 'consciousness', 'abilities' or 
'wants' to a machine or computer program is legitimate when such an ascription 
expresses the same information about the machine that it expresses about a p e r s o n ".45 
So it seems that he is satisfied, indeed even blasé, about the ascription of mental 
qualities to non-mental systems.
McCarthy argues that it is "useful" to ascribe intentional states to machines because 
the ascription may be able to help us "understand the structure of the machine, its past 
or future behaviour, or how to repair or improve it".'*^  The same ascription may also 
give us information about the "limitations on our own ability to acquire k n o w l e d g e " . ^ ^  
With this in mind we should have the accumulated advantage of being able to predict 
the future states of the machine on the basis of what we know about its previous states 
and present structure.
This is an argument that shares many similarities with Dennett's reasons for 
adopting an intentional stance towards objects, both mental and non-mental, in our 
world. Indeed, McCarthy does say that he "emphasizes criteria for ascribing particular 
mental qualities to particular machines rather than the general proposition that mental 
qualities may be ascribed",'** which is what Dennett is doing in The Intentional Stance.
49
McCarthy also wants to argue that it is easiest to attribute these mental qualities to 
simple machines of which we know the structure; as he says, "machines as simple as 
thermostats can be said to have beliefs, and having beliefs seems to be characteristic of 
most machines capable of problem solving p e r f o r m a n c e " / ^  What this suggests is that, 
if we observe a system in one state and it then performs an action that places it in 
another state, then we should attribute to it all the analogous intentional states that we 
associate with the system that has a full and active mental life.
But I think McCarthy goes too far, for it is as though he really does consider 
machines to possess mental lives, however limited those lives may be. Examples of 
such thinking are prevalent, an obvious example is when he says that "present 
machines have rather varied little minds"^® and he then ventures to state that our human 
capacities to love and hate are programmable, and although slightly more difficult 
"mental qualities like humour and appreciation of beauty" are not beyond being 
modelled.
Rosenschein’s views: The machine innards considered
Rosenschein takes up a similar position to McCarthy's except that Rosenschein 
looks at the physical construction of the machine, and is concerned particularly with the 
ascription of knowledge states. One further difference is that Rosenschein first admits 
that the concept of knowledge as talked about in AI rests "on a very limited conception 
of what it means for a machine to know a propos i t ionFor  him life is certainly more 
straightforward for he only accepts that a machine knows something if the state can be 
encoded in the form of a formal language sentence, or that the sentence can be derived 
using the "rules of an appropriate logical system".^ 2
The human approach
In a technical note of 1985 Rosenschein contrasts the 'interpreted-symbolic- 
structure' (ISS) approach with that of the 'situated-automata' (SA). In the first case the 
state of the machine is that of an encoder of symbolic items of data encoded by the 
interpreter. The symbols are so called because they map pieces of the internal state of
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the machine onto pieces of world state. Using this approach it is possible to ask "What 
information about the world is encoded in the state of the machine?"; or in the language 
of intentionality "What does the machine know?".
For the ascription of knowledge this approach requires "viewing the machine's state 
as structured in a certain way; knowledge is not an objective property of the way the 
machine is embedded in the w o r ld " . 3^ In the ISS approach knowledge ascription 
depends very much on the wishes of the designer. In fact so much so that if she wishes 
to assign a different interpretation to the same symbols, (its overall structure), the 
machine will be said to be in possession of different knowledge. Nothing else in the 
machine or in the world needs to change for this to be the case.
The mechanical approach
However, Rosenschein is not satisfied with the ISS approach because he believes 
that the environment and the machine's location in the environment is very important 
and the ISS approach does not take this into account. If the machine is to have 
epistemic properties assigned then it must be able to have an internal representation of 
an external event. So the SA approach is devised in order that knowledge can be 
analysed in terms of relations between the machine state and the state of its 
environment This suggests that the notion of knowledge is grounded in an objective 
correlation(s) between machine states and world states.
There is an initial assumption that the machine is part of an environment that can be 
in any one of a large number of variable states The environment generates the inputs for 
the machine and responds to its outputs. However, the machine can only know of the 
environment through its direct inputs and it is feasible that some information will not 
reach it because is not capable of detecting it or it is unable to discriminate cases when p 
holds from cases when it does not.
In the traditional AI approach the machine manipulates the data structures that 
encode language in a series of logical assertions. In the SA approach "logical assertions 
are not part of the machine's knowledge base, nor are they formally manipulated by the
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machine in any w a y " / 4  The assertions "are framed in the metalanguage of the 
d e s i g n e r "  ,3 5  and they are used to express the underlying assumptions made by the 
designer or programmer and offer characterisations of information content of the 
machine states being designed. The programmer has to be able to "comprehend the 
emerging design and verify that the machine will behave as d e s i r e d " .36
Many computer applications involve the system in a continually changing physical 
environment and the primary task of the computer is to monitor and respond to the 
alterations in these environmental conditions. For the computer to do this successfully it 
has to be able to recognise the appropriate stimuli in its environment and from this make 
an estimate of the responses that would be most probable. In this case, if the machine is 
to be said to know that such and such is the case, then the state of the machine must be 
capable of mapping the state in the environment and using the information 
appropriately.
Thus in his proposal of a "correlational definition of knowledge" Rosenschein goes 
deep into the innards of the machine so that when they, the innards, are in a particular 
state, say state A, it will be occupying a specific epistemic state, but if we then adjust 
the connections between the machine's wires, nodes and so on. it will occupy a 
different epistemic state, this time state A '. So there is a direct relation between the 
internal mechanism of the computer and the state the computer can be said to be in; and 
Rosenschein would like to call the properties of these states, that is, the internal 
structural organisation, 'epistemic'.37 It follows that the machine can be said to know 
something in, at least, a primitive sense, if it reflects a real world state. For a barometer 
to indicate a change in pressure it can be said to know of the change if and only if the 
true state in the world is one of pressure change. If it indicates a change of pressure 
when there has not been one then it cannot be said to know anything about the world. 
Similarly in Wittgenstein's example of being able to 'go on', if the person 'goes on' 
with the wrong answer they cannot be said 'to know' after all.
So in a somewhat different sense Rosenschein has admitted the importance of 
context for the attribution of intentional states, and like McCarthy, he ascribes mental
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States to non-mental systems, and like Dennett and McCarthy he emphasises the 
predictive capability that the designer has when she knows the information content of 
the machine state, that is, what the machine can be said in a primitive sense to know. 
All three of them argue that once we can recognise analogous states between mental and 
non-mental systems, and we attribute the same intentional states to them both, it will be 
easier to predict the forthcoming actions of that system.
2.8. A new, computational, theory of intentionality: Dretske
Dretske adopts a novel approach to the problem of ascribing intentional states in 
what is described as an 'information-theoretic' account that combines aspects of the 
McCarthy and Rosenschein theories. In the account he ascribes mental states to a 
variety of systems that range from the non-mental to the mental. Dretske starts by using 
the concept of "belief io distinguish genuine cognitive systems from mere processors of 
in f o r m a t io n " .38 He gives the example of an information processor as something like a 
tape recorder which cannot have the knowledge we obtain from using it "The reason 
the tape recorder does not know is that the information it receives neither generates nor 
sustains an appropriate b e l i e f .  "39 It can be inferred from this that it is the capacity to 
form beliefs that "distinguishes genuine cognitive systems from such conduits of 
information as thermostats, voltmeters, and tape-recorders".®®
As a preliminary part of the investigation, into whichsystems "qualify for cognitive 
attributes",®! Dretske offers a division of intentionality into three levels. The first order 
of intentionality is described as contingent, being entirely dependent upon the 
interaction the system has with its immediate environment The second order is nomic 
or natural, with the suggestion that the knowledge of this order is dependent upon the 
natural laws that hold empirically in the world. And the third order is analytic, for it is 
possible to have knowledge of % in the second order sense to form a belief about X, 
but not to know all the beliefs that are also synonymous with X.
A complete understanding of third order intentionality is only possible if we 
understand the term 'analytic'. An analytic sentence is tautologous, which is to say, it
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contains no new information. It is of the form 'A is B', when {A, B} are semantically 
equivalent For instance, the statement 'all bachelors are unmarried men' is analytic 
because the term 'bachelor' adds nothing to the meaning of the term 'unmarried man'. 
So both terms are interchangeable without any enhancement to the meaning of either 
term or any loss of truth-value in the overall statement
Both knowledge and belief have, for Dretske, a very high order of intentionality. 
The beliefs we hold about X  and the beliefs themselves are distinct even when their , 
content remains interdependent. The simplest way of explaining this is that it is my 
having the belief about X, and therefore also an understanding of its semantic content, 
that makes it distinct from the beliefs about X  per se. What has happened in my coming 
to hold a particular belief is that I have stripped away the superfluous information from 
my perceptual input and selected a specific piece of information, or concept, on which 
to concentrate. The information contained in the concept is then formed into 
conceptualised information from which the system is able to occupy a belief state.
2.8.1. Information content
Anything that has an information content is capable of exhibiting first order 
intentionality. A good example of this would be the visual field which carries 
information about the environment to the system. At this stage the system has a lot of 
information available to it and nothing in its perceptual field has been selected for 
attention. The information in this limited case is said, by Dretske, to be "analogue", 
which simply means that it is a continuous mass of information and not divided up for 
special attention.
2.8.2. Knowing
A more specific kind of analogue information is associated, by Dretske, with 
second order intentionality. If we use the visual field example again this is the system's 
narrowing of focus to the signals that it receives from a particular state of affairs in the 
environment It is still analogue information because no one specific informational point 
has, as yet, been selected for attention by the system. In this sense epistemic states can.
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according to Dretske, be attributed to the system that is capable of narrowing down its 
information content to this extent
2.8.3. Believing
The third order of intentionality is related to what Dretske describes as "digital" 
information. This can be most usefully thought of as focusing on one specific object or 
event in the visual field. A specific signal in the visual field is selected and the 
information is digitalised, which means that the semantic content is reached and 
extracted. An important point to note is that it is not just the idea of focusing in on an 
object or state of affairs, but also the fact that one part of the signal is selected at the 
expense of the other signals or parts of a signal and also at the expense of the 
messenger carrying the signal.
Another useful way of thinking about this notion is to think of two sorts of watch. 
At a first glance an analogue watch gives a lot of very general information about the 
time, the face of the watch, its dial and so on, but if we look at the analogue watch 
using a microscope, (what Dretske would describe as second order intentionality), we 
will get much less information, the details of which will be more specific. When 
looking at a digital watch we get a very accurate account of the time, right down to the 
seconds; but it can offer no more than that It gives only a very specific representation 
of the time and this Dretske would equate with third level intentionality.
Third order intentionality is equated with semantic content so that any system that is 
capable of this level of intentionality is also capable of understanding the nature of the 
object or event that it has focussed in on. Neither of the other two analogue levels are 
specific enough to offer an understanding of objects or events in their visual field. For 
Dretske the digital system would be capable of offering a representation of the specific 
object or event, whereas "in general analogue systems react to but do not r ep re se n t" ® ^  
the objects and states of affairs in their environments.
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2.8.4. An example of focusing and selectivity
If we look for example, at the configuration of newsprint, we can see that both it 
and the visual experience of seeing it carry information. The visual experience cannot 
be classed as the semantic content since it is in analogue form and only that piece of 
information that is specially selected and 'digitalised' is the semantic content The 
information carried by the visual experience is not digital; it needs a lot more cognitive 
processing before it can be raised to the level of a belief state.
If we consider a diagram of three concentric rings,which represents a newspaper, 
the newsprint and the information carried in the newsprint. The 'S' in the centre 
indicates that the whole diagram is a signal of incoming information from which 
information can be extracted. If you are looking unselectively you will see all the 
newspaper but no specific piece of information. A more selective look will still only 
focus on the newsprint but this time it will be on a particular piece of i t  Finally, on 
close inspection an article or paragraph in the newspaper will "be singled out and its 
semantic content sought. In the diagram below the semantic content is carried in the 
largest informational shell; the one in which all other information is embedded,
A - innermost informational shell 
Analogue - newspaper
B - middle informational shell 
Analogue • newsprint
C - outermost informational shell 
Digital - Semantic Structure
Figwrc I
A system that is unable to read can stül perceive the newsprint, so it is still able to 
receive the information even though it will not know what it means. However, the 
pattern of the newsprint alone will have no understanding of it and with a simple 
system there wül be a coding deficiency happening where it is unable to move from the
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perceptual form of the information to its cognitive form, i.e. there is an inability to 
completely digitalise the information that occurs in the senses in analogue form.
Dretske maintains that this 'inability' is why 'simple mechanical instruments' do not 
have access to the semantic structure of the information they receive. The instrument 
reads the information without forming any understanding of i t  A voltmeter cannot 
completely digitalise the information because it is nested in other structures which the 
instrument is only 'seeing', and what it 'sees' is in analogue form.
In another diagram. Figure 2, it is. possible to see more clearly the procedure that is 
involved in extracting the semantic content from the incoming information; a procedure 
we now recognise as 'digitalisation'. Again 'S' is the incoming signal, but the 
concentric rings now demonstrate the stripping away of irrelevant information to form a 
concept The material that is relevant will depend upon the perceptions and mental 
attitude or disposition of the perceiver.
INTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
WSUBJECT 1
INFERRING
MATCHING
SUBJECT 2 STRIPPING
INFERRING
Figure 2
On the left hand side of the diagram the two sets of circles represent two different 
subjects each of whom has stripped incoming information away to reach one particular 
piece; a piece of information that is most important or particular to them. 'Subject T 
might be said to represent the typesetter of the newspaper; whereas 'Subject 2' might be 
the person reading the newspaper. The particular circles that represent specific 'chunks'
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of information on the right have been matched with an internal representation of that 
same information. From the piece of information that they have chosen they can then 
infer what other circumstances will hold or be of interest and with this conceptualised 
information the system or subject is now able to occupy a belief state. (The circles with 
dashed lines represent pieces of irrelevant information.)
An instrument that is incapable of complete digitalisation is incapable of occupying 
higher-level intentional states. If a system can form a belief about its incoming 
information it can also intentionally alter its behaviour to suit the new beliefs that it has 
formed. However, only if the system is behaving in a rational manner will it take these 
new beliefs into consideration and this is what Dennett means when he talks of 'rational 
and predictable behaviour' that is exercised in relation to a system's assumed set of 
propositional attitudes.
In the instance of someone's holding a belief about some particular state of affairs 
we are not told the cause of their coming to hold that belief; all that is important, in 
Dretske's model, is that the individual's belief corresponds to the particular outermost 
informational shell and the semantic content of the overall structure. The belief carries 
only the information and says nothing about how it came to be there.
Dretske talks of a system having a 'plasticity' for extracting information. In essence 
what he means is the capacity for a system to ignore the message carrier so that it can 
concentrate on the information contained in the message. Perhaps a better word might 
be 'flexibility' because in everyday parlance we talk of being flexible in our decisions 
meaning that we are free to choose what we want to do. Few, if any, information- 
processing systems are capable of generating internal states from a remote source and 
ultimately being left with an information content which is also its semantic content 
Indeed, for Dretske the flexibility to achieve this is only possible for those systems that 
can reach third level intentionality, being able to form beliefs from an analysis and 
synthesis of their incoming information.
The voltmeter can only carry information about the source by carrying information 
about the way in which the message is carried, i.e. the messenger; because of this the
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pointer does not have as its semantic content the fact that the voltage is such and such. 
The information Cannot be completely 'digitalised', therefore it cannot be a belief. And 
voltmeters and other 'simple mechanical instruments' can never occupy belief states.
2.8.5. Dretske - in conclusion
In conclusion it can be briefly said that Dretske's first and second orders of 
intentionality do not have any flexibility to extract information from incoming signals, 
and that his third order intentionality has the plasticity to extract information and 
produce the semantic content So according to Dretske, the third level of intentionality 
is also to be thought of as the semantic content, and any system that is capable of this 
level of intentionality is also capable of understanding the nature of the object or event it 
has focussed on. Neither of the other two analogue levels are specific enough to have 
an understanding of the objects or events in their informational field.
The sorts of systems that Dretske equates these levels with is not very clear. 
Although, he gives us three distinct orders of intentionality based on the amount and 
extent to which information is processed, he only offers two categories of systems, the 
"simple information-processing mechanisms" and the "genuine cognitive systems".^^
In the first category he places 'dictaphones', 'television sets' and 'voltmeters', which, 
it should be noted, are all non-mental systems; and in the second category there are a 
mixture of mental and non-mental systems, for instance, "frogs, humans and perhaps 
some computers".
So it seems that he, like McCarthy, Dennett, and Rosenschein is not above 
assigning mentalistic terms to systems that are more commonly described as non- 
mentalistic. His reasons for doing so are slightly different because they are set out in 
information-theoretic terms, but nevertheless they are there. He says, "If a system is to 
display genuine cognitive properties, it must assign a sameness o f output to differences 
of input. In this respect, a genuine cognitive system must represent a loss of 
information between its input and its output"^^ With digitalisation information is lost, 
and this is why the television is not a genuine cognitive system for "it is incapable of
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digitalizing the information passing through it".^  ^A genuine cognitive system needs to 
be able to form beliefs and for this it needs the flexibility to extract or select information 
from a source which offers a variety of different messages. Such a system would also 
have to act in accordance with its newly formed beliefs or else we would have no sign 
that it actually had them.
If we now look at Searle's Chinese Room argument it will be possible to put the 
ascription of intentional states by these last three thinkers into a new perspective.
2.9. The Chinese Room: Intentionality, intrinsicality and semantics
In Minds, brains andprograms^^ Searle sets out a distinction between weak and 
strong AI. The former is the view that AI programs are useful and powerful tools but 
nothing more; and the latter is the view that there are all kinds of possibilities for AI, for 
instance "that the programmed computer understands the stories and that the program in 
some sense explains human understanding".^* Searle has no real disagreement with 
weak AI, but he puts forward 'The Chinese Room' argument as a challenge to the 
strong AI proposal that machines are capable of actually thinking.
The argument is probably already very well understood but, in case it is not, I will 
give an account of it again here. The argument is set up as a thought experiment and the 
idea is that you imagine yourself in a room which contains some baskets of Chinese 
symbols and a rule book for manipulating the symbols. On top of this you have to 
imagine that there are signs - which are questions - being passed into the room and you 
have to match them with other signs - answers to those questions - using a rule book. 
Having done this you pass the symbols back out of the room. The whole operation is 
done in a purely syntactic way without any understanding of the semantic content of the 
symbols. Having got proficient at the task of matching the symbols the people outside 
the room to whom you are passing them might well come to believe that you actually do 
understand Chinese because "your answers are indistinguishable from those of a native 
Chinese speaker"
60
What Searle argues is that there is no way that you can learn or be said to know 
Chinese from the mere syntactic manipulation of Chinese symbols, thus the people 
outside the room would be mistaken in their view. You have no more understanding of 
Chinese when you leave the room than you did when you entered i t  The point, he 
claims, is simple: "by virtue of implementing a formal computer program from the point 
of view of an outside observer, you behave exactly as if you understood Chinese, but
all the same you don't understand a word of Chinese All that the computer has, as
you have, is a formal program for manipulating uninterpreted Chinese symbols". 
Neither you nor the computer can know what the symbols mean by just matching one 
pattern with another and passing the newly matched symbol out.
He argues further that "symbols and programs are purely abstract notions: they 
have no essential physical properties to define them and can be implemented in any 
physical medium whatever", From this he concludes that because symbols have no 
physical properties that are theirs by dint of being a particular symbol, they can have no 
physical, causal properties. In a similar vein to Rosenschein's ISS approach, Searle 
says that the symbols in the program depend for their meaning on the programmer or 
designer. "Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.
What is required for semantics is an understanding of the symbol's meaning. This 
might suggest that the symbols have their meaning intrinsic to them. This is not the 
case. For symbols to act as symbols they have to be about some thing, or things, in the 
world and the meaning has to be attributed to them from an external source. "The point 
is that there is a distinction between formal elements, which have no intrinsic meaning 
or content, and those phenomena that have intrinsic c on t en t .The  human mind is the 
only thing that can attribute meaning in this way so, Searle would argue, it must have 
some intrinsic mental contents (semantics).
Searle does not agree with the ascription of understanding to a computer. In fact he 
calls strong AI a "tin can and sealing wax theory" ! For him the essence of having 
cognitive states, and in particular intentional states, is that they have an intrinsic or self- 
attributed semantic content. For example, our symbol manipulation in chess is what we
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mean when we engage in a game of chess. This self-ascription is what Searle claims is 
missing in computational simulations. For in the normal running of a program the 
programmer need only know the syntactical set-up of the program.The program will 
work whether or not it knows its semantical content
2.9.1. Does Searle weaken his foothold?
By answering the question, "Could a machine ever think?", with the answer "My 
own view is that only a machine could think, and indeed only very special kinds of 
machine, namely brains and machines that had the same causal powers as brains"^ "^ , 
Searle does weaken his argument On one hand he is adamant that machines cannot 
think and that they are just organised heaps of mechanical bits, whilst on the other hand 
he admits that human beings are machines as well! But Searle is a physicalist who 
argues that brains think and machines are physical entities in much the same way as 
brains. Thus, mechanical bits could think but not by virtue of an instantiated program, 
they would need some intrinsic mental content.
To a similar question, that of whether or not we could create a man-made machine 
that could think, he also answers "yes"; for he believes that it would certainly be 
possible if we were able to replicate all the physiological causes of consciousness. 
When he says "I regard this issues as up for grabs"^^ it is clear that he is not denying 
that one day machines, other than human ones, might be able to think and understand; 
so he does not flatly deny the possibility of a man-made thinking machine. Along the 
same lines he argues that a digital computer that could think could be created, because 
we are eo ipso digital computers.
However, he still answers the question, could something think by virtue of having 
an instantiated computer program, with a forceful "No". His reasons for doing so are 
that intentionality, and intentional behaviour, are biological processes and must depend 
upon biological phenomena, therefore they cannot be dependent upon only the formal 
processes that we find in a computer program. Up until now our computer programs 
can only simulate a thinking state and they can only do this because they are
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programmed with the right things to do and the right order for doing them in. This 
programming makes their actions look like rational preconceived behaviour when it is 
not Our ascription to the machine of thought and intentionality is what Searle would 
describe as "as-if ' intentionality because the machine is non-mental
Some time prior to Searle, Paul Ziff wrote a paper called The Feelings of Robots. 
Many of the arguments in this paper closely resemble those put forward by Searle. For 
instance, Ziff argues that a robot may be able to calculate but not literally to reason in 
the way that we do. What we are continually doing with machines is over extending the 
metaphors we use until they lose their metaphorical sense and become meaningless in 
their new context.
Earlier still we find Mac Kay saying ’any test for mental or any other attributes to be 
satisfied by the observable activity of a human being can be passed by automata'; 
nothing need be obviously wrong with the machine's performance, but it is still a 
performance and not the real thing. There is more to the intentionality of human beings 
than just their observable behaviour, yet we look only at the behaviour of a machine 
when we attribute the same intentionality. As Searle has said, "no simulation by itself 
ever constitutes duplication".^^
Challenging the Chinese Room, (l):System semantics 
But there are people who find fault with Searle's theory, for example, the 'systems 
reply' which has been made most forcefully by the Churchlands.
The systems reply states that "You don't understand Chinese but the whole room 
does. You are like a single neuron in the brain, and just as a single neuron by itself 
cannot understand but only contributes to the understanding of the whole system, you 
don't understand, but the whole system does".^^ So it is the room combined with 
everything inside the room that understands Chinese and not just the individual in the 
room. The idea is that whatever is doing the individual shuffling of the symbols is just 
like a single neuron in the brain, which by itself is unable to understand, but as one of
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many it contributes to the understanding of the whole system. So the claim is that the 
system as a whole understands but the individual or single neuron does not.
Searle describes this challenge as a "daring move"®® but réfutes it on purely logical 
grounds. He reiterates that symbol shuffling itself does not mean that whatever is doing 
the shuffling has access to the meanings of the symbols. It will not make any difference 
to its inability to understand if we unite the 'shuffler' with its environment If the 
symbol shuffler cannot understand Chinese then neither can the whole system it is 
contained in. Indeed Searle confronts this issue in the Chinese Gym argument; (a 
variant on the Chinese Room argument in which there is a "hall containing many 
monolingual, English speaking men").®^  The men behave like the nodes and synapses 
in the connectionist architecture of the brain. Again Searle argues that the Churchlands 
miss the point that was already made in the Chinese Room. They argue that a big 
enough Chinese gym would have higher-level mental features because of it size and 
complexity. But Searle opposes this by saying that any computation that can be done on 
a parallel machine can also be done on a serial machine. Thus if the individual in the 
Chinese room does not understand the language solely by carrying out the 
computations then neither can it understand when there are a whole host of them who 
do not understand. "You can't get semantically loaded thought contents from formal 
computations alone, whether they are done in serial or in parallel; that is why the 
Chinese room argument refutes strong AI in any form."®2
An argument similar in many ways to the systems reply, though more 
architecturally explicit, is put forward by a great many proponents of connectionism. 
Connectionists argue that order can emerge out of complexity and if we have a complex 
enough parallel machine it will produce intelligence as an emergent property. The 
argument goes as follows "Consider a human being; most would say a human thinks, 
but at the lower level is that really the case? Does a single neuron "know" or have any 
self-awareness? I suggest the answer is no. So where does intelligent thought come 
from? It arises from the combined actions of many neurons together - it isn't 
programmed, but it is emergent "®^ The neurons can be said to be following rules (of
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physics), in a similar way to the binary gates in a computer. In this sense the 
connectionist would ask why shouldn't computers think? We can take Searle's earlier 
refutation of the 'systems reply' to hold for this case also.
Sloman opposes the outcome of Searle's argument,®'* saying that "Computation is a 
purely syntactic, structural notion" whereas a "working computer goes beyond this, it 
understands its own machine code programs ...insofar as it systematically m ^ s  the bit 
patterns onto locations in its (virtual) memory and to actions which it can perform".®  ^A 
computer can do a wealth of things, for instance it can compare, copy, modify and 
select from its incoming information if it has a set of instructions it can follow. 
However, Sloman does add that the world that the computer has access to is a "limited 
virtual" one, and that it is also constrained because it "does not have the full richness of 
human use of symbols"®  ^to which it can refer.
Challenge (2):Intrinsic meaning
Another objection is raised by Hamad who questions whether or not meaning is 
intrinsic to a system. Searle, as we have seen above, wants to argue that intentionality 
is intrinsic to the human system, but not to a non-mental system like a computer.
"Searle challenges that a symbol system capable of generating behavior
indistinguishable from that of a person must have a mind",®  ^but Hamad wants to 
argue that even though the manipulation of symbols in the Chinese room is based on 
shape and not on meaning, the fact that they are "systematically interpretable" means 
that the interpretation is intrinsic to the symbol system.
The symbols in a formal symbol system can only have meaning when they stand 
for things in the world. Such meaning cannot be intrinsic to that system since it is based 
on what the symbols mean for us. So the interpretation depends on the fact that "the 
symbols have meaning for us, in exactly the same way that the meanings of the 
symbols in a book are not intrinsic, but derive from the meanings in our heads".®® The 
symbols in a book only have a meaning when we attribute one to them. So the
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meanings in the symbol system are extrinsic and not a workable model for the kinds of 
meaning that both Hamad and Searle would say are intrinsic to us.
To get off the sort of "merry-go-round" we are on with the attribution of meaning to 
one symbol always depending on another symbol we have ultimately to ground the 
meaning in non-symbolic representations; which themselves have to have an intrinsic 
meaning if we are ever to get started. So Searle says that symbol meaning is intrinsic to 
us as part of our representational system, whereas Hamad argues that symbols come to 
have a meaning once they are used compositionally in meaningful syntactic ways, and 
that there is no such thing as intrinsic meaning - meaning is always something that is 
attributed. So the meaning of a symbol, for Hamad, is grounded in non-symbolic 
representations which are compositions of invariant features that are formed into 
meaningful and syntactical strings.
For Searle, the meaning is something that is intrinsic to a mental system and not to 
the symbols used by the system. It is this intrinsic mental content which makes mental 
systems more than just programmable computers. In a mental system the intentionality 
is, as it were, inbuilt by virtue of its being mental; whilst in a non-mental system 
meaning is attributed by an interpreter who is external to the system.
Challenge (3):Boden's response
On just this same point Margaret Boden argues that meaning is not intrinsic to the 
system, for, she argues, all meaning has to be attributed no matter what the physical 
make-up of the system might be. The attack she makes on Searle's "two pronged 
critique of computational psychology",®^ in the Chinese room argument, is both 
forthright and to the point; she says that the 'explanatory power' of his claims 'is 
illusory', "the biological analogies...are misleading, and the intuitions to which he 
appeals are unreliable".^
Broadly speaking Searle is claiming that computational theories in psychology are 
worthless. He says that only machines of a certain kind can think and that humans are, 
at a highly abstract level, digital machines but they are digital machines whose
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substance is neuroprotein and not silicon and metal. Humans cannot be the simple 
instantiation of a computer program since the mere instantiation of a computer program 
cannot think, mean or understand, it can only shuffle uninterpreted patterns. A 
computer program for Searle has all the syntax and none of the semantics.
Boden says that Searle assumes that the computations of computer science are 
purely syntactic; that the computations "can be defined as the formal manipulation of 
abstract symbols, by the application o f formal rules''?^ Intentionality caimot be 
explained in purely formalist terms since it gives no account of how the human mind 
employs the information derived from symbols it perceives. Searle, it would seem, 
equates understanding with intentionality.
Searle's second claim is that symbols only have meaning when they are embodied 
in something with 'the right causal powers' that can generate understanding or 
intentional behaviour. His argument is that the brain, and only the brain, has such 
causal powers , and that a computer does not. So, that machines are made up of silicon 
and metal is highly significant, for only something made of neuroprotein, like our 
brains, can have the requisite causal powers for understanding. Therefore, it is simply 
our biochemistry that makes us different from machines.
Boden's counter-attack questions the whole area of understanding in the machine 
and she offers two responses; the Robot reply and the English reply. The Robot reply 
states that if an automaton were to have all the input and output states of a human being, 
with limbs that could pick things up and with a compatible visual system, then it would 
be able to "demonstrably understand both restaurants and the natural language...used 
by people to communicate with it".^^
Searle responds to this by saying that it just proves the point he was making all 
along that cognition requires causal relations with the world on top of the ability to 
manipulate symbols. He adds that whatever we add to the robot in the way of limbs and 
vision is still not adding intentionality or the cognitive capability of understanding. His 
response is 'personified' in the Searle-in-the-robot argument, where Searle places 
himself, figuratively speaking, inside the robot. In this case the incoming signals are no
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longer pieces of paper handed in by Chinese speakers from outside, now they come 
through the robot's perceptual sensors. The limbs supply the capability for the machine 
output Now Searle would argue that although the machine seems to be capable of 
whatever we are capable of it is in fact 'simply moving about as a result of its electrical 
wiring and its program' and it still cannot be said to understand.
Boden says that Searle makes an obvious mistake here, namely, that he considers 
that the robot is performing the functions of the brain then goes on to attribute full­
blown intentionality to the brain. This, Boden argues further, is not something that 
computationalists do at all. "Computational psychology does not credit the brain with 
seeing beansprouts or understanding English', intentional states such as there are 
properties of people, not of brains. Representations and mental processes are 
perceived as being part of the brain whereas prepositional attitudes are ascribed to the 
whole person. And Boden argues that Searle has essentially missed the point that the 
computationalists are making. "In short, Searle's description of the robot's pseudo­
brain (that is, of Searle-in-the-robot) as understanding English involves a category- 
mistake comparable to treating the brain as the bearer - as opposed to the causal basis - 
of intelligence.
2.9.2. Computation is not just syntactic
Searle argues that the machine cannot reach the semantics of a formal symbol 
system but Boden maintains that "The inherent procedural consequences of any 
computer program give it a toehold in semantics, where the semantics in question is not 
denotational, but causal" .95 For any symbol to be part of a program it must have a 
meaning, and for the program to be the cause of other events it must be linked to some 
causal phenomena. We can find out what the symbol means by looking at the causal 
links to the external phenomena. The symbols in a program "do embody some minimal 
understanding",^^ even if we consider such an understanding to be "so minimal that 
this word should not be used at all".97 Boden's conclusion is that "To view Searle-in- 
the-room as an instantiation of a computer program is not to say that he lacks all
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understanding", for "computational psychology is not in principle incapable of 
explaining how meaning attaches to mental processes", for the embodiment of some 
'minimal' understanding is not the same as understanding. In Boden's terms traffic 
lights, as symbols, embody understanding but they still do not understand.
2.9.3. Intentionality and biochemistry
Another criticism Boden makes of Searle is that if he is to maintain that it is our 
biochemistry that makes us different from machines, and that intentionality has its basis 
in the body's biochemistry, then why are we not able to define the products of 
intentionality in the way we are able to with the other bodily functions. She admits that, 
by its very namre, dealing with the brain is inherently morc difficult that dealing witli 
any of the other organs because of its inaccessibility and the essential part it plays in all 
our interactions. But she maintains, our notion of intentionality is more philosophical 
than biological, so, although Searle is probably correct about intentionality being 
dependent on the system's neuroprotein, he does not give us any information about 
why, or how, it does so. So, she argues that Searle is depending on intuition for his 
predictions and not on hard, empirical facts.
2.9.4. The humanist worries confronted
More generally Boden makes a number of points about the attribution of mental 
states to machines and the work of AI in general. She says that "The spectre of the 
mechanical rriind haunts the lay consciousness because it appears to threaten deeply- 
held values and traditional beliefs".9® Humanists could be said to possess such a lay 
consciousness' for in their philosophy, machines are incapable of carrying out truly 
purposive action; "being artificial or manufactured in origin, the machine's "thought" 
and "action" can be represented as meaningful or intelligent only by some ...appeal to 
the ends of the agent who made it".99
Persons who act to follow a goal that is not their own are often described as 
automatons. We call their behaviour mechanical. This, one might think, is sufficient 
justification for the humanist point of view, but no, their proposal also depends upon
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whether of not the notions of purpose and meaning are intrinsic to the agent Boden 
does not disagree with this position but she adds that the derivative use of a 
psychological term may be more of an advantage than the humanist thinks since 
computer analogies can help us to understand the workings of the human mind. Indeed 
many of the features of programmed computers are analogous to some extent to mental 
processes, and this has proved to be a useful tool. However, one of the big differences, 
and this is where the analogies begin to fall down, is that machines, as yet, do not 
approach their 'goals' from the position of having to wrestle with some internal 
conflict. Indeed, Boden seems to side, to some great extent, with the humanist 
arguments, but less on the controversial aspect of intrinsic meaning and more, because 
the technology to date does not even come close to the analogies we want to form with 
the structure and workings of the human brain.
Although Boden defends the use of analogous reasoning between minds and 
machines she does argue that "subjectivity, meaning, and purpose as currently 
understood can be attributed to artifacts only in the secondary sense, their justification 
ultimately deriving from the skill and interests of the artificer".*®® So there exist vast 
areas of mental activity where we can know only very little and then what we know is 
not through the construction of an analogous model, but through the capabilities of the 
designer. Indeed we may even discover that ultimately our notions of intentionality are 
largely indeterminate and thus nigh on impossible to program. In this instance, at least, 
Boden can be said to agree with Searle.
The number and content of our mental states, and in particule our epistemological 
states, mitigate against the possible application of all human thought in an inorganic 
system; "the epistemological issues involved are too obscure to allow one with a clear 
conscience to insist that all aspects of human thought could in principle be simulated by 
computational means".*®* So it looks like the magnitude and intricate nature of our 
mental states are, for Boden at any rate, probably the most compelling reasons for 
doubting that the postulation of human states is possible in an inorganic system.
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This interest in the 'magnitude and intricate nature' of mental states, their 
complexity, suggests that the internal structure or architecture of the system will be 
important This being the case I will now examine Sloman's work dealing with this 
area.
2.10. Intentionality depends on the complexity of internal architecture
Serial processors have been superseded by complex machines that are variably 
known as 'neural networks', 'parallel distributed processors'(PDP's) and 
'connectionist nets'. In a seminar paper Sloman talks at length about complexity and its 
relation to the architecture of a system.*®  ^Essentially what he is saying is that the 
richness of a system's architecture is related to the complexity of that system.
In a section called "Against the Turing Test " he states that "behaviour is never 
conclusive evidence for mechanism...In particular, human-like behaviour does not 
prove the existence of coexisting, independently variable, causally interacting, more or 
less enduring, internal states, like beliefs, intentions, hopes, etc.". In this sense, at 
least, he does not seem to be very different from Wittgenstein, Searle, Dreyfus et al. 
Sloman goes as far as to say that, with a different physics than our own present one, all 
'intelligent' behaviour could be presented in a giant "lookup table", although he gives 
no advice about how this would be achieved and what the new physics would consist 
of. The crux of the argument is that, because it is in principle possible to produce 
"inteUigent-looking behaviour" in an "unintelligent mechanism" we can rule out the 
observation of behaviour as "a defining criterion for intelligence (consciousness, 
having beliefs, etc.)".*®^
So what we can be said to have in this schema is, at base, a single lookup table that 
cannot generate or cause any other states to occur, and, at top, a system that has the 
ability to generate behaviour. By comparison the lookup table will be a system with a 
simple structure. Or architecture, whilst the top level system would have a complex 
architecture that gives it a greater capacity to act The complex system is the one to 
which we usually ascribe mentalistic states; sometimes, at least in the work of Dretske,
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Rosenschein and Sloman, such systems require such ascription because they are 
themselves, mental systems. However, mental terms are frequently ascribed to 
inorganic systems, and in the context of our interaction with such systems this seems to 
take place with a reasonable degree of success.
Sloman defends the use of such mentalistic vocabulary for describing inorganic 
organisms, but, he adds that a prerequisite of this type of ascription is that the systems 
are designed with a "richer (internal) architecture: more coexisting interacting 
states".*®  ^What he means by 'design' in this context is the architecture plus its 
mechanisms that can do all manner of causally related things; for instance: "creating, 
destroying, preserving, triggering, modifying, controlling, stopping, speeding up, 
slowing down, preventing, etc..." and all of these being directions for action between 
the component parts of the system as a whole.
In the discussion of 'design' Sloman talks specifically about creating interactive 
states between machine components. If we carry this back to the 'flesh and blood' 
example he talks of different mental states having different causal roles to play in the 
behaviour of the system. He gives two examples: "belief-like sub-states", which are 
environmentally produced and influenced; and "desire-like sub-states", which produce 
changes in the environment and which depend on the system's belief states.
2.10.1. Architecture and system capabilities
From this brief outline of the work it is possible to see that the 'design' and the 
architecture of the 'design space' are what Sloman perceives to be the most important 
aspects of the system if we are going to ascribe to it mental states. So with a different 
design space the system would be capable of different things and with a more complex 
design space, or architecture, the system would be capable of a greater number and 
wider variety of activities.
The thermostat is a simple case that is capable of only a limited number of 
procedures. It is possible, Sloman argues, to describe the thermostat as having a belief­
like state that is varied by the environment (the curvature of its bi-metallic strip that is a
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temperature sensor), and of having a desire-like state that is varied by the user 
(whatever temperature the user sets it at). However, he states that these are really 
"limiting cases" of the concepts and it is "silly" to argue over whether they are "real" 
beliefs and desires. I am not so sure that it is silly, nor do I accept that Sloman thinks it 
is either for he is still concerned about the architectural state, or states, under which we 
can accurately ascribe mental states to a system.
If the thermostat were architecturally able to detect the shivering or perspiration of 
the occupants of a room then its roles would be richer than its current on/off that we set 
and adjust according to our wishes. And, so, Sloman argues that "Different 
architectures support different mixtures of mind-like capabilities".*®  ^Simply a 
system's architecture is linked to its design space and different architectures will offer 
discontinuities in design space, meaning that the system would possess a different set 
of capabilities. Sloman describes the mental states of human-beings as requiring 
"VERY rich and complex architectures"*® ,^ and we can infer from this that he accepts 
that human capabilities match the complexity of their architecture.
Indeed Sloman goes on to say that to look at the design space of a system we will 
need to take into consideration its requirements, that is, what it needs to sustain its 
existence, and the environment it occupies. Of its being able to have intentional states 
Sloman says that this requires that the system has "the ability to have representational 
states", this would enable it to distinguish between the intention to act now and ability 
to envisage future possible states and intend to act sometime then. The element of 
choice becomes important and the ability to choose between alternatives, that is acting 
now or acting later, will depend on the complexity of the inbuilt architecture of the 
system.
2.11. Concluding remarks
In the beginning of the chapter I looked at the problems associated with the theory 
of mental states and how these related to our definitions of mental acts and physical 
acts. Mental states, themselves, were seen to be important because it is through their
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supposed existence, or the behaviour that is suggestive of their existence, that we are 
capable of ascribing them, or properties of them, to mental and non-mental systems.
Then I examined how the mind is related to its perceptual objects and the objects of 
its mental representations. It was noted that there is an element of reflexiveness in the 
relation that leads, in organic cases, at least, to a subjective or introspective, self-aware 
view of the system's interaction with the world. This can be compared with the 
inorganic case where reflexiveness may lead to adaptations or emergent properties, as 
in PDF's, but more often to predictable and generalised accounts of their relation to the 
world.
Within this area two views of the intentional relation were raised; the 'mentalese' or 
'language of thought' of Fodor, and the 'intentional stance' of Dennett. Dennett 
proposed notional attitude psychology which was not dictated to by the nature of 
internal representations or where such representations would be located. Notional 
attitudes are part of the system's "notional world"; and the notional world is the world 
at a particular time and place that the system is best equipped, mentally, to deal with.
The essential role played by the nature of the system's experience of its world was 
seen to be important for its possession of intentional states. One of the most significant 
aspects of this was that for a fuller understanding of the behaviour of a system we need 
to be able to see the system in its behavioural context This is especially so when we 
consider the ambiguity of our language and the problems involved in any sort of 
translation from behaviour to mental states. From the work in this area it seems that 
there are at least two possible conclusions, neither of which are completely satisfactory. 
The first is that we can depend upon behavioural capabilities for the ascription of mental 
states though as we have seen this is by no means guaranteed; and the second was that 
we could just resign ourselves to Searle's conclusion that there are mental systems and 
non-mental systems and 'never the twain shall meet'. As yet there seem to be no good 
reasons for accepting the fatalism of Searle's conclusion.
In what followed the discussion turned to intentional states and Dretske's division 
of them into the state where the system has only information, the state where the system
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can be said to have epistemic states and lastly the state where the system can be said to 
be understanding, and holding beliefs. In this information-theoretic account, we saw 
the production of a hierarchy that gave different systems with different capabilities, 
different intentional states. Finally I examined Sloman's work that favours a swing 
towards architecturally related system capabilities, so that a machine with a rich 
architecture will have a wealth of, what might or might not be legitimately described as, 
mental states. It is this issue, and the preceding ones, that I will be confronting in the 
ensuing chapters.
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3. Mental state ascription
3.1. Introduction
No firm distinction has yet been made between those systems that definitely- 
possess mental states and those which do not. This being the case I will now discuss 
the reasons that underlie our ascription of mental states to other human beings, non­
human animals and machines, after which I will begin to tackle the problem of whether 
or not the ascription can ever be justified.
The chapter complies with the following structure. I begin by stating the question 
that will be examined and clarified, then move on to reiterate the relevance of the 
question to this thesis and to theories of mind as a whole. Then I will pass on to some 
general arguments for why we ascribe mental states and a discussion of what, I argue, 
are the necessary criteria for the ascription of such states to a variety of human and non­
human systems. As we reach the close of the chapter there will be a summary which 
will emphasise again the main points of my argument, and I will end by drawing each 
of these points together in a conclusory paragraph.
3.1.1. The question statement
In this section I will state and discuss the question of "What are the circumstances 
under which we ascribe mental states or intentionality to systems other than 
ourselves?". Such a question is important for many reasons which I will briefly recount 
here before setting out the central argument
In the previous chapter I discussed several notions of the terms 'mental state' and 
'intentionality' as used by a number of noted theorists in this area. Now, before we 
proceed to an examination of the issue of whether or not an inorganic system can have 
mental states, I will spend this chapter looking into some other related matters that have 
first to be taken into account Initially I will examine why the ascription of mental 
attitudes and states has taken on such an important role in our world today. The second 
matter to take into account will be broken down into two parts; firstly, the ways in
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which we recognise and identify different mental states, and secondly, the 
circumstances under which we feel satisfied enough with the criteria to attribute mental 
states to a system other than ourselves. Finally, I will look at what makes us, and here I 
am making an assumption, but no other system capable of attributing the phenomenon 
of mentality. Forthwith these will be known as the 'why', 'when' and 'how' of 
ascription.
3.2. The 'why' of mental ascription
The ascription of mental states and intentionality seems to be something that we do 
with greater frequency in our everyday existence. Most of the time these ascriptions are 
just implicit, which means that by our interactive behaviour we are tacitly ascribing 
particular mental states to other systems but at other times they are explicit, which is to 
say spoken. I believe that there are a number of related reasons for the rise in both 
implicit and explicit ascription and it is these reasons which I will now broach.
There have been many dramatic changes that have affected our environment over 
thie last couple of centuries. In the eighteenth century there was the Industrial ■ 
Revolution which began to provide machines capable of performing brute physical 
tasks, and so to irreversibly change the life and livelihood of mankind. Then at the end 
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries we were swept from a 
Classical or Newtonian view of the world to the non-determinism of quantum 
mechanics and Einstein's theories of relativity. Within a very small number of years our 
whole idea of physics had been turned on its head. So, with the scientific world trying 
to come to terms with events similar in scale to the Copemican Revolution of the 
sixteenth century, we find ourselves in this present century engulfed in the Information 
Revolution which is busy providing machines that will be able to replace the 
performance, by human beings, of brute mental tasks.
The fundamental characteristics of the Information Revolution have been the 
increased amount and availability of raw information and the tools to process it  Our 
communication systems have become so sophisticated that it is now possible to transmit
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/and receive messages in all sorts of ways; telephone, electronic maü and electronic file 
transfers to name but a few. It is even possible to work or converse with others using 
computers that are thousands of kilometres apart because of the rapid transference of 
data between multiple sites. Thus all the information we could ever require is now 
'ready-to-hand' for we have both quantity and speed of retrieval at our command.
With all this freely available information the awareness we have of our lives, and 
the lives of others, has advanced so much that we are now capable of seeing ourselves 
in relation to a much greater context than was once available. We are no longer the 
inhabitants of a restricted social and geographical environment Our increased 
information about our larger existence has made us aware of our world, and the 
universe within which our world is orbiting.
This revolutionary change has occurred for two fundamental reasons, the first is 
financial and the other intellectual. Both reasons can be seen positively as enrichments 
of the individual and his or her society. If we choose to look at them positively, they 
can be seen as rewards that have served to set up, sustain and forward a demand for 
more information and thus greater knowledge. As rewards they do, of course, 
encourage a greater interaction with our environment and one of the rewards of this is a 
richer awareness of our world. In this situation we are faced with an ever escalating 
pattern of behaviour; which dictates that with a greater awareness of our world there 
will be an increase in our desire for more information.
Of course, awareness and availability of infonnation are not enough by themselves 
to make us intellectually or even financially richer; what is also necessary is an 
understanding of the received information, and an understanding that includes 
ourselves in relation to our world. It is understanding that is the crucial difference 
between the received or incoming information and the grasp of knowledge, and such an 
understanding itself depends upon at least a cursory notion of how to use the 
technology that conveys the information. It is not necessary to understand the internal 
structure and functioning of the machine, but an understanding of how to use the 
relevaiit technology is indispensable for an adequate exchange of information.
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Thus we find that the information revolution has offered us new technology that 
enables the rapid conveyance of huge amounts of information to destinations 
throughout the world. Technology of this sort has been developed to do many of the 
jobs that used to be done by human beings. Then it is little wonder that, if the tasks that 
were once within the repertoire of only human systems that we know to possess 
mentality are now within the domain of those that are carried out by mechanical 
systems, we will ascribe mental states to non-human, non-mental systems.
If previously the performance of a task, or tasks, has been identified with human, 
mental systems, then a likely underlying presupposition might be that the minimum 
requirement for the successful performance of the task is that the system that carries it 
out is, at the very least, capable of occupying the mental states of which the human 
system is capable, or the equivalent of such states (whatever they may be). It is one 
way of making it easier to understand what sorts of characteristics would have to obtain 
for a system to be able to do some particular task, and from this knowledge it would be 
possible to anticipate the requirements of a system that would have to execute other 
similar or related tasks.
But it is not only a matter of our being able to know what are. the necessary 
requirements of system A in circumstance B where it has to perform task C; another 
advantage of ascribing mental states to a system, even if that system has no mentality in 
the way that we have come to understand it, is that the ascription can be a very useful 
predictive tool. For instance, if we are able to predict to a fairly high degree of accuracy 
the actions of other systems, then it would mean that our interactions in the world can 
take on an order and determination that they would not otherwise possess.
With the ascription of a mental state being only that and not actually the ascription 
of complete mentality our interactions with any other system (even with another human 
being) can only ever be carried out more shrewdly and with better informed 
judgements. For unless the other system is identical in all ways to me, and with a 
personal history that is exactly the same as mine, its actions can never be determined by 
me in the way that I can determine my own actions. If it had all these properties it
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would be feasible to argue that the 'impostor' was in fact me for it could be no-one 
else. If it were possible to ascribe a full mentality, or active mental life, it would have to 
include aspects such as a freedom of will and again, because the system could act in 
whatever way it pleased, we would have come fiill circle to find ourselves once again 
only capable of informed, but not accurate, prediction.
That we have the capability to predict at least a proportion of the prospective 
behaviour of other systems means we are no longer interacting in such a haphazard way 
within a random world. Being able to predict action means that we can also adapt our 
own behaviour with respect to what we expect another system will do and this 
adaptability gives us an increased chance of survival. If we had no such capability, that 
is, we were to have no idea of the temporal or causal connections between past, present 
and future actions, we would have to learn each event for the first time each time it were 
to take place. Inevitably this would have serious consequences for the survival of the 
human species.
Now, the question of whether we are right to make such ascriptions is not, as yet, 
the issue; for we do ascribe states to other systems and there is a rationale behind this 
action. Dennett and others would argue that it is perfectly reasonable, in fact, perhaps 
even inevitable, that we will ascribe mental states to anything that exhibits 'human-like' 
behaviour; indeed it is necessary in some sense to do so because it enables a much more 
sophisticated interaction with such systems, which in turn enriches our understanding 
of whatever information is passing between us.
People from the humanist* schools of thought would argue to the contrary saying 
that ascription of mental states to non-human, inorganic systems can only possibly 
entail misunderstanding since we are saying of a machine or artifact that it, for example 
Taiows X or 'believes x , when it is not in fact capable of such complex activity. They 
would argue that the requisite mentality is missing from such a system and they would 
say that Dennett, McCarthy and others are guilty of using language that already has an 
application in one particular context in a quite different context where its use and
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meaning are perhaps subtly, but significantly altered. I will now look briefly at the 
differences that context can make to the use of language.
The language we use to describe the actions of organic systems has been developed 
to suit a context in which there are certain organisms, for example, human beings, that 
behave in certain ways that are strongly suggestive of their possessing a variety of 
sometimes complex and sometimes not so complex mental states. When we use the 
same language to describe the putative mental states of inorganic systems that are also 
inanimate, such as a teddy bear, we are told that this is mistaken attribution and that we 
are guilty of anthropomorphism. However, for some people it seems to be relatively 
unproblematic to describe a system that is inorganic, but with moving parts, as being in 
possession of mental states.
This seems to suggest that the difference is in the possession of the moving parts, 
but if that were so then describing a Jack-in-the-box as having a desire to surprise 
would be quite a natural and acceptable thing to do. No, the difference must lie in 
something more than a thing's just being capable of movement, for if that were all that 
was required for the possession of mental states mentality would not be an issue at all.
The something 'more' that the is required by the system is to be capable of 
exhibiting appropriate behaviour. What is meant by 'appropriate behaviour' is that 
which would lead the observer (and ascriber) to say that the system is in possession of 
some mental state that corresponds with the behaviour. If we look at the example of 
trust the distinction between mere animation and appropriate behaviour can be seen to 
stand out more clearly.
As human beings we have the ability to trust each other when the occasion warrants 
and for the most part our trusting someone depends upon their exhibiting behaviour that 
we are able to inteipret as being that which is trustworthy. However, it is true that we 
extend our trust to some inorganic things thus enabling us to say of a car that we trust 
its brakes, its steering and so on. Thus it is possible for us to drive with a feeling of 
greater security than we would otherwise have.
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Both of these judgements are about our having a relation of trust with another entity 
and about being able to predict, with some degree of certainty, future events, yet they 
are different in very significant, but straightforward, ways. For instance, the trust we 
have in another human being is inextricably bound up with our prior knowledge of that 
person’s character and our interpretation of their behaviour. In one sense my trust is 
about the physical behaviour of the individual, but in another sense it is about what I 
believe to be going on inside that person’s head. On the other hand, trusting that my 
brakes will not fail is just a belief about the physical world and the physical world states 
that entail. It depends upon the beliefs I have about my world and not about the 
attribution of mental states to the car or its brakes. It follows that both examples are 
about physical events but the former is also about the mental states that precede and 
accompany the physical events when performed by an individual with a mental life.
Another sign of the difference, but this time a purely linguistic one is this: I say that 
my trust in à friend can be betrayed if my friend lets me down in some way; yet I do not 
say of my brakes that they have betrayed me, (unless I am being melodramatic), for it 
would be a peculiar misapplication of language since the term 'betrayal' is reserved for 
use with things that we consider to be morally culpable and thus responsible for their 
actions. The worst my brakes can do is fail, but they cannot betray me as a trusted 
friend might.
Of course, it is true that in the event of an accident we might say "I trusted these 
brakes" or "I blame the brakes", but this is just because of our tendency to ascribe 
intentionality and mental states in an effort to explain circumstances that we might not 
fully understand, if the brakes fail they do so out of a physical deficiency, but if my 
friend betrays me she does so out of choice. The difference is in the fact that only one 
of them is capable of making a decision about its actions and the other is entirely 
dependent upon whatever physical states of affairs hold at that time.
In a similar way, if we were capable of constructing an algorithm from which we 
could predict the behaviour of even the most complex computer then, in terras of trust, 
all we would ever have is the sort of trust that we can have in the brakes of our car. The
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sort of trust we have in other people is a different kettle of fish that is more like having 
faith in a god, that is, the sort of belief that can be firm, indeed even unshakable, even 
when the evidence for our holding the belief is scanty. An algorithm from which we 
could predict the future* behaviour of other people would not be a formalisation of trust, 
rather, it would reduce the need for us to trust at all.
I will now turn to the reasons why the evidence upon which we base our attribution 
of mental states is, at best, inadequate. A bare outline of my argument is as follows: our 
ability to ascribe mental states depends upon two things, namely; our ability to use and 
understand language, and two, our apprehension of the complexity of the system with 
which we are dealing. (These will be discussed at in section 3.4 and then at greater 
length in chapter four.) We have already seen that animation is not enough and that 
appropriate human 'mental state’ behaviour is necessary if we are going to even 
consider the possibility of imputing mental states in an inorganic system. I would like 
to look at what counts as 'appropriate' behaviour, and when is it possible for us to 
recognise and identify such behaviour as such.
3.3. The 'when* of mental state ascription
To reiterate, we are looking for what leads us to attribute mental states to other 
entities, and so far we have settled that the only evidence we can go on is the 
perceivable behaviour of the system to which we are attributing the states and so in this 
instance the 'when' describes the state of affairs under which we feel justified in our 
ascription of mental states, and the justification can only be when the system behaves in 
accordance with tlie paradigm case 'as-though' it understood, believed, knew, wished 
or whatever.
The problem with evidence and finding 'appropriate' behaviour is that we have to 
first of all establish behaviour with which it can successfully be compared. Once we 
have this model we can say Tes, this behaviour fits with our model' or 'No, this 
behaviour does not accord'.^ So that any behaviour other than the appropriate one 
would not, as a result, be in accordance with the system having that mental state.
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The most suitable starting point in the search for appropriate behaviour is to look at 
the entities to which we already ascribe mental states and look at how they behave in 
some given circumstances. The most obvious entities are those that we know to 
possess mentality because it is with them that the attribution of mental states will most 
readily take place. So we will look to human beings, for it is with them that we can start 
to construct a paradigm of behaviour.
3.3.1. Recognition and identification of 'appropriate' behaviour
The discussion that follows will be about the sorts of evidence we have for the 
occurrence of mental states, and because of this it will be about mental states in general 
and not any particular example such as, ’believing', knowing', 'hoping' and so on.
As already mentioned there are two rules to follow to recognise that a human being 
has a particular mental state. The first of these is to look at the individual's behaviour, 
for in the majority of cases (there will always be exceptions) each different mental state 
will be discernible by a different behaviour or repertoire of behaviours. The second rule 
is to look for spoken verification of the mental state that the person is claiming to 
occupy. This type of behaviour is characterised by the use of the first person 
propositional attitude, for example, "I believe" or "I wish". I will argue that neither of 
these are completely reliable methods for an accurate determination of the mental states 
of any system, but, until something more dependable comes along, these are the only 
guides we have.
When wanting to know if someone believes something we look for evidence of that 
belief. Here are two examples, one of a belief in some physical, and therefore 
observable, aspect of our world, and the other a belief for which there is no physical 
object in the world, occupying a point in space and time, to which the belief relates.
The first example is of Mary who puts up her umbrella, thus giving us an indication 
that she believes she needs some form of protection from the elements. If she goes on 
to put on some boots we will have another piece of evidence, from which we can 
extract the information that Mary believes she needs shelter from wet weather. Mary
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may also offer us a verbal verification for our thinking that she has a certain belief or set 
of beliefs; for instance she may say "I believe it is raining and if I don't have protective 
clothing I will get wet". Thus we have two sources of proof for the attribution of a 
belief state to Mary, we have her physical behaviour and her spoken behaviour. We 
have also our own empirical corroboration to back up Mary's verbal and visual 
evidence. So if we see it is raining, and Mary acts in accordance with there being bad 
weather, then we are more likely to attribute to her the belief that it is raining.
The second example is of someone holding a belief in something superphysical, a 
divine being or a state of Nirvana, perhaps. For us to attribute the mental state of belief 
in this case we can only rely on the acts of the individual, for example, they may chant 
mantras and wear saffron robes, or they may attend a particular church service on every 
appropriate occasion. On top of this they might try to convert us by telling us about 
their own personal epiphanies or how much better their lives have been with a faith in 
something spiritual. In this, the abstract example, no empirical experience of our own 
could ever corroborate the mental state of the other individual for his or her experiences 
are of a personal or subjective nature.
So in our first example we have the physical and spoken behavioural evidence of 
the person to whom we are ascribing mental states, plus our own visual back-up to add 
credence, or indeed a refutation, to their story. In the second case we have only the 
behavioural evidence of the other person for there is nothing that we can perceive that 
could add or subtract from their being in a particular state of belief. An interesting point 
about the second example is that my ascription of a mental state does not only rely upon 
the careful interpretation of the individual's behaviour but a necessary aspect of my 
ascription is an examination of their behaviour within a specific social situation. It is 
this contextual dependency that makes my identification of their mental states more 
reliable; for in a whole context I am more likely to recognise if I am being deceived, say 
for example, that the person to whom I am ascribing mental states is an actor who is 
taking part in a theatrical production.
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I have shown that for the ascription of mental states we first need a model with 
which we can compare the behaviour of a second system to which we might, given the 
right circumstances, make an ascription of mentality. In this instance the paradigm case 
is that of human activity, for human beings are already complex systems that not only. 
possess mentality but also the ability to communicate their experiences of their 
individual mental states. By using their example to show how we can compare, 
recognise and identify the greatest likelihood of the occurrence of particular mental 
states, I have been able to demonstrate that ascription depends upon one of three 
possibilities. These possibilities are: firstly, to make an ascription of mentality solely on 
the basis of physical behaviour; or secondly, to ascribe mental states on the basis of 
behaviour that also has a linguistic back-up, that is, the person saying they 'believe x' 
or 'desire y'; or thirdly, to make an ascription of mentality on the basis of behaviour 
that is linguistically reinforced by the person but in addition to that to have the ascribers 
own, perhaps, corroborating^experience of the system's world at the time that the 
ascription might take place.
Having demonstrated that we are able to make ascriptions of mentality to systems 
other than ourselves on the basis of exhibited behaviour, I will now move on to the 
question of how we actually undertake such ascriptions.
3.4. The 'how* of mental ascription
In this context 'how' will be used to describe the physical manifestations behind the 
action of making an ascription. For example, how we actually ascribe a mental state of 
belief or unhappiness. I shall be arguing that the act of ascription can be made in either 
one, or both, of the following two ways; directly through the use of language, or 
indirectly through our interactive behaviour with another system. Thus in this section I 
will discuss these two acts of ascription.
3.4.1. Language - linguistic ascription
For me to be capable of fully understanding both the physical and verbal behaviour 
exhibited by another system I too have to be a language user; for I need to be able to
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understand what is being said by another system as well as be able to use language to 
express what I think it "knows", "understands", "believes" and so on. So by being a 
language user that already manifests mental states I am capable of attributing mental 
states to systems other than myself. This does not preclude the ascription of mental 
states using a non-verbal form, but it does suggest that behavioural ascription could not 
be made as clearly as linguistic ascription.
Being a language user means that I have all the procedures for verifying the 
mentality of others at my disposal. For instance, I can observe the behaviour of another 
human being, I am able to understand when it uses propositional attitude statements to 
express its state of mind, and I am able to apply the value of my own experience as a 
testimony to its stated frame of mind. Were I interacting with a non-human system, 
incapable of using natural language, it would only be usefully possible for me to 
compare its behaviour with that of other more complex systems. Only its non- 
linguistic, or physical, behaviour is perceptible; and it cannot describe its own internal 
states reflexively in a way that human beings can. Even someone who is mute can make 
gestures, such as a sweep of the arm meaning "all of this", that shows that he or she 
sees themselves in relation to the larger context of their world; a computer is not capable 
of this sort of self-consciousness behaviour.
It seems then that being a natural language user has its advantages for it allows the 
user to assign meaning to things in its world and thus to interpret ever changing states 
of affairs and to act on them by attributing mental states where applicable thus enabling 
a more thorough and sophisticated interaction with its environment. There is also the 
advantage that information can be passed quickly between users of the same language, 
for example, the same social group who have shared meanings and uses of words. I 
would like to now put forward an argument to show that the acquisition and use of 
language are important for our being able to ascribe mental states.
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Language acquisition and use are important for ascription
In our everyday use of language its acquisition does not play a big role, indeed it 
could be successfully argued that how we came to acquire language plays no part at all 
in day to day conversation. To demonstrate this I will offer an example that portrays a 
physical interaction between me and my world. If I wish to cross a river and I make 
enquiries about a means of doing so, the origins of the language that I use are 
unimportant. What is important is that I am understood; how I came to know the word 
'bridge' or to make grammatical use of the preposition 'across' is immaterial. Similarly, 
I am not interested in how my means of crossing the river came to be there, unless 
perhaps to question its safety, but even that is more a matter of its physical structure 
here and now rather than a reflection on the skills of the bridge builder.
Thus I would argue that when talking of physical things in the world, such as a 
bridge across the river or a game of bridge, we need make no recourse to how our 
language came about. For a proper understanding one needs only to have learnt the 
relevant language and be able to use it in the appropriate circumstances so we can 
understand each other and make ourselves understood. If we use language in 
inappropriate circumstances it will sound like nonsense. The appropriate circumstances 
are what Wittgenstein would describe in the Philosophical Investigations as the right 
"language game".
We start learning how to use language, or play "language games", from a very early 
age without any formal or theoretical instruction. We may learn the names of objects by 
ostensive definition or in s^ociation with other things, but we only learn their 
application through interactive use in society. Throughout our lives we continue to leam 
new words, with different applications and configurations, and because of this how we 
acquire language becomes gradually less and less important compared with the manner 
in which it is used. Both the acquisition and the use of language have to take place in a 
social setting, but of both of them only the language use remains socially important.
93
since it is only through continued shared use of words and phrases that we can ever 
know that we are using them in an acceptable way.
Up to now I have been concerned with the acquisition and use of language in 
relation to talking about everyday states of affairs in our worlds. I have claimed that 
how we acquire language is irrelevant for its successful continued use, but I have added 
that how we use language remains important, if only because it allows us to have 
shared meanings, thus enabling the process of communication to take place. According 
to Wittgenstein a "private language" is of no use for communication because no-one 
could ever know precisely what any other person means. A shared use results in a 
shared meaning.
In the slightly different context of ascribing intentional states there are new 
problems to be met. No longer are we confronted by ordinary language which is used 
to describe a physical world, now we are faced with trying to offer a description of 
mental states that lie, by their very nature, undisclosed to us. We are back to the 
philosophical problem of other minds but in this case we are concerned only with when 
and how we should ascribe the capabilities of minds to systems other than ourselves. If 
we talk about the ascription of 'capabilities' to minds rather than the ascription of actual 
mental states the problem of other minds becomes one of physical functionality, which 
is to say what the system is able to do, rather than whether it possesses intentionality 
and has mental states that are comparable to the ones had by me.
Earlier I said that we attribute mental or intentional states to other systems if they 
seem as-though they know, desire, wish, and so on. So the ascription of a form of 
mentality can be seen to depend entirely upon creating analogies with other behaviour 
that we associate with particular mental dispositions. Even from an examination of my 
own behaviour I can see that there are occasions when I behave in a 'belief-like' or 
'want-like' way. If I then extrapolate from these and examine the behaviour of other 
systems it might be possible to pin down which essential characteristics occur in both 
my behaviour and that of the other system. I will have created an analogy between the 
two sets of behaviour.
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If I am going to use language to ascribe an intentional state to something that I am 
doing, thinking or whatever then I am going to have to first of all be capable of 
discerning my own mental states from my behaviour, and then I will have to be able to 
compare my behaviour with that of other systems when the same intentional language 
has been used. To do this will require a great deal of understanding of both the 
behaviour that is taking place, and the language that is being used to describe the 
behaviour.
My social use of language is very important if I am to have a complete 
understanding of both the language that the other system uses^ and the language I use 
to describe my own mental events. However, in the case of mental ascription the way 
my language was acquired is also of great importance. For if, as I have argued, 
language is acquired and used through social interaction, and the ascription of mental 
states and intentionality is first made by analogy with my own mental states, of which I 
have a first hand knowledge, and subsequently with other systems with which I interact 
socially, then the way language is acquired and subsequently used will matter a great 
deal. It is from our initial acquisition of language that we leam and build up the 
framework of linguistic behaviour, the propositional attitude elements of which can 
then be characterised by the exhibition of appropriate 'mental state' behaviour.
If we acquire a language by analogy with things, situations and states of affairs in 
the world and if that language is in continual use then the way it came into being stops 
mattering. However, with the language that we use to describe mental states its 
acquisition is by analogy with that behaviour which we consider to be the most 
appropriate 'mental state behaviour', so how the language was originally acquired is 
important if the analogy is to be upheld.
Such mental state behaviour is necessarily human for two reasons, firstly, because 
we know humans possess mentality, and secondly, because they are the only systems 
with the capability to describe these mental states. The analogy set up at the acquisition 
stage of learning must always be significant, even if we are not always aware of it.
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since it is on this basis that we can attribute mental states. The first analogy is important 
even if the subsequent contexts alter and we leam some new criteria.
The most notable difference between the ascription of mentality and the physical use 
of language is that the behavioural analogies of mental attitude ascription, by which we 
leam to recognise the likely occurrence of a mental state, only alter very little 
throughout our lives and our continued use of language. Their alteration is restricted 
because they are the outward physical signs of the manifestation of an inward non­
physical mental state and we have no other way of recognising them.
Quite simply the recognition and identification of mental state behaviour is different 
from the recognition and identification of physical objects because of the disparity in the 
quantity and quality of the received information. With concrete objects there is always 
much more informational input; for instance, if I am learning how to identify a pint of 
beer I will have the taste of the beer, its smell, the colour of the liquid, the size of the 
receptacle and many other things to go on. For the recognition and ascription of a 
mental state we have much less information to go on but what we have must remain 
closely akin to its original form if recognition is to continue.
Before moving on to the next section of the chapter to show that the ascription of 
mental states can also be non-linguistic, I will give a summary of the argument that I 
have set out above. Then I will draw the attention of the reader to some examples of 
attribution through linguistic interaction to a human system and an inorganic system.
The acquisition and use of language requires a social environment, an environment 
in which we can leam to use language properly, that is, the way our society does. How 
we acquire the terms to describe physical objects in our environment does not continue 
to matter, but how we use those terms does. How we acquire mental state language is 
by inward reflection and outward use. If I feel sad and have no language to describe it,
I will nevertheless still feel sad; and the people with whom I interact would behave with 
me 'as-if I feel sad. With the facility of language it is easier to express my sadness but 
it is still difficult to compare it with the sadness of another person.
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The acquisition of my 'sadness' language will have been from my own experience 
of my mental states when I feel a particular way. My use of language to express my 
sadness will always be a social use that involves interaction with other human beings 
who can also feel and express (perhaps using slightly different language) their sadness. 
How I acquire my experience of sadness and the language I leam to accompany .it will 
always be important for it is that acquisition that dictates how I judge my own later 
experiences of sadness and the sadness I experience, second-hand, in the hearts and 
minds of others.
When dealing with non-human organic systems, such as cats or beavers, the 
ascription of mental states is most definitely done on a basis of non-linguistic 
interaction, however, when dealing with human beings the attribution of mentality 
made by the human observer can be verbal as well as behavioural. The human 
capability to ascribe mental states both behaviourally and linguistically means that it has 
a distinct advantage over other systems that are not capable of using natural language. 
The advantage of being a language user is three-fold; firstly it means that the description 
of our own mental states is more exact; secondly, we can be understood by other 
language users; and thirdly, our ascription of the mental states of other systems will be 
more accurate.
However, it is not just the ability to use a language that matters, it is also the fact 
that there was a need for a more competent form of communication there in the first 
place followed by a continued use and adaptation of the language in our social 
environment. A recent argument states that "it is not the fact that man can speak which 
counts so much as the fact that he has something to say".^ That we have something to 
say is a result of the elaborate nature of our society and our complex interactions with 
one another within our society. The complexity of our interactions is made more so 
because we are are trying to define the nature of abstract, 'in-ihe-head' entities; the 
mental states of ourselves and possibly other systems.
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3.4.2. The ascription of mental states using language
Now to two examples of the ascription of mental states through linguistic 
interaction. The first is of a computer that asks for the replacement of a floppy disk. 
Often when trying to run an application on a computer a message will appear on the 
screen asking that the user replace a specific disk. The disk will be one with the 
application on it and the computer is unable to run the application without the disk. The 
message is usually something like "Please insert the disk entitled Word4'". To all 
intents and purposes the system can be attributed with a 'need' for the disk, or it might 
even be said to 'want' the disk.
The 'want' or 'need' can easily be compared with a human need for something; and 
with this example in mind, perhaps the need for a pencil and some paper before a letter 
can be written. It is certainly true that human beings can start the whole operation of 
letter writing in their heads and later transfer it to paper but the actual letter writing 
cannot be started unless the implements are there to be used. The 'implements' needed 
by the person are comparable to the 'application' needed by the computer.
In this example I have deliberately kept the comparative needs superficial, so that 
the need for a floppy disk by the computer runs no deeper (cognitively) than the need 
by the human being for writing equipment. What are more difficult to compare are the 
deeper emotional needs of a human being for affection and security, for nothing similar 
exists in the computer environment. Even an animal such as a cat can show a need for 
affection and warmth by pushing its head against your hand until you stroke it or 
curling up on your knee when you are reading a book, but no computer has yet been 
developed that needs to be encouraged or praised when it has correctly transferred a file 
or transferred a text from Latex to Word 5. Indeed it would take a vigorous stretch of 
the imagination to mistake the computer's superficial request for the much deeper wants 
and needs that can be expressed by a human being or some animals.
It should also be remembered that the computer is intended to be 'user-friendly' so 
it is meant to emulate the kind of polite human-like behaviour that is most likely to get a
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positive response. The language the computer uses is programmed into it so that it can 
be more easily understood and our use of intentional language^ is just a way of 
describing the actions of the computer in a way that is likely to be understood, and 
more importantly responded to, by competent users of the same, in this case natural, 
language.
The second example to be used is that of someone running to catch a bus. There can
be no doubt in the mind of the observer that the actions displayed by the other person of
looking round, trying to cross the road hurriedly, running along near the edge of the 
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footpath, continually glancing behind them to watch the approach of the bus and 
shouting "Stop", are the behaviours that correspond most accurately with someone 
having a desire to catch a bus. If I was to go through a process of gross analogy with 
my own behaviour every time I thought about ascribing a mental state to something I 
might say to myself, "If I were doing all the things this person is doing now what 
would be my state of mind?". At least using this technique I am able to compare my 
own mental activity with what I assume to be theirs.
It is true that unless we are acquainted with the person we are unlikely to know why 
they hold such a desire, but our ascription to them of the wish to be in time for the bus 
does not depend on background reasons, only on their behaviour at the time. It is 
certainly true that if the person had not shouted to the driver to "Stop" I would still have 
been able to infer from their other behaviours that they wanted to catch the bus. It is to 
this non-linguistic behaviour and ascription that I wish to turn to now.
3.5. The story so far
This section is a summary which will be followed by an explanation of what exactly 
is meant by the 'non-linguistic ascription of mental states'. Up unto now I have talked 
about why, when and how we set about ascribing mental states to other systems and 
here they now are in précised form.
Why do we ascribe mental states? We ascribe mental states for two reasons, the 
first is that we are interacting with inorganic systems that can perform mental-like tasks.
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and, the second reason is that it is a useful predictive tool that facilitates interaction and 
communication between human beings and what are perceived to be 'intelligent' 
systems.
When do we make ascriptions of mental or intentional states? Mental states are 
ascribed to systems that behave 'as-though' they understood, wished, hoped and so 
on. Since I can never know for sure what is going on inside another system all that is 
left to me is to base my ascriptions on their perceivable behaviour. There are three 
levels of verification for a system being in a mental state; they are, purely behavioural, 
behavioural with the system offering a linguistic back-up, and finally, behavioural with 
a linguistic back-up and the corroborating experience of the ascriher.
How do we physically ascribe mental states to other systems? Ascription can be 
either linguistic or behavioural. Which is only to say that I can attribute a state to 
something by saying "X wishes that Y" or "Mary believes it is raining", and in each of 
these the attribution is made using language; alternatively, I can attribute a state of mind 
to something by adapting my behaviour to fit in with what mental state I perceive it to 
have, and ascription of this latter type is non-linguistic.
The distinction can also be made with respect to implicit and explicit 
representations. For instance, I would not say of a machine that it 'believes Y' but I 
might behave implicitly to it 'as-though' it does. The machine or the cat might behave 
as-though it has a particular goal in sight. It behaves in totality, that is, the system 
altogether can behave in such a way but there is nowhere within the system that we can 
say 'Ah, there is the representation of its goal'. The goal-directedness is a function of 
the system as whole and no one particular aspect of it. In sum we can say of the 
machine, and perhaps all animals except human beings, that the appropriate goal- 
directed behaviour is accompanied only by an implicit representation.
The human system seems, at tire moment anyway, to be the only system that can 
have explicit representations. An explicit representation can take a number of forms, 
spoken, as when I say "The moon is made of green cheese", or thought, as when I 
think but do not say out loud that "The love of money is the root of all evil"^, or even
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physically drawn but not verbalised, such as a painting of my favourite walk. The 
capabilities of human beings are enhanced by the fact that they can have such explicit 
representations. It follows then that any system that could move from having only 
implicit representations to having explicit ones would necessarily be endowed with a 
different set of capabilities, and not least of these would be the fact that it would have 
graduated from 'as-though' mentality to having real mental states.
3.6. Apprehension - ascription need not be linguistic
The non-linguistic ascription of internal characteristics takes the form of a brute 
physical enquiry. A sort of 'poking and fiddling' approach which can probably be best 
described with the help of examples. The first example will be of inorganic systems and 
the second will be of non-verbal communication with an organic, but non-human 
system.
Say, for example, I am given two machines to use and the only way I can find 
anything out about them is to fiddle and poke at them. If one is a thermostat and the 
other is a video recorder my interaction with each of them will begin to take a distinctly 
different form. There are fewer buttons, if any, on a thermostat and only one switch 
with an on/off position. The video recorder, on the other hand, has many buttons, 
lights and switches all of which cause me to behave with it in a more circumspect way. 
On the basis of these gross physical differences alone my interactions with the different 
systems begin to develop and become separate. If I go further and open both systems 
up to see what is inside this wül only serve to reinforce my by now distinct approach to 
each of them.
On a superficial interaction alone I will have come to the decision that the video 
recorder is a much more complex system that is capable of a great many things that the 
relatively basic thermostat is not. By my behaviour alone I will have ascribed to them 
quite disparate internal states. The thermostat is only capable of low-level states, such 
as being able to process information about the temperature of the room, whereas the 
video recorder can be programmed to record different programmes at different times on
101
different channels. My behaviour with the video recorder will probably reflect the 
instinctual feeling I have about this being quite a 'clever' piece of machinery that can 
seemingly understand what I ask it to do. .
A not dissimilar interaction is the noii-linguistic interaction we have with non­
human organic systems such as pigs, cats and beavers. The biggest difference between 
these systems and non-linguistic inorganic systems is that the former have mental lives 
about which we know very little. We do not, for instance, know if a cat or mongoose is 
capable of seeing itself in relation to its world or whether its responses are just a matter 
of the organisation of innate DNA structures that dictate the drives for fight, flight, food 
and reproduction. With inorganic systems we can be fairly certain that the ones we have 
to date are justyï/i/fe state machinesJ that is, machines with completely determinable 
states, that are incapable of introspection or exercising free-will.
It may be feasible to take an inorganic system to pieces to examine its internal 
design and machine states but it is not a feasible procedure for our investigation of 
animal or human mental states. Although it is possible, with some experiments, to look 
more closely at mental states such as excitation and stimulus-response, it is not possible 
to discover anything about what the system believes, hopes or feels sad about since we 
have not yet achieved the dizzy heights of being able to recognise in patterns of brain 
behaviour the mental states which might belong to them.
We attribute mental states to animals in a very similar manner to the way in which 
we ascribe mentality to humans; we base it on 'as-though' behaviour. If a cat is hungry 
and it has grown up being fed canned food that is taken out of a particular cupboard, 
then it is odds on that the cat will have learned by association that rubbing itself against 
the cupboard and miaowing will elicit the desired response of a willing human with a 
can-opener and a tin of cat food. The cat behaves as-though it knows where the cat 
food is and as-though it knows how to ask to be fed. If we are willing to attribute 
mental states to inorganic systems because of their exhibited behaviour then there seems 
no reason why we should not attribute mental states to camels, cats, and crocodiles on 
the basis of their display of Toiowing' behaviour.
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3.6.1. The implications of 'as-though* ascription
With the help of these examples it has been shown that there are often good reasons 
for ascribing mentality to systems that exhibit behaviour which suggest that they are 
occupying a particular mental state. The ascription in these examples is behavioural but 
non-linguistic because the systems being dealt with have no use of natural language. 
There are two possible implications of this type of ascription, namely: one, that the 
mentality is in the head of the beholder and not in the system being apprehended; and 
two, that mentality is something that is also out there and by interacting with other 
systems we get glimpses of it
The first of these conclusions rims headlong into solipsism because it denies 
mentality to anything else, including other human beings, and permits mentality only 
for me in my world. There can be no meeting of minds in this world for my world is aU 
that there is since all I have available to me are my own perceptions. A weaker version 
of this view might be that it can be accepted that mentality exists in other human beings 
on the basis that if it exists for me, and they are like me physically, there is a very good 
probability that it exists for them. In this sense it is possible to create our human 
analogies of mental state behaviour for it is possible to imagine what it would be like to 
be another human being. What becomes difficult is imagining what it would be like to 
be another entity like a cat or an aardvark, and even more difficulty is encountered in 
imagining what it would be like to be a computer, for we have no experience with 
which to compare their being. Which is only to say that in some sense I know what it is 
to be an organic entity but not what it is like to be an inorganic entity.
To accept the second implication is to accept that mentality can exist in any other 
system that behaves as-though it has mental states. It is a position adopted by realists 
who accept that there must be mental activity in other things because we are able to 
interact with them in complex ways. For a machine to behave as-though it understood, 
and for it to have an implicit representation of the question being asked, is still a form 
of mentality even if only a simulated form. So it is not worth discarding realism out of
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hand. The biggest drawback for realism is that it, like solipsism, ceases to enquire 
about the nature of mentality once its position has been adopted.
A more attractive position is in the middle ground where it is possible to ascribe 
mentality to other systems on the basis of a created analogy with my own experiences.
Their experiences may never be identical to mine but they, that is my mental states and 
their internal states which we can only glimpse in their behaviour, have similarities and 
overlaps that are by no means insignificant. The most we can say for now is that our 
access to other kinds of mentality is limited and can be attained only gradually, and we 
may eventually discover that the relationship between my mentality and that of other 
non-human systems (animals and machines) is asymptotic.® Thus we might find that 
many, but not all, of our mental states can be shared with other types of systems. One 
particularly problematic state is that of self-consciousness, as the following diagram 
illustrates.
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In this diagram the dashed lines indicate the problems that exist in trying to differentiate 
between one sort of mental state and another, for example, being able to say where a knowledge 
state ends and a beliefs state starts is by no means an easy task.^ The diagram is described as 
being asymptotic because the lines of Information processing', 'Knowledge storing' and 'Belief 
formation' respectively, all run in the same direction, above the systems that are capable of 
performing at each level, however, none of them actually reach and follow the curved line of 
'Definite belief formation' which indicates the beliefs of which I can have first hand experience, _ 
which are, my own beliefs. Notably none of the other systems can ever 'reach' and thus have 
direct experience of my own self-conscious intentional states.
3.7. What role has vanity in our reluctance to ascribe mental states?
Throughout this chapter it has become apparent that the ascription of mental states is 
done on the basis of whether the exhibited behaviour can be described as human-like, 
and if it can, in what sense and to what degree is it human-like. A new term, 'as- 
though', has been employed to express the similarity of the behaviour but also to try to 
deflect the conflict that surrounds the subject of non-human systems that behave 'as- . 
though' they are in possession of human mental states.
I would like to put forward an argument to propose that initially the conflict arises 
out of a sort of arrogance that allows human beings to think of themselves as having an 
unrivalled intelligence and a monopoly on the possession of high-level mental states.
An intelligence such as it is that walks hand-in-hand with the knowledge that we are 
subjective systems capable of introspection, the contemplation of abstract concepts and 
the ability to ascribe mental states to other things and of these mental states we imagine 
that if they are in existence, we wül be able to draw an analogy between them and our 
own. So, we ascribe mentality to something that behaves like us because of a belief that 
says if the other system is capable of behaving like us then it must have mental states 
just like ours else how could it behave in the manner in which it does.
An arrogance of this sort can be seen in modem astrophysics in the case of the 
"Anthropic Principle" which states that "there will only be observers to look at the
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Universe in rather specially selected universes".^® The implication of this is that our 
cosmology interacts so intricately and with such accuracy that without it existing in just 
this way the human being could never have come into existence. We are part of a 
"specially selected universe". Thus it can be concluded that human beings did not just 
happen by accident but are instead part of some larger well-fashioned plan in which it 
was ordained that our existence would come about in order for us to be able to 
understand the universe and its order. What the Anthropic Principle does not say is that 
the other implication is this: if things had not happened just as they have the lack of 
'plan' would not have mattered to us because we would not be here to reflect upon iiii
Here we have human beings that perceive themselves as being comparable to, but 
not identical with, any other system which is a dangerously exalted position from 
where it is easy to topple.
3.8. Social and observational criteria in ascription
Before I move on to the summary of this chapter I would like to say a word or two 
about the question of intrinsic meaning and how it relates to the problem of ascribing 
mental states. When dealing with symbols and the manipulation of symbols the idea of 
intrinsic meaning is contrasted with that of attributed meaning; the former suggesting 
that a symbol has a particular meaning as an essential part of its being that symbol, and 
the latter, that all symbols have a meaning assigned to them by the users of the 
symbols.
Both intentionality and the ascription of intentionality can be expressed in the form 
of propositional attitudes, and for this the system must be capable of using language. 
To use a language it must first be learnt, and to use it to form intentional statements the 
system must be capable of incorporating its language into its everyday life. The element 
of uncertainty implicit in the phrase 'everyday life' suggests that the system must be 
capable in some sense of analysing and synthesizing the language it possesses in order 
to form new expressions that will describe new states of affairs.
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So a fundamental requirement for a system that can have belief states and 
intentionality is that it be capable of manipulating symbols. This ability means that a 
language user is able to juggle symbols, assign new meanings to symbols and create 
new expressions from novel configurations of symbols, and because of this it has a 
tremendous advantage over any other non-linguistic system. One example of this 
advantage is that the language user can interact with other similar systems, sharing and 
conveying information that is mutually beneficial.
Through social interaction with other systems of similar linguistic potential the 
human system has become a language user. It is both capable of using language to 
convey useful information and of creating language to make this process possible.
Thus, it follows, that it must be able to manipulate symbols and strings of symbols to 
express new meanings and also attribute new meanings to symbols that have an 
established use, as, for example, when writing a code.
We are, in effect, human symbol processors that can manipulate formal symbol 
systems, but we are distinct from the purely formal symbol manipulators because we 
are capable of the assignment of meaning to whole sets of symbols and perhaps creative 
meaning or language us when writing works of fictional literature or song lyrics. A 
good example is of the invention of a whole new alphabet where each letter will have 
been assigned a meaning distinct from any of the other symbols, each consequent 
conjunction of letters will have a complex meaning and each configuration of these 
conjunctions into words and phrases will have a separate set of meanings still.
As language development and use is a product of the social interaction of linguistic 
peers the meaning of its constituent parts, whether singly or in conjunction, will be 
dependent upon its culture. Similarly, language can only be relevant when used in the 
culture in which it originates and is currently in use. A crude example to show the 
importance of this relevancy is that of English speakers who go abroad and try to be 
understood using their own language, they do, sometimes without noticing, raise their 
voices and speak more slowly in a vain attempt to be understood, not realising there are 
also cultural barriers acting to inhibit language comprehension.
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With this cultural development of language it can be argued that it is not possible for 
symbols to have an intrinsic meaning for meanings are 'put into' our heads by linguistic 
interactions. Meaning becomes a social phenomenon that makes it possible to speak to 
ourselves internally in a sort of 'internal socialization', but the meanings are not in our 
heads alone; they are a composition of what is in our heads and in our worlds. In just 
this way the meanings we ascribe to things are a reflection in our heads of the reality in 
the world. As a social construction the essential elements of any language will have 
their meanings attributed by the parts of society that use that language. I, for example, 
would understand very little of a knitting pattern, but people who knit regularly could 
converse happily and successfully, each understanding the other and being understood.
To summarise: that symbols can have intrinsic meaning becomes very doubtful if 
we accept that the symbols and strings of symbols that go to make up a language are 
created and adapted by a society for the use of that society. The symbol meanings are 
attributed by the users, and it is only through using a language in the environment in 
which it was developed that we ever come to know that a meaning is shared.
The implication of this to our current problem is that it comes full circle to 
demonstrate our reliance on social or observational criteria for the ascription of mental 
states to other systems. To say of something that it understands is to use a social 
phenomenon, language, to describe a social phenomenon, behaviour. Both types of 
social phenomenon can only be fully understood when the language and culture are also 
understood. If the meaning of a symbol was intrinsic then that symbol could be applied 
cross-culturaily with no loss of, or mistaken, comprehension.
The meaning of a language is something that is attributed by the users of that 
language; it is based on social criteria and does not mysteriously exist somewhere in the 
head. In just the same way mental states are attributed, they do not have a physical 
existence and are socially defined and dependent.
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3.9. Main summary and conclusion
My discussion began with how widespread and frequent has become our ascription 
of intentionality and mental states to non-human systems. It was proposed that this was 
due to our increased interaction with a largely technological environment, and that we 
ascribe a variety of mental states to these systems because they perform tasks that were 
previously only imaginable within the domain of human beings.
Non-human, inorganic systems are now capable of doing things that were once 
only done by human beings who are capable of wide ranging high-level mental 
activities. As we are the only system we know to possess mental states we ascribe 
mental states by forming an analogy with ourselves. We are human beings that have a 
mental life with intentionality and mental states which we can describe using language 
for other language users to understand. We have found, perhaps through trial and 
error, that it is better to treat a system that behaves 'as-though' it has a particular mental 
state as though it really has the state for it assists our interaction with it and permits us 
to narrow down and predict its possible future states. If all we have is the 
behavioural criteria that suggests that a system is occupying a mental state then it would 
be more sensible to go on this information than ignore it in the hope of something better 
turning up.
A big advantage that we as human systems have is that we are capable of using 
language which enables us to describe our own intentional states and inner mental life 
and to express our ascription of mental states to other systems. The way we acquire and 
use language was shown to be important for the attribution of mental states. We acquire 
language through analogy with objects and states of affairs in our world and we only 
leam to use language properly through shared use in a linguistic society. Then when we 
come to ascribe mentality to something this too must be done by analogy since we have 
no access to actual mental states other than our own. The analogy we look to has to be 
with other things we recognise as being part of our linguistic interaction with our 
world.
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However, as was shown, language is not the only way of ascribing mentality for it 
is possible to ascribe it through behavioural interaction alone. Everything depends upon 
my behavioural interaction with the other system in a way that suggests what its 
capabilities might be, thus implying whether or not I think it capable of only 
'processing' the information, 'understanding' the information or forming 'beliefs' 
about it.
From this discussion it can be concluded that if we are to achieve a good 
understanding of the possible mental states of another human system there are a couple 
of conditions that would have first to be met. They are, firstly, that we, and the other 
system, would need to be users of a shared and mutually comprehensible language so 
that verification can be given of the mentality of the system to be ascribed; and 
secondly, that the ascription of mental states would also need to be made using the 
same language. Where there can be no linguistic corroboration, for example, a human 
being who is mute or a non-human animal, our understanding of the mental states can 
only be partial. But even here it would be possible for us, as human beings, to put 
ourselves in the plaee of another human being and imagine how he or she must feel 
even though they cannot tell us. In this sense then, it is possible to have a better 
understanding of a human being who is without language than an animal who is also 
non-linguistic.
Understanding why a machine acts in a particular way is easier to discover than any 
kind of understanding we can ever hope to achieve of the behaviour of a cat or another 
person. This is because it is possible to know in total the internal structure of the 
machine and to know what state it is occupying at any one time. Thus it is possible to 
know of what the machine is, and is not, capable. In this way, it is extremely doubtful 
that of a thermostat one would ever want to say, "It believes the room is too hot". What 
we might be more inclined to say is "The thermostat has processed the information 
correctly and the relative curvature of its bi-metallic strip has caused the heating system 
to be switched off'. The second statement is without question a much more accurate 
representation of what has gone on inside the thermostat
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It must always be borne in mind that the events that take place inside the 'minds' of 
other systems are only available to us through shared behaviours which can be either, 
or both, linguistic and physical Eventually we have to say that something does or does 
not possess a mental state and it is only a matter of accepting as evidence, though not 
incontrovertible, what we perceive before us. Only the other system can ever know that 
it occupies a particular frame of mind or mental state. The implication of all this is, of 
course, that even if it were possible to endow an inorganic system with mental states 
only it would ever know for sure that it had such states because only it would have 
direct knowledge of them. Only the individual system can speak the "language game" 
that describes its own private mental states; so it is just as Wittgenstein says "If a lion 
could talk, we would not understand him".^^
1 Also known as the "carbonist" school because they maintain that the only system capable of 
possessing mentality is a system that is made up'of carbon atoms.
2 The words do not have to be spoken or even said into oneself, for when we recognise appropriate 
behaviour we may just act in accordance with the other system being in possession of a particular 
mental state. In this way our comparison of the observed behaviour with our model has been implicit.
 ^In this case the language refers to that used by another human being or the programming language 
that is created and implemented by a human designer for human/computer interaction.
 ^McCrone, John (1992) "Avoiding the Freudian Slip", Computing, pg.35 20th February 1992
 ^Intentional language is more often seen in messages like "I can't find the dictionary. If you find it for 
me this time I promise to remember where it is in future." that appear when you want to use a 
Spellchecker in a word-processing application.
 ^ 1 Timothy, chapter 6 : verse 10.
 ^A full explanation of Finite State Machines will be given in chapter five where I discuss four 
different kinds of machine and their capabilities to recognise increasingly more complex grammars.
® More will be said about this asymptotic relationship in later chapters, and in particular in chapter 7, 
the conclusion.
 ^This problem will be discussed in much greater detail in chapters five, six and seven.
Longair, M (1989) The new astrophysics', p.201, taken from The New Physics, Paul Davies (Ed) 
Cambridge University Press
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 ^^  Similar sorts of discrepancies can be brought to bear against the teleological arguments for God.
Any implication that a system is in a particular mental state is still only an implication, it is never 
without doubt
Wittgenstein, L (1958) Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell, p.223.
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4. Complexity
4.1. Introduction
This chapter will be structured in the following way. As in the previous chapter I 
will begin with a statement of the problem area and the specific question that is to be 
confronted. Following this I will look at the notion of complexity as three sub-divided 
issues. 1 The three categories of complexity are, (i) the architectural complexity of the 
system, (ii) the complexity of the action or behaviour of a system, and (iii) the 
complexity of the relationship between the system and its environment They are subtle 
distinctions which will be drawn together again in section 4.3. when I will look at how 
a system's architectural complexity can be related to the complexity of the capabilities 
that the system can perform, I will also attempt to show that the second and third 
categories necessarily collapse into one since no behaviour can be exhibited without 
there being some relationship between the system doing the behaving and the 
environment in which the behaviour takes place. To finish the chapter I will give an 
account of how these notions of complexity arose in chapter three and how the issues 
of ascription in that earlier chapter relate to the broader notions of complexity that will 
have been unfolded here.
4.1.1. A statement of the problem
In this chapter I will examine the question of how machines can be distinguished 
and stratified by means, and in terms, of their complexity. I am proposing that the 
notion of complexity can have many different interpretations and that this, in itself, 
makes the task of distinguishing between systems a lot more difficult However, in an 
attempt to confront these difficulties I state the problem as follows: given a specific task 
or competence, what is the minimum degree of complexity that a system would require 
to accomplish it?
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If one were to examine the question of consciousness, one should begin by looking 
at which systems we already accept as possessing consciousness. We would then need 
to ask the question of why these systems qualify but others do not and one approach to 
this might be to look at what other capabilities are manifested by the system and then 
examine the relationship between these other capabilities and the presence of 
consciousness. It might then be suggested that the capabilities that accompany 
consciousness in one system will be most likely to occur in other conscious systems. 
Then, in an effort to see which other systems possess consciousness, I could apply the 
now specified criteria of 'requisite capabilities' and if they are present I might 
extrapolate that consciousness is also manifest in the system.
Because the thesis as a whole deals with the attribution of mentality, and whether or 
not it is justifiable to ascribe mental states to inorganic systems, the tasks and 
competencies that I will look at will be mental ones such as understanding, knowing 
and believing. I will be assuming that for organic systems to have mental states such as 
these they must also have consciousness, for without it their mentality would be 
inactive or redundant. In chapter five I will illustrate and explain Dretske's hierarchy of 
mental states that will show that some mental states are of a higher order than others, 
and because Dretske proposes that there are such levels only complex systems with 
many capabilities can reach what he cites as the highest order mental states.
With this borne in mind a distinction will be maintained between possessing 
consciousness and possessing self-consciousness, for, as yet we have evidence to 
show that only the human system is capable of being self-conscious and thus 
manifesting higher-order mental states, and this, of course, complies with our notion of 
the human system as a remarkably complex one. I will now look more closely at three 
categories according to which complexity can be defined.
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4.2. Three categories of complexity
4.2.1. Complexity of architecture
It is possible to demonstrate that there are three quite different notions of 
complexity. I shall set them out as distinct notions and then go on to show how they 
overlap with one another. This section will be concluded with a discussion of which 
notion, or notions, can best be used to define the sort of complexity that is at issue 
here.
The first notion is that of the complexity of the system, as in "here is a system that 
has a complex internal structure". Forthwith I shall call this "architectural complexity". 
In this instance the primary concern is with the internal design and structure of the 
system and with nothing that is external to it. Because I am concerned here with organic 
and inorganic systems, and because many people would quibble with the use of the 
term 'design' for the internal structure of an organic system, I shall, henceforth, talk of 
the 'architecture' of the system and this shall refer to whatever is internal for both 
organic and inorganic systems.
When trying to establish the différences that exist in architectural complexity 
between different kinds of system it becomes apparent that it is not as easy as one might 
at first expect For example, if we think of the internal organs that I have in common 
with my cat then we find that there are very few differences, for it too has a heart, 
kidneys, liver, lungs and a brain. It is true that the cat's organs may function in slightly 
different ways to mine. For example, its heart beats faster per minute than mine and its 
cooling system is different for it cools down by panting, thus allowing water to 
evaporate from its tongue. I on the other hand perspire so that there is a surface 
covering of water on my body which evaporates and causes my temperature to 
decrease.
There is the gross physical difference of size but this leads us into another dead end 
for, if I were to conclude that because the cat has a much smaller brain it is less capable 
than a human being, then I would have also to plead that because the elephant's brain is
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larger it is more capable than a human being, and this is quite evidently not the case. 
However, one ratio that is important is that of brain size in relation to the overall mass 
of the animal. A good comparison can be made by looking at the size of the human 
brain in relation to the size of its body and then looking at the size of a dinosaur brain in 
relation to its size. It is quite easy to see from this why dinosaurs have been considered 
to be stupid for they have a tiny brain that seems to bear no relation to the immensity of 
their body. Penrose writes that the part of the human brain that human beings are 
"proudest" of is the cerebrum -"for that is not only the largest part of the human brain, 
but it is also larger, in its proportion of the brain as a whole, in man than in other 
animals".^
Of course, when we consider the difference between the architecture of a machine 
and the architecture of a human being we can immediately see that there are very 
obvious physical anomalies. Fundamentally the machine is made of different material, it 
is silicon and metal, whereas human beings and other organic systems are carbon based 
skin and bone structures. However, the external nature of a system is not always a sure 
indication of its internal architecture for some machines can carry out much more 
complicated tasks than, say, a hare, so no hard and fast distinction can be drawn to 
show relative complexity between systems on the basis of their physical constituents. 
Thus, in this instance at least, the skin versus metal distinction can be passed over, 
even though it is the source of a fundamental property distinction between organic and 
inorganic systems.
The internal architecture of a machine can be seen to be in many ways dissimilar to 
that of any living system. A machine has no heart for it has no need for a supply of 
blood, nor has it a brain that needs oxygen for nourishment What it does have is a 
supply of electricity that feeds it in a way that might be thought of as analogous to the 
blood supply in any animal body, and it has an elaborate arrangement of wires, silicon 
chips and circuit boards that take the 'nourishment' of the electrical charge and carry out 
the computational operations it has been programmed to perform.
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It must be said that computers are not trying to emulate, in every possible way, the 
functions of every mammalian organ; but what they are trying to model are some of the 
many functions of the brain. To make the model look more brain-like, and perhaps act 
more brain-like, the internal architecture of many computational machines has been 
developed to resemble a neural network, bringing with it the advent of parallel, instead 
of serial, processing. One advantage that parallel processing is often assumed to have is 
that it can run and complete tasks in much less time than is needed by a serial computer. 
However, this is not always the case for, by their nature, some computations are better 
if processed serially. The quick rule to follow is to look at the task and see if it can be 
divided into subtasks that can each be carried out independently of any of the others. If 
it can, each of the subtasks can then be processed concurrently and, as a result, the 
overall processing time will be speeded up.
With gross physical differences in architecture being ruled out as indications of 
relative complexity the distinction might turn out to be more subtle in nature. An 
example of a subtle difference can be seen in the primate family, of which anthropoid 
apes, such as man, monkeys and chimpanzees, are all members. The physical 
differences between the different members of the primate family are found to be 
negligible; we are roughly the same size, our limbs, body and head are arranged in the 
same fashion, and we all have opposable thumbs with which we can lift, hold and use 
tools. The architecture of our brains, as in all other mammals, is also roughly similar, 
and the size, shape and structure of the monkey brain has led to numerous studies of its 
behaviour being carried out so that it is possible to see how closely man and other apes 
are related.
Monkeys have been observed to be capable of many things and not least of these is 
the capability to work through quite complex tasks by acting out all the necessary 
behaviours* often with the use of tools that might have been previously created. An 
example of this is trying to reach food by breaking into a termites nest which needs 
three separate types of stick and three distinct stages of activity. The first stage is to use 
a heavy stick to break the shell of the nest, next to use another stick to poke a hole in
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the nest, and finally another stick is used with which the termites can be drawn out 
Indeed, going through this complex repertoire of activity it might be considered that the 
monkey has an explicit representation of the goal that he/she is attempting to achieve. 
Thus our distinction between man and other apes seems destined to lie in the subtlety of 
a two percent difference in our DNA structures, for ninety-eight percent of our DNA is 
identical.
Of course, a geneticist might argue that this relatively small amount of difference in 
the DNA structure is really quite substantial and not the subtle distinction that I am 
suggesting it is; but I would contend that I am discussing the likelihood of the 
complexity of architecture being placed in direct relation to the possession, by the 
system, of different kinds of mental states, and this is not genetics. So, the amount of 
identical DNA that humans and chimpanzees share might turn out to be a good 
indication that apes and chimpanzees are only slightly less complex in structure than 
man but still capable of manifesting high-level mental states such as knowing or 
understanding, even forming beliefs and possessing self-consciousness, - as we have 
seen Penrose has claimed.^
One of the major problems that is encountered when trying to compare the 
complexity of the internal architectures of different kinds of system is that we are often 
attempting to compare two unlike things. For instance, the inside of a computer or a 
kettle is very different from the inside of a bat or a sea-cucumber, so trying to establish 
some relationship between their comparative levels of architectural complexity is not 
really all that feasible. However, if we look at the architecture of any of the marine 
coelenterates (jellyfish), and compare their architecture with that of the dog next door, 
we will discover some similarities that enable us to construct a more realistic 
comparison. Both organisms need food to live, and both have digestive chemicals that 
aid the break-down of their food; and both organisms need to take in oxygen to live, 
although they do so in very different ways. Both organisms have cells and neurones 
but in the dog they are thousands of times greater in number and in less primitive 
formations than in the jelly fish.
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Similarly, it is possible to compare the architecture of a thermostat and a video 
recorder for they are essentially constructed out of the same stuff and just by looking 
inside, as we did in chapter three, we can see that a thermostat has only a few parts and 
a very simple design. As a result of its architectural simplicity the thermostat would be 
easier to replicate. This is not the case with a video recorder.
Another set of examples that should not be forgotten are those of systems that have 
a simple internal architecture but a complex array of behaviours. In the computational 
world complex patterns can be formed from simple equations as seen in the Julia and 
Mandelbrot sets. Whilst in the animal world we need only think of the ant or the bee for 
they are both capable of behaviours that seem to go far beyond what one would 
suppose possible from their limited structure. Both types of organism have evolved 
complex social structures in which different members of the group play different roles.
Leaf-cutting ants of South America have huge underground nests and are capable, 
by working together, to bring down a tree, remove all the leaves, shoots and stems and 
carry it back in tiny pieces to their nest Once there they chew the pieces of tree to form 
a compost and feed off the fruiting bodies that are produced by the compost Another 
example are the tree ants of Southeast Asia that sew leaves together to construct a nest 
This is made possible by a sort of competition where one group of ants hold leaf edges 
together with their jaws and feet and another group on the inside of the leaf sew them 
together. The sewing material is produced by them bringing larvae to the site and 
squeezing thdm to produce silk. The ants doing the sewing move the living larvae 
across the leaf junction until the leaves are finally joined.
Thus it would seem that whether the distinctions to be made are gross or subtle the 
internal architecture by itself can lead us to few conclusions about the overall nature and 
complexity of the system. So I shall move on to consider another possibility which is 
that it is only possible to demonstrate the difference in architectural complexity by an 
examination of the capabilities that an inorganic system is designed to accomplish, or 
that an organic system can be seen, by its nature to, possess.
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4.2.2. Complexity of capabilities or behaviour
In this section I will look at the second category of complexity which is the 
complexity of the system's action or behaviour; for example, "here is a system that can 
do complex things". Forthwith this will be called "behavioural complexity". In this 
category only the external behaviour is important and not what the architecture of the 
system itself is like. As in the example above, of the monkey and the termites' nest, the 
monkey was seen to be capable of planning for the action needed to carry out the task 
of acquiring food and even using three separate tools to enable it to do so; I am 
concerned now only with what a system can be seen to be capable of doing. The 
relative complexity of these behaviours will then be taken as a reflection of the 
complexity of the system that is capable of carrying them out.
Again if we look at the example of the thermostat it has a limited repertoire of 
actions that are primarily dictated to it by the particular construction of its binary 
mechanism and bi-metallic strip. It cannot act in any other way than it does because that 
would necessitate a different structure and as a result it would be a different machine 
altogether. A sewing machine, on the other hand, is capable of carrying out a greater 
number of different functions than a thermostat so it can be correctly assumed that it has 
a more complex mechanism. Still more numerous and varied are the functions of which 
a basic computer is capable and it is justifiable for this reason to say of the computer 
that its architecture is still more complex than either of the other two. However, they are 
aU only capable of processing the information which they have been designed to 
receive, and for this reason my thermostat cannot sew a patch on my trousers, my 
sewing machine cannot transfer files from one directory to another and change the 
respective format of the documents as it does so, and my computer cannot turn down 
my central heating when the room reaches the required temperature, nor can it switch 
from one type of stitch to another.
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the machines I have spoken of are only capable 
of taking in certain types of information, processing that information and issuing the
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output; they are, as already mentioned, machines with a finite number of possible 
states. They are to a very limited extent aware of their environment, (for there are only 
very specific things that they are designed to react to), and behaving as-though they 
understand the infomation they take in and process. The illusion that they have the 
ability to understand is promoted by the consistency of their processed informational 
output that is, by necessity of design, in keeping with the original informational input. 
Their behaviour may give the illusion of being complex and the product of a machine 
that must have a complex architecture, but it is only the product of a machine that has 
been programmed to be sensitive to specific informational cues that are received from 
their restricted environments.
Another form of behavioural complexity is the sort of ’second-hand’ complexity of 
the design behaviour of the programmer who is writing some software for a computer 
to run and a person to use. The programmer has to consider the architectural complexity 
of the computer and the limitation of its capabilities, he or she has also to be aware of 
what the user might and might not be capable. This means that not only is the 
programmer trying to express the complexity of his or her own. creative thoughts, but 
also the complexity of the possible users, the interface with the users and the sort of 
computer in which the software is to be used.^
In non-human animals there is a huge range of possible behaviours. All animals 
have to be able to process information if they are going to be able to survive. Indeed, all 
animals need to be able to process information in a very short space of time, what 
computer scientists describe as real time, for the decisions they are making are truly life 
and death. Any animal that is not aware of the danger in its environment, or that reacts 
too slowly to that danger, will not have the chance to run away again. Some 
fundamental element of understanding must be present that enables the animal to make 
decisions between what is and what is not dangerous in its environment Similarly, 
animals have to be able to distinguish between those things that are good to eat and 
those things that are poisonous, and it is certainly the case that animals very rarely
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consume anything that could kill them. But in non-human animals this might be a 
matter of their genetics rather than an understanding of their environment.
When it comes to defending themselves some animals have evolved highly complex 
and colourful displays that frighten or mislead possible predators. When threatened 
cats' fur stands up and they bare their teeth when danger is anticipated so that they can 
look twice their size and much more fearsome. Other animals rear up to increase their 
size, and some become as small and inanimate as possible, such as hedgehogs, so that 
the predator might fail to notice them or leave them for dead. Many wasps and flies 
without any stinging ability still have brightly striped backs, like those of more 
ferocious insects, so that they can look to all the world like predator and not prey.
It would certainly be admitted that many animals behave as though they can do 
more than merely process information, for they seem to be capable of understanding 
things in their environment and even knowing when it is best to run away or best to 
stay quite still untü the danger passes. It might well be argued that they seem to know 
of needs for their own safety and that these judgements will have to contain an idea of 
how they see themselves in relation to their world.
I think it would be difficult to deny that these capabilities are conscious or deliberate 
for there is an element of judgement in them, albeit a split second one in the decision to 
fight or take flight. However, it would be much harder to make a claim for self- 
consciousness in these capabilities. But there is certainly a sense in which the animal 
knows that it is 'it' that is in danger or 'it' that needs to be fed. So it might be argued 
that it is self-conscious but not in the linguistic sense where the animal would say to 
itself, "I know that it is me that is being chased". That ihe animal can behave 
intentionally is one thing but that it might also being able to describe its behaviour using 
propositional attitude statements is another thing altogether, and one that I would argue 
is extremely doubtful.
Hintikka has argued that there is nothing added by, for example, my knowing that I 
know that Y; but I would argue that there is, and it is a proof of self-consciousness.
For when "I know that I know the name of the woman I have just passed" then I have
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reason to suppose that I will shortly remember her name. It is a sort of psychological 
"knowing" that permits me to reaffirm things to myself. It is not a logical one in which 
there exists nothing more than mere reiteration. Of course, if I never do remember her 
name then it might be said that I had mistaken her for someone else, or that I had 
simply forgotten it; but in neither case is it a matter of an error in my logic.
I think it is not possible to extract the behaviour that is exhibited by a system from 
the environment that the system occupies. No behaviour is exhibited in a vacuum and 
so I think it can safely be concluded that all our actions are, if not a product of our 
interactions with our environment, then at least directly related to i t  Examples of this 
can be seen in the cases of prisoners who are kept in solitary confinement so that they 
have only the barest of links to their environment Such people have been known to 
turn inwards, living in their minds and imagining scenes in which they would like to 
participate. Sometimes the imagined adventures become indistinguishable from their 
actual life and they lose their grasp of reality. The capability of imagining possible 
worlds is something that can be done only when there has been one there once on 
which to base the imagined possibilities. The capability to imagine is a function of an 
original environment with the added constraints that have been placed on the individual 
by his or her present environment.
Thus it can be said that the sorts of capabilities possessed by a system are not just a 
reflection of the complexity of that system but of the complexity of the system plus its 
environment. With this in mind I would now like to look at the third category of 
complexity in which complexity is seen as a product of the interaction between the 
system and its environment Indeed in all the examples I have discussed it is hard to see 
how any of them could behave in a way that would not somehow, even tacitly, include 
their environment
4.2.3. Complexity as the product of the system and its environment
The environment has been present in all of the examples thus far discussed, what 
little extra there might be is the question of just how much the environment influences.
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or is present in, the capabilities of any system. It is certainly the case that the 
capabilities of aU systems are constrained by the environment in which they live, or in 
the case of inanimate systems, the environment in which they are situated. For a 
situated automaton, such as a thermostat, the fluctuations in its environment influence 
its actions to the same extent as its internal mechanism, for it has nothing else. If either 
part was disabled the thermostat would cease to function. A computer is situated, but it 
has a more varied environment which is not rendered useless if one part of its 
environment fails to function; for example, if the mouse button is disconnected from 
this computer I am still able to move the cursor arrow by using the cursor keys. 
Similarly, if I remove a drawing application I am still able to use any of the other 
installed applications. Each of these two situated machines behave in the way they do 
because of their link to a specific part of the environment. And although the first is 
more constrained than the second, in respect to their environment, their capabilities are 
completely linked by their architecture and their relation to that environment.
Being non-situated, or free to move around, allows for an ever changing 
environment and an enriched informational input. To cope with this the capabilities of 
the system have to be much greater. For all animals the environment is important and 
their physical form and capabilities have adapted and evolved to suit that environment. 
The finches discovered by Darwin on the Galapagos Islands are good examples of this 
type of continuing adaptation. The finches have evolved beaks in a variety of sizes and 
shapes so that each of the groups of the subspecies can feed off a different set of plants 
and seeds and thus the species as a whole can survive. So in this way their complex 
evolution and continued survival is a product of their environment and their capability 
to adapt
The capabilities of many other animals have been altered by changes in their 
environment With ever growing towns the countryside is fast disappearing and foxes, 
squirrels and badgers have all become adept at foraging for food in their new urban 
environment They have had to learn a whole new set of signs for danger and for food. 
But although their capabilities have adapted it does not mean that they are any more
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capable than they were before. What they and human beings possess is the capability to 
adapt to unpredictable changes in their environment, and it is this capability that 
machines lack. A situated system has a predictable environment and anything beyond 
the range of that environment is beyond the scope and 'awareness' of the machine. A 
non-situated system has an unpredictable environment all of which is within the 
possible perceptual scope of the system; it is all possible informational input for the 
living organism.
But differences exist between the adaptations made by species and those made by 
individuals. Individuals adapt to changes in their own, personal environment and 
changes that affect only them or a group of people in a similar predicament to them. For 
instance, a group of people who feel saddened or angered by the depletion of mineral 
resources and the destruction of the world's hard wood forests might choose to change 
their behaviour so that they no longer buy products made from that wood and recycle 
the minerals such as steel and aluminium that are used to make cans for food and drink. 
The adaptation of a whole species happens on a much grander scale such as that made 
by the finches mentioned above and they are not something over which the species, or 
any member of the species, has any direct conscious control.
Animals or human beings have to be continually aware of their environment and 
flexible enough to select the pieces of information that are the most relevant to them and 
attend to them. They have also to be capable of deciding whether to act on that piece of 
information or select another piece. All of this has to be done in a tiny space of time to 
enable the system to do what is best for its continued survival. In the case of non­
human animals the decisions are conscious but perhaps not self-conscious. Human 
beings, on the other hand, are capable of awareness of their environment on a grand 
scale and on a personal scale. They are capable of selecting information and processing 
it. They can understand the information they receive and extract knowledge from it. 
From this knowledge they are capable of forming beliefs about their world and about 
the worlds of other people. They can then choose to act upon those beliefs or ignore
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them, for many people have principles by which they try to live but in unsuitable 
circumstances such rules can be overlooked.
On top of all this human beings are capable of making themselves comprehensively 
understood, and of understanding others in their social environment by using a shared 
set of symbols, a language. As was seen in chapter three the development of natural 
language has been possible for two reasons, the first is that human beings are by nature 
social animals with a shared environment and the second is that they are sub-symbolic 
systems capable of creating abstract symbols and assigning meaning to those symbols 
to produce a symbol system or language. Because of this human beings are capable of 
describing and discussing every aspect of their interaction with their environment, from 
the kind of weather we are having to a personal belief in a superphysical deity. So 
human natural language is a product of the relation between what we know to be a 
complex system and its environment.
4.2.4. A summary of complexity
I would say that the capabilities of computers, although vast and on the increase, 
are dictated by a combination of their internal design, their architecture, the program 
that has been instantiated and the environment in which they are fixed. They have no 
flexibility to choose what information to react to in their environment. The capabilities 
of non-human animals are still widely dictated by their environment but the higher- 
order animals, at least, have the added capability of being able to choose what they 
attend to in their environment. From this selection the system can choose how it 
responds to the information, that is, whether it will run away, fight, or conceal itself. 
This response may be dictated entirely by the arrangement of its genes, but with 
animals such as monkeys and even cats, it is not at all easy to rule out the possibility of 
there being a self-conscious element in their judgements.
With human beings it is easier to say what is possible for, as a member of that 
class, I have my own experience to go on. I know that I am capable of processing vast 
amounts of information, selecting what are the most important pieces for me.
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responding to them and storing what is not immediately required for later use. The 
biggest advantage I have is that I know I do all of this, or at least the parts that 
necessitate it, with myself at the heart of my judgements. It seems reasonable to 
extrapolate from my own experience to say that other human beings have the same, or 
at least roughly the same, capabilities. I interpret incoming information subjectively and 
thus everything I explain to other people will have my own personal slant or 
interpretation. I am a product of my environment, but my many and varied capabilities 
are the product of my being able to see myself in my environment and act, for at least 
some of the time, for my own best interests. However, as a self-conscious yet social 
animal I am also capable of subjugating my own interests to the interests of the 
continued survival of society as a whole.
Thus I am capable of a high-level awareness of my environment, the selection of 
information from that environment, understanding the information and making self- 
conscious judgements involving it. I am also able to anticipate how other objects and 
states of affairs in my environment will be affected by my judgements, and to change 
my judgements or try to justify tliem to others, or indeed myself, using language. I, 
and all other human beings, if my extrapolation from myself as an example of human 
sentience and experience is correct, are very complex systems indeed with a great many 
capabilities.
In chapter three I discussed the methodology behind mental attitude ascription, and 
through the discussion it was demonstrated that the notion of ascription is a very 
complex one for which a complex system with many capabilities is required. Such a 
system has to be able to both identify the signs that imply the occurrence of a mental 
state and use language, or another form of behaviour, to ascribe the state. I will now 
look at the aspects of complexity that arose in the context of chapter three.
4.3. Complexity in the ascription and possession of mental states
In chuter three I looked at why, when and how we ascribe mental states to other 
systems; or in the language of cognitive science, what are the conditions under which I,
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the observer, can decide that something I am observing has a particular inner 
representation. The conclusion I reached was that because we can never become that 
other thing, or even look inside its head, I can only ascribe inner mental states to it by 
looking closely at its behaviour and examining it for appropriateness in a particular 
context From its behaviour I should recognise signs that are consistent with other, 
analogous mental state behaviour that I have already established in myself as the only 
true mental system that I can be said to know. The evidence for mentality can never be 
one hundred percent sure, thus the outcome has to be that even if another system does 
have mental states only it can know for sure that it has. This outcome applies across the 
board to all systems, organic and inorganic-
This ascriptive procedure is, itself, a very complicated procedure that is made up of 
a number of discernible complex actions. I shall discuss each of these separate aspects 
of complexity in the next section.
4.3.1. Creation of a paradigm case
Firstly, when I looked for a behavioural paradigm case, with which to compare 
other behaviour to see if it was indicative of the occurrence of mental states, I turned to 
the human system, and in particular myself, that is the only accepted possessor of 
mentality that I can ever hope to know with certainty. It is the most complex system of 
which I have a comprehensive, but still by no means entire, knowledge. It is possible 
to recognise from both what we know and what we do not know of the human mind in 
general, that we are dealing with a system of an amazing complexity. A system that is 
capable of conforming to accepted patterns of behaviour in an effort to understand and 
be understood; but equally able at deception and behaviour intended to mislead.
Any comparison, and setting up this paradigm case is no exception, necessarily 
involves looking at the system within its environment; for it is only when I behave in a 
particular way and I see other systems behaving in a similar way, in a similar 
environment that I can compare the probability of the mental states underlying the 
behaviour being the same as well.
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4.3.2. Consciousness and self-consciousness in the environment
Other aspects of complexity can range from being conscious to being self-conscious 
in an environment Part of being self-conscious is the ability to adapt and survive 
within a continually changing world. It could be contended that a desk-top computer 
can adapt to changes in its environment, but I would argue that it has been programmed 
to do so and its environment is a limited, finite one in which it has a great many 
possible states but all of them fixed by its program and ultimately predictable. What 
seems paradoxical about the human, or indeed other organic systems, is that the more 
we discover about them the more complex they seem to become and the less we realise 
we know. This is not the case with a computer that processes things serially because 
everything that it can do has to be known ahead so that it can be programmed into it. It 
is a finite state machine whereas the human system has an infinite number of possible 
states.
4.3.3. Language use and self-consciousness
The ability of human beings to report incidents and information from their 
interactions with the rest of the world is one of the most complex actions they perform. 
One of the prerequisites of being able to use language is that the system is capable of 
seeing itself in relation to events in its world. The advantage that sophisticated language 
users, such as human beings, have is that their descriptions of events and states of 
affairs in the world have a subjective element that a purely functional description does 
not possess. The notion of subjectivity is not an easy one, but basically it can be 
explained as how the individual sees him or herself being affected by events, or even 
possible states of affairs that might some day hold, in the world. For instance, if I hear 
a Party Political Broadcast on behalf of the Conservative Party I might justifiably form 
the opinion that their policies would be detrimental to my continuation in academic 
work. The result of this will be a personal or subjective belief that I ought to vote in an 
effort to change the government to one under which I, and others with interests similar 
to mine, would be better off.
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If I were not able to see things happening in relation to me they would either have 
no effect on me, effect me but I have no forethought, or my report of them would be a 
purely functional one, A functional report is the kind of message that comes up on a 
computer screen to say that there has been a system error, or that more memory is 
needed, and so on. It is not the sort of thing that is subjective or even indicative of any 
form of consciousness, it is a programmed reaction to a particular set of circumstances; 
and is fundamentally no different from, for example, switching on the lights for the 
opening of the Christmas Season at Harrods, or waiting for the traffic lights to change 
at a crossroads.
So, as we also saw in section 4.2.3.* one of the most significant signs of 
complexity is the possession of a reflexive relationship that pertains between the system 
and its environment However, actually pin-pointing what counts as reflexive 
behaviour is, as we have seen, a very difficult thing to do. Indeed the only signs we 
have to rely on are either behaviour that is in keeping with haying a mental state, or a 
linguistic utterance that professes the occurrence of a state of mind. These can either 
describe the situation, or at the very least demonstrate an awareness and possible 
understanding of it.
Of the appropriate behaviour and the use of language the latter is a surer sign of a 
system's complexity for, if the language is used correctly, it is an indication that the 
system is capable of possessing a great diversity of mental states, from the simplest 
information processing to the self-conscious formation of attitudes and the complex 
state of holding beliefs. These are the very states that are the product of informative 
interaction of a human being within its social environment, and they are those that have 
made it possible for the system to form a set of subjective beliefs and ideas about his or 
her world. However, much more is possible, for with language not only am I able to 
create and adapt my own set of beliefs, but I am also able to modify, by linguistic 
means the intentionality of other linguistic systems. Rational argument is just one 
example of how this type of modification can take place.
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The social relationships within which we acquire and practice our use of language 
are themselves very complex. In them we have to do many things and exercise many of 
our mental and physical capabilities. Initially we have to be systems that have a 
potential capability for learning language, and on top of that we have to be capable of 
being innovative with that language so that we can create new words and phrases to 
describe novel situations that arise and those that might arise given the right 
circumstances. We have, in effect, to be intelligent 'sub-symbolic systems' capable of 
forming and using language.^
That our language arose in the first place suggests that there was a need to express 
more and more about events taking place in the environment and our relationship to 
those events. One suggestion might be that the purely physical behaviour through 
which we initially conveyed information might have become outmoded with the 
development of our environment and progression of our society with which it 
coincided. With a greater self-awareness our methods for conveying information have 
had to become more advanced and the sounds we make have taken on forms that enable 
us to explain and describe complex states of affairs.
Occurrences similar to the evolution of language have arisen in the rest of the animal 
kingdom. All animals communicate with each other in some way, and some animals are 
even capable of communicating with human beings. Of this latter kind I am thinking 
mainly of domesticated animals such as cats, dogs, and even some farm animals that 
have a lot of contact with human beings. The distinction drawn here is between organic 
systems that are capable of intra-species communication and inter-species 
communication, respectively.
It is not clear whether or not domesticated animals treat human beings as a totally 
different species from themselves, or whether they simply consider us to be extensions 
of themselves that provide some of the resources they would otherwise have to supply 
for themselves. This is by no means an easy question to resolve, but from a first hand 
example of one of my cats asking me, but not another cat, for food it would seem it 
makes some distinction between what it can reasonably expect from me and what it can
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expect from another cat. It may just be a behaviour it has learned through repetition, but 
just what the distinction is it is impossible to discover.
There are many examples of animals that communicate only within their own 
species. One of the best is that of bees that have an extraordinary range of dances with 
which they are able to exchange information. Indeed entomologists have so far 
identified as many as sixteen different very complicated bee dances; but, as yet they 
have only discovered interpretations that fit three of the dances. In general, the dances 
allow a worker bee, having discovered a good source of pollen, to describe the location 
of the pollen to other worker bees. It seems that the dances are rather sophisticated for 
they have implicit in them the details of the directions and distances of the pollen from 
the hive.
For our present purposes what is most interesting is that their social interaction with 
one another has become elaborate enough to demand the development of an enhanced 
communicative techniques. It is vast and complex in relation to the magnitude of the 
bees' environment. But in comparison to the language of the human species it is an 
extremely limited form of communication. This is because there are great differences in 
what each species demands of its communicative process.
That the human system requires a language is indicative of the great complexity of 
human society. That a language is created, (and there are a great many languages), used 
and developed over an extensive period of time establishes the human system as one of 
the most complex systems that can be imagined. Our language facilitates the expression 
of a great many things, from straightforward descriptions of physical objects and states 
of affairs to the most introspective and fraught of our emotions; still further it can cater 
for the discussion of abstract concepts and ideas of philosophy, mathematics, 
theoretical physics, and so on.
The means of communication that is developed by a species can be seen as a 
reflection of the complexity of the social, natural and mental or cognitive environment 
of that species. With its very complex mental and physical states the human species has
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developed a descriptive language that is accordingly very complex. This then is a . 
reflection of the total environment of the human system.
4.3.4. The apprehension of complexity by the human being
The notion that complexity becomes an issue when we consider the way the human 
being apprehends complexity in other systems or states of affairs in its environment is 
one that we shall return to now. It appeared first in the context of how and why we 
ascribe mental states to some things rather than others. In this chapter I shall discuss 
two aspects of the human apprehension of complexity. The first is the human ability to 
apprehend other entities in relation to itself whilst also seeing itself in relation to the 
world. So that there are two stages of recursion required in this reflexive relationship 
between the human system, the system with which the human being is interacting and 
the world. The second aspect to be considered is the complexity of the decision-making 
by which the human being is capable of comparing the behaviour of one system with a 
system that is already known to be more complex than the first and conclude that the the 
one being compared is, or is not, itself a system as complex as the one with which it is 
being compared.
. Within the recursive interaction I am assuming that it is acceptable that the human 
system is conscious; what I would add to this is the ability of the human system to be 
self-conscious in their interactions with other systems that exhibit awareness and also 
conscious of the T in relation with the wider context of our world. This is no different 
from what many people already attribute to other systems such as computers and cats.
In the case of a computer, its 'awareness' of its environment can be demonstrated 
through its reaction when someone types a command-line or clicks the mouse button. 
Cats can be seen to be aware of their environment in many ways, their posture, the 
movements of their ears, one eye being half open to keep an eye on things when 
resting, and so on.
However, problems arise, firstly in what way is the awareness that a computer has 
of its informational input different from the self-consciousness that is characteristic of
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the human system; and secondly, what makes the possession of self-consciousness an 
advantage. As already mentioned above and in chapter three the possession of self- 
consciousness as it occurs in the human system is identified in two ways; firstly, by the 
use of propositional attitude statements by the individual that place him or her in a direct 
first person relationship with their world and the states of affairs in that world; and 
secondly, in a much less reliable way, by the careful examination of a system's 
behaviour to identify a correspondence between its behaviour and its ascribed mental 
state. The 'correspondence' is a matter of the consistency and appropriateness of the 
behaviour.
Propositional attitude statements are usually made in relation to something of which 
we can have a mental "picture". For example when I say "I believe it is raining today",
I have a "picture" in my mind of the falling rain. And if I say "I hope my cat wül come 
home soon" then I again have a "picture" in my mind of the return of my cat. Being 
capable of intentionality means I am able to interpret information I receive from the 
world outside and I am also able to conceive of new things that I 'hope', 'doubt', or 
'fear' might happen.
I am able to recognise machine 'awareness' of its environment by its acting in 
accordance with information it has been given or with how it has been programmed to 
react to changes. For instance, if something does not match with what the system is 
programmed to expect it will give an error message that tells me what is required before 
it can proceed. So the machine is also capable of acting reflexively within its 
environment What then, if indeed anything, are the differences between machine 
reflexivity and human reflexivity?
If we look back to chapter two, and paragraph two of section 2.11. there is a brief 
statement about the distinction between organic systems and machines. The former 
have the capability for self-conscious introspection, whilst machines may be capable 
(depending on the complexity of their internal structure) of reflexive activity and the 
outcome of this might be some type of emergent property or properties. However, the
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result of reflexive action within the machine is more likely to be a predictable behaviour 
or sequence of behaviours that are the result of the instantiation of a specific program.
Self-consciousness allows the human system to look at itself in relation to its 
environment, but strictly speaking this is no different from what a recursive program 
can do in a machine; but it would seem that there must be something more going on in 
human self-consciousness for intuitively I can tell that my awareness of jny 
environment is richer and more diverse than that of the program in the machine. We set 
about recognising self-consciousness and recursion using the same techniques with 
which we learn to recognise and identify mental states and intentionality in systems 
other than ourselves; that is, by the examination of behaviour and the corroborative use 
of propositional attitude statements.
Here the differences begin to show for the machine is constrained by the limitation 
of its scope or capacity for experience. On top of this there is the fact that it runs on a 
basis of programmed, and not naturally perceived and processed, information. Thus 
even if a machine, using a voice synthesizer, could utter propositional attitude 
statements they would still have to be written into its program for such utterances 
cannot be made at whim by a machine.
Another way of thinking about this notion of choices that are made 'at whim' is to 
consider the notion of subjectivity. A  machine cannot subjectively choose to do 
something that is not already part of its physical structure or dictated to it through its 
instantiated program. Within certain, perhaps physical, limits the human being can 
choose to behave as it pleases. A human being can choose to be moody and 
unpredictable even though his or her life is successful and all the outward signs would 
suggest that they should be happy. In an individual's choices there is an element of 
subjectivity that allows his or her personality to be expressed.
The choices that I make are influenced by the experiences I have had and no other 
person can make the same choices for no other person can have had all my experiences, 
and historically, physically and mentally there is only one me. Many machines can have 
the same structure and internal design so that any two machines with the same physical
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structure and the same program will always react in the same way to the same problem. 
There is no subjective element at play here, for the machine cannot say to itself "What 
would T like to do in this instance?". There is no concept of T in the course of action 
that the machine follows, whereas because I am self-conscious I see myself in all my 
judgements. I am able to see myself in relation to how I remember the past, how I deal 
with the present and how I foresee my future. I am conscious of the very complex 
relation in which I stand to my world through time.
It could be said that the machine is aware of its incoming informational input or 
stimuli in much the same way that I would be aware of an electrical shock or impulse 
that is passed over my skin. I react to the impulse. I do not respond to it for implicit in 
the notion of response there is the suggestion of something more premeditated and 
thoughtful. When I feel the sudden twinge of pain I withdraw my hand in an impulsive 
or innately dictated action. I automatically flinch from the pain without having any 
choice in the matter. I do not have to weigh up whether or not I prefer to withdraw my 
hand or leave it there to sustain further injury. In just this manner the machine reacts to 
the relevant incoming stimuli, it does not sit and muse about the outcome of its reaction, 
it simply reacts. The machine might be aware of the sensation or stimulation but it 
cannot feel the pain in the way a human being or an animal can. However, neither of 
these ideas for a distinction is particularly novel; they can be found in Stanley 
Rosenschein's recent work.
The human abilities to be self-conscious, behave intentionally and ascribe meaning 
to symbols are linked in at least two ways that are the inverse of the machine constraints 
already mentioned. The first is that the human being is not a passive receiver of 
information, and the second is that it cannot help but ascribe meaning to the events and 
states of affairs that it encounters. In the first case human beings actively go out seeking 
information and the information they find is always processed subjectively with the T 
of their self-conscious judgement always being present. The second case is slightly 
more awkward for it requires that the human system be linguistically oriented.^
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Selectivity and flexibility
As an organic system at the top of the phylogenetic scale the human being is capable 
of moving around its world in search of all kinds of information. It is therefore capable 
of actively experiencing a continually changing set of events and states of affairs with 
which it has not previously been acquainted. It will have no use for a lot of the new 
events it experiences and these are either banished to the realms of peripheral perception 
or ignored altogether. The information that is important to the individual is processed 
through the senses and either used or stored for use in the future. But the fact that 
human beings are not passive receivers of information means that they have the ability 
to choose what is important to them and select only certain pieces of experience or 
information for special attention.
So what we have so far is that the mental life of human beings is in a continual state 
of flux and the human system is a very complex one that can deal with there always 
being new and different stimuli to attract its attention.^ To say that it has the capability 
to select those pieces of information which are of use to it whilst ignoring others is to 
suggest that the system is very flexible in its approach to the range of incoming 
information. When an initial selection has been made the range of information will have 
been narrowed down and from this it is possible to select specific objects or events to 
which the system can give yet closer attention. It is these selected pieces of information 
Dretske describes as 'digitalised'.*
Such pieces of information are selected by the human being on the basis of what is 
most appropriate for its well-being; but they can also be for its amusement. One 
example of this would be that I can choose to disregard a sensation of hunger if I am 
enjoying a conversation with friends or engrossed in reading a book. The scope of 
choice that a human being has is immense and its level of flexibility to select the most 
appropriate information has to be correspondingly great.
Selectivity is based upon the flexibility of the system that is doing the perceiving 
and the breadth of the range of its possible choices. A machine can be said to have a
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limited scope because it is only capable of following a course of action that has 
previously been sketched out for it in its internal design and program. It cannot exercise 
any capability to choose. Any system that has alternatives, although those alternatives 
might be limited, and is capable of choosing the most apt of these in a given situation, 
is exercising a greater amount of flexibility of choice than a computer with a fixed 
program and structure.
For example, a thermostat has no flexibility and only a very limited scope for the 
receipt and processing of information. It caimot demand food, it cannot feel tired, and it 
cannot converse about its perceptions because it has no use of language and it is not 
aware of anything other than that which it has been programmed to perceive.
In between the two 'extremes' that I have chosen, of human beings and 
thermostats, there are a great many other different systems, both organic and inorganic. 
A machine with more capabilities than those of a thermostat would have more incoming 
stimuli and it follows that the system itself would have a greater flexibility, however its 
choice of information is still dictated by the program it is running at the time. On the 
other hand a cat can choose between all sorts of incoming stimuli in its environment and 
unlike the thermostat it has no fixed or 'situated' environment. It can move around its 
world, in much the same way as the human being, seeking new information about 
food, territory and possible mates. It has a greater flexibility to select the information 
that is of immediate importance and thus narrow down the field of relevant information.
Assignment of meaning
Embodied in the notion of being flexible in the selection of the most relevant 
incoming information is the notion that human beings ascribe meanings to events and 
experiences even though they may not be consciously doing so. For instance, when I 
look at clouds I often interpret their form to fit something with which I am familiar, 
often seeing human faces or the shapes of animals in them. The same thing happens 
with doodles or scribbles.
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In Hamlefi we can see an example of just this type of occurrence. In the dialogue 
between Hamlet and Polonius that follows it is possible to see the many forms that 
Hamlet, whether in real or feigned madness, imagines a cloud can take.
Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel?
Polonius: By the mass, and 'tis like a camel, indeed.
Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel.
Polonius: It is backed like a weasel.
Hamlet: Or like a whale?
Polonius: Very like a whale.
We can also see that Polonius tries to look for similarities between the forms that 
Hamlet is reportedly seeing and the clouds that he can see; and it is nearly possible to 
see Polonius convincing himself that "Yes, he's right, if I look at it this way that cloud 
is very like a weasel".
A similar thing happens when we read tea-leaves in the bottom of a cup or we have 
someone tell us our fortune from the laying out of a set of cards. In each case a 
meaning is attributed by the reader and another level of meaning is attributed by the 
person for whom the fortune is being read. This new level of meaning is constructed by 
the person whose fortune is being read their own knowledge of their personal history 
and from this extra information the fortune-teller's interpretation can now take on a new 
and enhanced meaning.
Seeking examples for the attribution of meaning to events and states of affairs in 
our worlds is by no means difficult Indeed, for suitable examples we need look no 
further than mythology and the theory of animism. In the former we see natural events, 
such as thunder and lightning interpreted as, for example, the wrath of the Gods to 
instil fear into the hearts of mankind. And, in animism we find explanations in the form 
of the ascription of intentionality by young children who relate events in the world to 
what is meaningful to them. So the sun rising and setting becomes "The sun is getting 
up" and "The sun is going to bed". Nothing remains without meaning for too long in 
the human world because, in much the same way as Dennett describes the intentional
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stance as a predictive tool, we make sense of everything we encounter so that our 
interactions with objects and events that are external to us are made easier.
It does not matter that our ascription is not completely accurate, for what is 
important is the reliability of the prediction. For the child the sun's 'getting up' and then 
in the evening its 'going to bed' is a useful way of establishing a continuum of complex 
solar events whilst not having to understand any of the difficult scientific concepts of 
space, time and motion. Quite simply the child compares the movements of the sun to 
her own daily events thus enabling her to predict a future state of affairs. Their 
explanation is meaningful to them, and it works even though it is not scientifically 
accurate.
I win now summarise what has taken place in this section and then move on to look 
at the promised second aspect of the complex notion of how we, as human beings, 
decide that another system is, or is not, itself a complex system.
An interim summary
This section dealt with the difference between the complex self-conscious relation to 
the world and a simpler relation of awareness of the world. The observation of 
appropriate interactive behaviour between a system and its world is the only way we 
can infer its awareness. For a human being this behaviour can be purely physical 
interaction or linguistic interaction in the form of propositional attitude statements - both 
being forms of behaviour. For a machine such as a computer the behaviour is the 
reaction between what is typed on the keyboard and what the computer proceeds to do 
in accordance with the command it has been given.
Human beings can choose how they wish to act and no two choices made by any 
two human beings will ever be exactly the same for they can never have wholly 
identical contributing experiences. A computer does not have any subjectivity or 
element of choice in its actions; which is to say that all its actions are the result of 
internal design and instantiated program.
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In the case of higher-order animals the lack of evidence makes it difficult to know 
whether their behaviour is a result of self-conscious choice or just innate drives. In The 
Emperor's New Mind Penrose appears to come down on the side of self-conscious 
higher-order mammals, such as monkeys. The example he gives is of a monkey that is 
trying to reach a banana that is hanging from the ceiling. In the room with the monkey 
is a box and after some fruitless (sic) attempts the monkey displays a sense of 
realisation and brings the box over to just below the banana, climbs the box and takes 
hold of the banana. If we take into account the close relationship of humans and 
monkeys and we accept that the criteria for recognising and identifying behaviour in 
humans can hold for monkeys, then it does appear from this example that monkeys, 
too, are self-conscious and have the ability to make subjective decisions.
Implicit in having self-consciousness is the notion that the human being is able to 
see him or herself in relation to their world, and with such a capability come the 
attributes of being flexible enough to select from a huge range of possible choices the 
course of action that will best suit the individual in his or her bid to survive. The 
flexibility to choose diminishes when we move to simpler systems, indeed when we 
reach a system such as a thermostat the choices are non-existent. Systems that are not 
fixed, such as robots, cats, and monkeys have to have greater flexibility to select things 
to attend to in their environment. The robot, of course, is still limited in the sense that it 
can still only do those things for which it has been designed, but with it being capable 
of movement it will have more inbuilt decision making mechanisms.
In relation to these points if a system other than a human being were self-conscious 
or flexible enough to select any piece of information for attention, it would not be able 
to tell us for, as yet, only the human being is capable of assigning meaning to symbols 
and creating language in just the way that we have. In fact assigning meaning is not 
only confined to straightforward symbols, for human beings assign meaning to 
everything in an effort to understand and predict their world.
Thus I would conclude that the relative complexity of a system depends upon (i) the 
amount of information it processes, (ii) its flexibility to select the most relevant piece of
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information, (iii) whether the choice is made on a basis of a set of programmed 
instructions or subjectively, (iv) the system being able to ascribe meaning to incoming 
information, and finally (v) being able to use language to describe its relation to its own 
world. A very complex system is one that can fulfil all of these criteria and the only one 
that can, as yet, do this is the human being.
The complexity of the decision making process
In chapter three I spoke of the ascription of mental states being dependent upon 
how complex we think the other system to be. The sort of apprehension we have of the 
other system depends upon the consistency^ ^  and appropriateness of its behaviour in a 
variety of circumstances. So there are three things that are required; firstly, that the 
human being doing the comparing has devised a set of reliable criteria upon which she 
can base her judgements, secondly that a justifiable link must exist between different 
degrees of complexity and the achievement of different levels of mental states, and 
finally that the human system is complex enough to be able to.make a rational 
comparison between the established criteria and the exhibited behaviour.
The criteria for mental state ascription are set up by analogy with a paradigm case, 
and the best model to use is that of a system we already accept as possessing mentality 
of a sufficiently high, or even more complex, level than any other known system. In 
this instance then the most appropriate model is the human being. The analogy is not 
necessarily made using language, for just behaving in a particular way with something 
can show that we assume it has a certain set of capabilities. So the apprehension of at 
least some kind of mentality - or assumed mental state - did not start with language; 
however, the assumed mental state of another system is most accurately, although not 
necessarily, expressed using language.
By dint of their having no physical location in space and time, and therefore a 
somewhat idiosyncratic physical manifestation, the description of mental states is a 
difficult procedure. What we tend to go on are the "family resemblances" that are the 
most commonly observed features aeeompanying the possession of a partieular mental
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State. Of course, the advantage that the human being has is that it is capable of 
expressing aspects of its mentality, thus enabling the observer to compare the physical 
manifestation of a mental state with the verbal corroboration. In this complicated 
manner we established a set of analogous mental state behaviours. It is frequently a 
matter of trial and error when we try to understand the mental states of another system. 
Often we can be misled or deliberately deceived by behaviour that does not fit the 
accompanying propositional attitude statement, but by and large we get by using the 
analogies we have learnt through social interaction and the application of the context to 
the actions, for example, an actor who 'dies' in a piece of street theatre may move our 
hearts hut we do not believe he is dead.
The second requirement is that there is a relation between complexity and the levels 
of mentality that a system can reach. I shall keep this discussion brief because I intend 
to say a lot more about this in chapter five when I take a closer look at two hierarchical 
a r r a n g e m e n t s .  ^ 2 ^  prerequisite of being able to show any relationship between these 
two things is that mental states can be divided up into levels of difficulty. So that we 
can say, for example, that being able to take in information is of a lower order than 
being capable of processing it, and being able to select the relevant piece of information 
from aU sorts of stimuli is more sophisticated than having a limited environment and no 
capacity for selectivity.
It would appear superficially that this is not such a difficult thing to show, for in the 
example earlier of a thermostat which we know to have a very simple structure it was 
shown that its capabilities are limited, it has no other function than to process specific 
pieces of information and it has no freedom to exercise selectivity for it has no choices. 
A simpler example is an automatic kettle for it can switch itself off when the water 
reaches boiling point, but it cannot switch itself on when the water temperature drops 
below a hundred degrees Fahrenheit So the kettle must have an even less complex 
mechanical structure than a thermostat
Keeping to the same, previously encountered, examples, a video recorder has a 
greater capacity for informational input and although it is still programmed the system
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has a wider range of information from which it selects the pieces that take priority. In 
this way it is able to record programmes in the order in which they are screened and not 
get the dates mixed up and thus overlook or forget some.^  ^Indeed if someone had a 
video recorder with the capacity to forget information it would be sent back to the 
manufacturers because it is unreliable! It seems then that reliability will be a trade off 
with phe increase of complexity.
Looking at human beings and the amount of information they can take in, select, 
process, interpret, form beliefs about and explain using language, it is not difficult to 
see reasons for which we should accept them to be very complex systems with a great 
many functional capabilities. It is also possible that the diminishment of reliability is in 
keeping with the notion of human complexity, for so often we misunderstand 
information, mis-remember information or just plain forget it. We talk of selective 
retention being a feature of the human memory, what we mean is that human beings 
tend to remember things that have a particular relevancy for them and discard things that 
are irrelevant. But the process of forgetting is not always this methodical and useful 
things get misplaced.
By now some things have been set down as things the possession of which 
indicates a high degree of complexity. They are: self-consciousness which is best 
demonstrated through the use of propositional attitudes and thus requires the use of 
language; being capable of the selection of relevant pieces of information and the 
subjective interpretation of the selection; being able to assign meaning to symbols and 
to use language; and, finally, being able to forget information that is no longer relevant 
- a sort of selective process in reverse.
The notion of rationality is not something that need be confined entirely to the 
mental life of human beings for it would seem that there is nothing in 'being rational' 
that does not also exist in 'being logical' and, by their very nature, computational 
machines are logically bound. Even a thermostat functions on the basis of a binary 
code. In being logical or rational there is an element of being correct, even sober, in 
one’s judgements; (though it must be remembered that 'sobriety' of judgement is a
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noun used only when describing the decisions that human beings make because they 
are capable of rashness and insobriety). To be entirely rational in all one's judgements 
would mean the adoption of a complete impartiality that would sometimes mean that the 
end result is detrimental to oneself.
One's own subjectivity should not enter into a rational judgement for the decisions 
are both factual, that is, based on fact, and matter of fact. It is not so much that the 1' is 
not present in the judgement, it is more that the worry about "how will T be affected" 
is removed altogether. In this way then rational action is something of which both 
human beings and machines are capable. However, it would be mistaken to say they 
are equally capable for one is drawn to conclude that ultimately the machine is always 
absolutely rational since there is no possibility that its judgement could ever be clouded, 
even unwittingly, by introspective thoughts.
However, in the case of mental state ascription, being able to rationally compare 
two things in the environment is a different matter for it demands that the system is 
capable of seeing beyond itself and into the world where a comparison can be made and 
that the two things to be compared have some essential correspondence. This, in turn, 
requires an understanding of the things being compared; which in this case are 
appropriate mental state or 'human-like' behaviours and the possibility of concurrent 
mental states.
As already discussed there is no restriction on what the human being can perceive 
within its environment so it is free to compare the attributes and existence of any 
physical objects or states of affairs that it encounters. But, more than this, it is able to 
entertain the fundamental ideas behind abstract concepts and compare the outcomes of 
possible future states. Any machine, no matter what level of sophistication it might now 
have reached, is always constrained by its design which dictates those things in its 
environment to which it can react Nor is a machine likely to be interested in what the 
'good' life might be, or in whether or not any other system has mental states. It does 
not have to try to predict or contrive the best way it should interact with me.
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Thus it appears that the creation of an analogy with my own mental states and the 
comparison I make between myself and the behaviours of other systems is something 
that is peculiar to me and human beings in general. Only I wonder about the nature of 
other things in my world and only I, and other human beings, try to create analogies 
between our behaviours, experiences and possible mental attributes. It is not something 
that computers have been designed to do, nor is it something for which non-human 
animals have any obvious need to do since their interaction with the world is on a much 
more basic level.
This and all the other areas of complexity that arose implicitly in chapter three can 
be found as aspects of any one of three categories of complexity that were discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter. I shall now draw this chapter to its conclusion with a 
summary of the main points that have arisen and a look at what is in store in the next 
chapter.
4.4. Conclusion
In answer to the original question "given a specific task or competence, what is the 
minimum system that would be required to accomplish it", it can now be answered, if 
still only provisionally, that for a system to be capable of, for example, processing 
information it must first be aware of its environment. Such 'awareness' is 
demonstrated, even by the most limited systems, by their capability to react to stimuli 
that are relevant to i t  However, being able to respond to a fixed type of stimulus, such 
as a rise in temperature, does not indicate that the system has any flexibility to decide 
which are the stimuli that are relevant to it. Indeed it suggests that the system has a very 
limited range of actions or behaviours and no flexibility at all. So a simple awareness 
only shows that the system can respond to the aspects of its limited environment for 
which it has been programmed.
For us to say of a system that it "knows X" the system would have to demonstrate 
first that it had understood "X". To do this it would have to explain its understanding 
and answer questions on its claimed knowledge. For example, when someone gives
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you directions to get to the local library, you repeat their directions to show them that 
you have understood and that you now know the correct route to take. But this is an 
easy example for it is spoken verification. Other examples are purely behavioural and 
for these we can never be completely sure that any system other than ourselves does 
truly understand or know anything. Someone may pretend to understand and be lucky 
enough to nod in all the right places and so fool us into thinking they know what we 
mean. Machines on the other hand act in accordance with our requests and their 
programming and in so doing can fool a great many of us into thinking that they 
actually do understand what we are typing in. Maybe our criteria for what count as 
understanding and knowing behaviour are not yet precise enough and this is why we 
can be so easily fooled.
To be capable of making subjective judgements the system needs to be self- 
conscious, and being self-conscious requires that the system has the flexibility to 
choose those stimuli in its environment that are the most relevant to it and its continued 
livelihood. Making these sorts of judgement necessarily includes an element of 
subjectivity for each judgement will be made on an individual basis to fit a specific set 
of personal circumstances. The only system that we know for sure to possess such 
self-consciousness is the human system. Our certainty is based only on its capacity to 
report its intentionality and intentional actions using propositional attitude statements. 
We do not, and perhaps cannot ever, know whether or not animals behave 
intentionally. Behaving intentionally would permit the presence of self-consciousness 
in their actions and they cannot use language to inform us of its presence. Nor is it 
possible for us to imagine what it is like to be another animal in the way that it is 
possible for us to imagine what it is like to be another human being.
In the next chapter I will offer a further examination of the relationship between the 
complexity and capabilities of different systems. I will begin by looking at two 
hierarchical arrangements that have already been constructed. The first was developed 
by Chomsky to show an incremental relation between the complexity of a system and 
its capability to recognise and interpret different levels of grammar. In the discussion of
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this hierarchy there will be a closer look at the actual physical requirements of four 
different types of machines that display different capabilities. The second hierarchy is 
one designed by Dretske that first shows a division of intentionality into three levels, 
and then goes on to demonstrate how each level relates to the complexity of a particular 
system and the ability of that system to process incoming information and possibly act 
upon it.
I will offer arguments to show that Chomsky's hierarchy is successful for he deals 
with machine states that can be quantified and a direct relationship can be shown 
between the machine and its capabilities with little or no difficulty. Whereas because 
Dretske deals with mental states his hierarchy is bound to fail for it is not always the 
most complex system that can carry out the most complex tasks and some very simple 
systems can do very complicated things.
Endnotes:
 ^ 'Complexity' in this sense bears no relation to the technical sense of 'complexity' in 'Complexity 
Theory'. I mean complex' as in intricate' or 'not simple'.
2 Penrose, R (1989) The Emperor's New Mind - Concerning Computers, Minds and The Laws o f 
Physics, Vintage Press, p.483
3 Ibid. p.551
 ^If design behaviour is second-hand complexity, then so too are thoughts or any explicit representation 
of objects or goals for the system. In this sense first-hand complexity is the physical structure of the 
system and its potential in relation to its environment; and any product of this is second-hand.
 ^Clark, A. and Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1990) The Cognizer's Innards,
 ^See above section 4.2.3., fifth paragraph.
 ^This is not to deny that other organic systems are complex; nw is it to deny that they have a 
continually changing set of stimuli in their environment The comparison being set up is between the 
flexibility of the organic system to detect and select incoming information, as opposed to the inorganic 
system that depends upon its program and its fixed environment for information from which it has no 
freedom to choose.
® Also see Dretske referred to in chapter 2 and again, in greater detail, in chapter 5 section 5.3.
 ^ Shakespeare, W. (1604) Hamlet, Act 3 Scene 2, lines 383 - 389, The New Penguin, 1980.
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Penrose, R (1989) The Emperor’s New Mind, Vintage Press, p.550-552
 ^^  The notion of the 'consistency' of behaviour is really only useful when we are dealing with organic 
systems that possess a brain, for.with known mentality their behaviour may be subjective and not 
cUctated in the way the actions of a computer are dictated to it by the program it is running.
One set up by Chomsky that shows a direct relationship between the recognition and processing of 
different levels of grammar by machines that vary in complexity, and the other is Dretske's relationship 
between levels of intentionality and corresponding mental states.
The notion o f forgetting is an interesting one for it suggests that being capable of forgetting takes a 
very complex system indeed. A system that has so much informational input that it forgets to deal 
with important things or gets its priorities wrong and fails to do things in the most successful order is 
a system that has a capacity for interesting behaviour.
I think it is probably very unlikely that animals create anything similar to the rational comparisons 
that human beings make and this is quite simply because their lives do not demand interaction, with 
each other and with other species, on this sort of complex level.
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5. A hierarchy of complexity and capabilities
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will extend the conclusion I arrived at in chapter four: that any 
system's capabilities depend upon the environment that it inhabits, and to show that a 
positive relationship exists between the complexity of a system and the complexity of 
the tasks it is able to carry out, (so that a system's capabilities are a function or product 
of its complexity plus its environment). By the end of this chapter I intend to have 
shown that hierarchical structures, relating the enormous diversity of capabilities of a 
system to both its architecture and its ability to adapt and generate behaviour, are 
sufficient for describing machine states but not for the description of mental states.
The ability of any system to generate behaviour can be divided into two types. The 
first of these is spatial in nature and remains statically present in the design of the 
system. It is not flexible and cannot be enhanced or altered in any way by changes in 
the system or the system's environment. It has no scope and is capable of generating 
only a limited set of behaviours within the system. An ideal example of a system that 
has the capacity for this sort of fixed behaviour is a kettle because no amount of change 
in its environment will create any change in its actions. The second type of generative 
capability is temporal in nature and dynamically generated in the system. It is flexible 
enough to be able to change itself and bring about changes in other systems, and there 
is no limitation set on this behaviour because the full structure and capabilities of the 
system are continually changing and cannot ever be fully known. Simple systems 
possess only the former whilst more complex systems have the capacity to possess the 
temporal generative ability since they are systems that need to adapt to survive within a 
continually changing environment.
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This chapter will be structured in the following way. The form of previous chapters 
has been to begin by giving a statement of the problem and the area that will be covered 
in my attempt to deal with it, this I shall do in section 5.1.1. Then the discussion will 
be opened in 5.2. by setting out Chomsky's hierarchy. I shall first say why Chomsky's 
work is pertinent to my own work and then take a closer look at the grammars and the 
machines that Chomsky describes and the relationship that he claims exists between the 
two. Then I will follow the same procedure with an examination of Dretske's hierarchy 
of intentionality. Dretske's hierarchy is more obviously useful because he deals with 
intentionality and its relation to the possession, by a number of different systems, of 
particular mental states. I disagree with some of the points that Dretske makes and I will 
offer arguments to show why I do so and then go on to offer possible solutions to these 
difficulties. The chapter will be brought to a close with a discussion about why 
hierarchical stratifications are a successful way of dealing with machine states that are 
distinguishable and quantifiable but not of examining mental states which are vague and 
thus difficult to define. A new strategy for comparing machine states and mental states 
will be examined in chapter six.
5.1.1. A statement of the problem area
Initially the problem to be dealt with in this chapter is whether or not it is possible to 
demonstrate using a hierarchical structure that there is a positive correlation between the 
architectural complexity of a system, its environment and the functionality it possesses. 
By 'functionality' I will mean the things of which the system is capable. In chapters 
three and four I made use of many examples that showed that in our shared world there 
are a vast array of systems, both organic and inorganic, that are capable of behaving in 
ways that vary quite considerably; some are only capable of processing information, 
whilst others are capable of a full understanding of their environment and forming 
beliefs that will dictate and direct their subsequent behaviour. I will argue that the
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complexity of the tasks or behaviour that a system can carry out will be directly related 
to the architectural and environmental complexity of that system.
I will turn now to an example of an architectural structure that was developed by 
Noam Chomsky in 1959. His architecture demonstrates the idea that the tasks that a 
system carries out are related to the internal complexity of that system and the amount 
of information that it has been designed to respond to within its environment, so that 
where a system has a simple internal design and a very limited environment it will be 
capable of carrying out only the simplest tasks. With an increase in the complexity of its 
architecture it is probable that there will be a corresponding increase in the number and 
variety of the stimuli within its environment to which it can respond; which is just 
another way of saying that it will have a greater functionality, or range of capabilities.
5.2. The Chomsky Hierarchy (1959)^
Still looming large is the question of when it is justifiable to ascribe mental states to 
non-human systems and in chapter three I argued that it is possible for me to know my 
own mental states and by my interaction with other human beings I can extrapolate 
from my experiences and their commensurate behaviours that they too have mental 
states that are very probably qualitatively similar to mine. However, when it comes to 
ascribing mental states to other systems things become a lot more problematic. It is no 
longer possible for us to reasonably say that we "know' what it is like to be a cat or 
moose or any other animal, nor, for that matter, is it possible for us to know what it is 
like to be a machine such as a television or a thermostat Our decisions about whether 
or not another system, organic or inorganic, has mental states are based upon two 
things; its actions and our apprehension of its architectural complexity. A positive 
decision about its possessing human-like mental states will usually depend upon how 
consistently human-like its behaviour is and whether or not we consider it to have an 
internal complexity that makes it possible for it to occupy a mental state. This "human-
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like' behaviour I have called 'as-though' behaviour, because the system behaves 'as- 
though' it knows, understands, and so on.
In the work that follows I will examine how Chomsky shows that there is a 
correlation between the complexity of a machine and the complexity of the grammar that 
it can recognise and interpret He deals only with the capabilities of some machines and 
not with the capacities of any organic system so the field is already suitably narrow 
making it a good place to start our examination of hierarchical relationships because 
there are already boundaries or constraints placed on what we are to look for. We shall 
be examining the progressive changes in the capabilities of inorganic systems as their 
architectures become more complex and their connection to the environment becomes 
more enriched. So at this stage there is no need to go beyond these boundaries to look 
for implications about organic systems as well.
5.2.1. The grammars
In particular Chomsky wants to look at the ability to recognise and interpret phrase 
structure grammars, of different levels of sophistication, that are demonstrated by four 
different machines. What he offers is a straight-forward comparison, showing an 
incremental increase in the complexity of a system, the elements in its environment to 
which it is designed to respond and the capabilities that these two can together afford 
the system as a whole.
I shall make one or two general points about the grammars and then take a look at 
the four grammars and what they comprise in. Then I will move on to examine the 
machines that Chomsky uses to set up the other side of his hierarchical comparison.
But before I do any of this I will offer a clear view of the hierarchy in the form of a 
diagram so that reference can be made to it as the text is read.
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Grammar Machine
TypeO - generates 
unrestricted grammars
Type 2 - generates 
context-free grammar
Type 3 - generates 
a primitive grammar
Type 1 - generates 
context-sensitive 
grammar_______
FSM - a basic combinatorial 
machine. Output limited by 
input states.
Turing Machine - a basic 
machine with an infinite 
auxiliary memory______
NPDM - non-deterministic 
push down machine - the 
next state is unpredicted
Linearly bounded automaton 
- TM with tape restriction
Eigurc 4
The ^ntences or phrases that a phrase structure grammar generates are called the 
surface structures of the grammar. In formal languages, such as those used for 
programming, the description stops at the surface structure. In natural languages 
descriptions can often go below the surface structure to deep structures. We talk of 
sentences that are ambiguous as having hidden meanings and in grammatical language 
these are said.to have one or more deep structures that are below the surface structure. 
The constraints that are talked of are those that are placed on the production rules of the 
grammar. They produce restrictions and consequently make the grammar easier to 
understand.
The first grammar that we will look at, but the one that comes at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, is Type 3 grammar, or the set of regular grammars. These are also known as 
finite state languages, where the finite states are equal to a finite set of nodes on a
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transition graph.2 Thus when we find ourselves in the middle of a sentence using this 
granunar the only information we need to know to enable us to finish the sentence 
correctly is what state we are in at present No other information of any kind is 
necessary. So, for example, we do not need to know the content of the first part of the 
sentence that has already been written or the context of the greater piece of writing of 
which this one sentence is only a very small part 
An example would be as follows:
r
Figure 5
N, O, or P are all non-terminal symbols; the start symbol is N  and is commonly the 
'determiner', examples of which are 'the', 'an' and 'a'; o, p, r- and s are terminal 
symbols and the final node is indicated by a diagonal bar across the circle. If N is 
The', O is 'ginger', P is 'cat' and Q is 'sleeps', then the sentences that could be 
generated will be sentences such as. The ginger cat' or The ginger cat sleeps'.
Such grammars and finite state networks as these offer a simple mechanism for the 
generation of sentences and the analysis of language, However, because the mechanism 
is simple it means that many more interesting sentences, and indeed, languages cannot 
be generated? An example that Krishnamurthy offers^ is that finite state grammar finds 
itself incapable of dealing with sentences in English because of the richness and variety 
of the expressions that it uses. It finds parenthesized expressions difficult to describe 
for the same reasons, that is, that their meaning often depends upon the expressions 
within which they are embedded or they are simply asides about which the present state 
is unknown.
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The regular expression language can be produced with a very basic finite state 
machine. It is used for representing regular sets. Three benefits are offered to the user 
of a language as basic as this. Firstly, its expressions can be written out in a line from 
left to right and it is then obvious which are the terminals and non-terminals, and which 
are the start and finish nodes. Secondly, it has a precision and formality that natural 
language has not. And thirdly, it is the most simple of all the formal languages for a 
designer to use. However, the third benefit has an accompanying drawback, and it is 
this; because it is the simplest language that can be used there are relatively few things 
of any great interest or significance that can be done with it.
Tlie next grammar that Chomsky makes use of is Type 2 or context-free grammar. 
These are used extensively to describe both formal and natural languages. These 
grammars are of a slightly more complex form because they are context-free and not 
limited in the way that a finite state grammar is. An example of their form would be, 
"A->x" where A ' can be replaced by *x’ anywhere it appears for there is no constraint 
on the context. It is still a fairly simple grammar that is often easier to use than the more 
complex 'context-sensitive' grammars which are the next up on Chomsky's hierarchical 
scale.
By looking at the derivation of a sentence in context-free grammar it is possible to 
show how a particular sentence can be generated from its rules alone. The clearest way 
of seeing how a derivation of this sort operates is by looking at the diagram of a parsing 
tree.
Q  Root node - component
Leaf node - O  
Subcomponent
Leaf Node
Full node - subcomponent
Figure 6
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The start symbol always appears as the root of the tree, (which paradoxically is at the top of 
the diagram), and the terminal symbols are at the end of the branches just as the leaves are 
on a tree.
In the following diagram I use a sentence of natural language^, "The man hit the
ball", to demonstrate this more fully where D' is the determiner, ’NP’ the noun
phrase, 'VP' the verb phrase, 'N' the noun and 'V the verb.
Sentence: "The man hit the ball"
man hit
Eigurg 7
Type 1 or context-sensitive grammar is a phrase structure grammar that satisfies the 
condition that for any proposition "p -> q'\ q has the same number, or a greater 
number, of symbols as p. The language generated by this grammar is known as a 
context-sensitive language. These languages are not very suitable for the formalisation 
of statements that have grammatical constraints. For these it is perhaps better to return 
to a context-free grammar that is already equipped with added constraints.
A context sensitive language is, however, very useful for the representation of 
propositions in a more complex natural language. The sorts of propositions I am 
thinking of are those where the context in which the phrase is used becomes important, 
or where the sentence is already heavily embedded. Indeed any instance of ambiguity 
might render the sentence inexpressible without the use of a more comprehensive 
grammar.
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For example, in the proposition "xwz > xyz", y only maps on to w where the 
conditions of x  and z are also met in exactly the same way as they are in the first half of 
the proposition, xwz. So that A is in a particular context between x  and z is seen to be 
of great significance. Thus, if y is also between x and z, with x  still placed to the left of 
y and z still to its right, and x  and z have the same meaning that they did in xwzy then A 
and y can be said to be equal. So for: x  = ’Mr.Bun', w = '(the baker)' and z = 'bakes 
cakes', y also represents '(the baker)' where x  and z consistently stand for *Mr.Bun' 
and 'bakes cakes', respectively. Thus, it can be seen that w's context is very important 
and only something that a context-sensitive grammar can recognise and interpret.
The grammar that is the most complex and therefore in the highest position on 
Chomsky's hierarchy is Type 0. It is a grammar that can generate an unrestricted set of 
grammars and with every set being recursive Type 0 is well able to parse sentences of 
English in context However, it is a grammar that has a mainly theoretical application 
for it is most commonly used for examining the complexity of a particular computation 
to see if that computation can be generated by any of the other grammars.
In any of the other grammars, types 1 to 3, the number of non-terminal symbols on 
the left-hand side of the implication sign has to be equal or less than the number of 
terminal symbols on the right-hand side. In the type 0 grammar there can be any 
number whatsoever of non-terminal and terminal symbols. So with no correlation being 
necessary there are no constraints of any kind placed on this type of grammar.
I shall turn now to the machines that are capable of recognising different phrase 
structure grammars. This section will explain what they are and the basics of how they 
operate so that we can see just how they set about recognising a grammar. I will 
discuss the corresponding grammars as I go along.
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5.2.2. The machines and their behavioural properties
Finite State Machine (FSM) and Type 3 grammar
The simplest form of machine is called a basic machine. It is described as a 
combinatorial machine because it is only able to interpret a set of input information and 
from that produce a set of output data that is a combination or function of the inputs. 
The difference between a finite state machine and a basic machine is that the finite state 
machine is a basic machine with the improved capability of an internal state that alters in 
relation to the input. So that the output of a FSM (which is already specified) is a 
function of the input and its internal state. Both machines have very limited capabilities.
Provided we know the initial state, the input and the transition function, the 
behaviour of the FSM can be determined absolutely. With the same information it is 
also possible to specify the set of all final states of this machine. As a result of this 
increased power the FSM is now able to recognise grammatical sequences as being 
members of a specified grammatical set. By 'recognition' I mean that the machine will 
react in one predicted way if the sequence is a member of the set or in another different 
way, again predictable, if it is not.
An FSM is considered to be deterministic if given a specific state s the same input 
symbol will always cause the FSM to move into a particular state and no other. 
However, there is a non-deterministic FSM (NFSM), which can move into more than 
one possible state on receipt of the same input symbol. It has more than one possible 
transition and because no weights can be assigned to these transitions it can be 
described as a possibilistic machine.
The FSM is capable of recognising only the type 3 grammar that is identical with 
the regular expression language, and is known as the regular or finite state language. 
Indeed both the FSM and the NFSM can accept the same sets of words in the type 3 
grammar. One significant advantage of the NFSM is that it can be a smaller machine
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since the transition state can remain unspecified. Extra space is required in the FSM 
because the 'go to' state has to be stipulated since it is a deterministic machine. When 
the state outcome is not important a NFSM is used.
Push Down Machines (FDM), Non-deterministic Push Down Machines
(NPDM) and Type 2 grammar
The structure and capabilities of the FDM (here assumed to be determined) dictate 
that it lies somewhere between the Turing Machine (TM - see below) and a FSM. A TM 
is a FSM with an infinite auxiliary memory in which information can be stored and 
recalled in any way at all. The difference between the TM and the FDM is that in a FDM 
there is a restriction on the storing and recalling of information in the auxiliary memory. 
In this way the restriction resembles a stack where the object or symbol that is last-in 
can be picked off first or the one that is first-in can be picked off last. The implication 
of this is that symbols are always stored at, or recalled from, the top of the stack. When 
a new symbol is added to the stack it pushes the previous symbol that was put there 
first down one place in the stack, so that the first symbol is now in the second place in 
the stack.
The FDM is made up of an input tape, a FSM and a stack. The stack is its memory 
which can be compared to random access memory, (RAM). As we have seen the FSM 
does not have any memory so that the addition of the stack or memory to the FDM 
increases the capabilities of the machine. An added capability that a FDM has over a 
FSM is that it can recognise the class or irregular sets of context-free grammar. It is this 
class that contains regular or finite state languages and is therefore of great value for the 
generation and translation of computer languages.
The stack is represented as a string of symbols from an alphabet, and because the 
stack is assumed to be arbitrarily long any number of symbols can be added to the top 
of the stack. The furthermost symbol to the left is considered to be the first in the stack. 
When a symbol is added to the stack it is called 'push' or 'load', and when a symbol is
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deleted from the top of the stack it is known as 'popping'. The stack is non-uniform 
because only the top is added to or taken-away from. This type of stack memory has 
two advantages, firstly it has no addressing scheme, and secondly, only two 
commands are needed for the storing and recalling of information. These commands are 
"push" and "pop".
We have seen that in a deterministic push down machine the output is determined 
by whatever the specific input is. This is not the case for a non-deterministic push 
down machine. For instance, the PDM has one possible internal state to which it can 
move on receipt of an input, whereas, for the same input, the NPDM has a number of 
different possible states it can go to. So the next state is not determined or determinable. 
It might well happen that for the same input both machines output the same state but, 
because only one response can be predicted it cannot be stated categorically that this 
will happen on every occasion.
Being non-deterministic does not necessarily mean that a new class of states is 
added to the system, for the same states may be present in both machines. Being non- 
deterministic may even mean that the overall system of the NPDM is smaller than the 
PDM because the latter has a special set of output states that are necessarily present.
Linearly Bounded Turing Machine and Type 1 grammar
The Linearly Bounded Turing Machine (LBTM) is a machine that is similar to the 
TM except that it has a limited amount of tape that contains only the input string plus an 
extra two squares that are to hold the end markers. This limitation means that the 
machine is restricted in its power to recognize some symbol strings. However, even 
when the length of tape is increased as a linear function of the length of the input string 
the computational ability of the machine remains unaltered because no additional 
information is being added in the form of new symbol strings. This machine, a linearly 
bounded memory machine, is capable of recognising the Type 1, context-sensitive
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languages. The tape bounding means that the machine is only capable of generating 
and interpreting a particular set of input strings or symbols in a limited direction on 
either side of the tape head. This 'limited set of symbols' between the two 'bounds' is 
the context to which the 'read/write head' is sensitive, in this case it is from 'alpha' to 
'kappa'.
Read/write Head
right left
Linearly bounded tape for a TM
Bounds
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Turing Machines (TM) and Type 0 grammar
A Turing Machine is a Finite State Machine that has an infinite auxiliary memory in 
which information can be stored or recalled in any manner by the movement of the tape 
in either direction (right or left), and by an unspecified number of squares. The basic 
hardware of a TM is in two parts; a head and a potentially infinite tape. The head can 
read or write a symbol, move left or right or stay put in relation to the cells or squares 
marked-off on the tape. The tape is of an infinite length and it extends from each side of 
the head. It is marked into square cells that can contain symbols from an alphabet set 
written in. A machine of this sort must be capable of accomplishing a number of simple 
tasks. Those tasks are firstly, that it must be capable of changing the symbol on one of 
the observed squares, and secondly, it must also be capable of changing one of the 
observed squares to another square.
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The symbols on the tape are formed from a finite set of symbols called the external 
alphabet or that consists of a lowercase English alphabet, Arabic numerals, 
punctuation marks and a symbol for a blank. By reading from and writing to the cells 
of the tape the machine communicates with the outside world. This communicative 
ability is demonstrated by the movement of the head to the left, or to the right or by its 
remaining static.
It is only possible for the machine to reside in any one of a finite set of states, S. 
These states are indicated by the use of the lowercase Greek alphabet in the diagram of 
the LBTM. The transfer of the machine from one instruction to another can be seen as 
equivalent to a change in the 'state of mind' or internal state of the machine.
The TM has three main functions. Machine Function (MAP), State Function (STF) 
and Direction Function (DIF). The resulting TM computations are simply a matter of 
executing and repeating the actions of the MAF, STF, and DIF. At any given time, the 
machine state plus the content of the scanned square will either cause the machine to 
take action (moving right or left) or to halt If it reacts at all it will be to perform three 
actions before the next appropriate time interval. The actions are, (i) that the square 
being read is erased and another symbol is printed on the square (MAF), (ii) that the 
internal state is changed (STF), and (iii) that the head moves to the left or to the right or 
remains static (DDF).
Every Type 0 language generates a recursively enumerable set of languages that are 
made up of arbitrary sets of symbol strings. In terms of the grammar already set out 
above a Turing Machine could be constructed that could recognise and successfuUy 
parse its sentences. No restrictions or constraints exist on the production rules of this 
language.
I WÜ1 now give a resumé of what has been said in this section. Then in the next 
section I wiD take a look at Dretske's stratification of intentionality into three levels and
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the implications that this has on the related capabilities of the systems he proposes as 
capable of the different levels.
5.2.3. A resume of Chomsky's hierarchical stratification
As a formal symbol system a machine is capable of recognizing and generating a 
specific set or class of languages. The level of its capability will depend upon its 
internal states or architecture and its auxiliary memory that stores and retrieves input 
information. Being a very basic machine the FSM has no auxiliary memory so it is 
restricted to the generation and acceptance of regular grammars and languages. 
Languages of this sort are very primitive but they can be used to implement things such 
as text editing and command languages. The PDM and NPDM are slighdy more 
complex with an auxiliary memory but because there is a restriction on their capacity to 
store and recall information, they can only accept the class of context-free languages. 
The linearly bounded TM is similar to TM in every way except that it has a restricted 
tape which means there is a limit placed on the input strings that it finds it possible to 
recognize. A result of this is that it can only accept, recognise and interpret context- 
sensitive languages. The TM, with its infinite auxihary memory, can generate 
unrestricted grammars and information can be stored and recalled in any manner at all.
It is possible to see from this fairly straight-forward hierarchical arrangement that a 
relationship exists between the architecture, or internal states, of a machine plus the 
input it is capable of receiving from its environment and the capabilities of the machine 
to carry out certain tasks. The tasks are ’certain' because in Chomsky's example they 
are set out for us and consist of the recognition and interpretation of phrase structure 
grammars that themselves vary in complexity from the most simple, type 3, to the most 
complex, type 0.
The architecture and the environment can be seen to have had a substantial influence 
on the capabilities of the systems in question so that we can see that the simple
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machine, with only the most limited connection to the world, is capable of only the 
simplest tasks. The most complex machine with a number of obvious links to the world 
is capable of generating and recognising the most complex grammars. And in between 
the two there are two machines, the one that is slightly less complex in design than the 
TM, the bounded TM, with constraints on its tape which mean it has a more limited 
access to the world. It is less capable than the TM but more capable that the FSM, the 
PDM or the NPDM. And finally, the deterministic and non-deterministic push-down 
machines that have a more complex design than the FSM because of their memory 
facility but with the constraint of having no tape which means they are unable to 
recognise context sensitive grammars; because of this they are more capable than the 
FSM but less capable than the linearly bounded TM and the TM.
Chomsky deals with machines and machines states and their relation to the world is 
shown through the languages they can use and the phrase structure grammars they can 
generate, recognise and interpret He does not deal with mental states, nevertheless he 
shows that there is a tenable relation between the structure of a system, its link to its 
environment or domain and the things of which it is capable.
Dretske shows this relation by looking at the possibility of a number of different 
types of system, organic and inorganic, having particular mental states. This possibility 
is based on his notion of dividing intentionality into three levels and then examining 
which level of intentionality different systems exhibit depending on their capabilities.
We shall see that the idea is that a simple system, capable of only simple information 
piocessing and first level intentionality, can occupy only the most basic of mental 
states. A more complicated system, that can exhibit some understanding of its incoming 
information is capable of a higher level intentionality and can therefore possess higher 
level mental states.
Having already looked at Dretske's theory at some length in a previous chapter, section 
2.8,1 will briefly go over the main points that were made there and then go on to show the
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logical formulation with which he forms his divisions of intentionality. Following this I 
will explain how his division demonstrates that a relationship can be seen to exist between 
the system, the stimuli it can respond to in its environment, and its capability to process the 
information it receives. However, I will also show that if this relationship is shown in a 
hierarchical stratification it is bound to fail because it deals with mental states that cannot be 
differentiated in the way that machine states can be.
5.3. Dretske's hierarchy of intentionality^
Dretske outlines three levels of intentionality and he attempts to relate these three 
levels of intentionality to the plasticity or flexibility of a variety of systems to extract 
information from their incoming perceptual signals. He concludes that only systems 
that are capable of reaching third order intentionality are flexible enough to be able to 
completely digitalise information and disclose the semantic content contained therein.
The human mind is the most effective system for reaching this level, but it is not the 
only one that Dretske believes to be capable of this level of intentional behaviour.
The human system has the plasticity to digitalise the nested analogue information 
that it perceives in a signal and from that information extract the semantic content, The 
semantic content that it extracts will be the one which is most relevant to it and the belief 
system that it already has. The implication being that if two people have the same 
sensory input they might still each extract a different semantic content^ and it all 
depends upon what is of most interest to them. However, the main point is that human 
beings can form beliefs, and it is this that distinguishes them as cognitive systems from 
thermostats which are mere information processors. So, it would seem that for any 
system to be capable of forming beliefs it would first need to be capable of processing 
its incoming information at a level of third order intentionality.
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5.3.1. Intentional states and levels of intentionality
As has already been stated all information-processing systems can occupy 
intentional states of one order or another, so that some systems are capable only of 
information processing, whilst others can understand and conceptualise the information 
they receive. A physical state carries information about a source, which is to say that it 
occupies an intentional state relative to that source. If we take 'S' to stand for the signal 
that the system receives from the source of the information, then in any of the orders of 
intentionality S states that't is F, but it does not necessarily state that't is G',
regardless of the fact that anything that is F is G. The information in structure S has a
prepositional content that possesses intentional characteristics.
Dretske gives his orders of intentionality as follows:
fl) First Order of Intentionality - (Contingent)
(a) All Fs are G
(b) S has the content that t is F is G
(c) S does not have the content that t is G
The signal 'S' has a content that exhibits first order intentionality. All information- 
processing systems exhibit this order of intentionality for it depends solely on the 
interaction of the system with its immediate environment The best explanation of first 
order intentionality is that it is possible to receive some information about a thing 
without receiving all of the information about it  So, for example, a thermostat receives 
the information that the room temperature is too high but it has receives no information 
about why this state of affairs has come about The thermostat can only receive 
information of a particular kind from a general information signal for nothing else is of 
relevance to its successful operation.
(2) Second Order of Intentionality - (Natural)
(a) It is a natural law that Fs are G's
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(b) S has the content that t is F
(c) S does not have the content that t is G
At this level it is not the signal,'S', but the system that exhibits the information 
content of second order intentionality. In this instance it is possible to know something 
without necessarily being aware of all its underlying implications. For instance, it is 
possible to know that a pool of water is freezing without knowing that the water is also 
expanding, even though it is a natural law that water cannot freeze without expanding. 
The notion of its expansion is a piece of implicit information that depends upon the 
natural laws that hold in the empirical world.
(3) Third Order of Intentionality - (Necessary)
(a) It is analytically necessary that F's be G
(b) S has the content that t is F
(c) S does not have the content that t is G
Again the system, and not the signal, exhibits third level intentionality. For 
example, it is possible to believe that 12 is the number you get when you multiply 3 by 
4 without necessarily knowing that 12 is also the sum of 7 and 5. Knowing one does 
not entail knowing the other, nor does it rule it out Thus it is possible to know 
something is the case without knowing all that there is to know about it. Dretske's own 
example is that we can know that the solution to a mathematical problem is 23 without 
being aware that 23 is also the cube root of 12,167; where t is Fis '23' and t is G is 
'the cube root of 12,167'. So that just because it is necessarily so does not make it also 
necessary for us to know it.
It is this third order that I am most interested in for having the capability to reach 
third level intentionality means that a system can be seen to possess the flexibility to do 
all manner of things, from ignoring some pieces of information whilst selecting others, 
to the extraction of the relevant semantic content and the formation of appropriate 
beliefs.
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5.3.2. Semantic, or prepositional, content
If we cast our minds back to chapter two I showed there a diagram of three 
concentric rings'  ^that Dretske uses to show what he means by analogue and digital 
information, and how wc digitalise information to form beliefs. According to Dretske 
belief corresponds to the outermost informational shell, for a formed belief is the only 
completely digitalised piece of information and all other information in the signal 
remains nested in analogue form inside the outermost shell. A visual experience is in 
analogue form and only the information that is selected and conceptualised becomes 
digital. Once a system has reached the level of belief it must be sure that it has a 
semantic content that is commensurate with the formation of what would be, in its own 
personal context, a true belief.
Dretske describes this semantical content as the prepositional content that 
demonstrates third order intentionality. A belief, unlike an information structure, has an 
exclusive prepositional content which the system has formed. This accounts for the 
belief that a system forms not being in any way determinate. An information signal, on 
the other hand, carries all the nested information that is possible within that one signal. 
That a human being can have a belief about %, and therefore also an understanding of 
its semantic content, makes that belief distinct from the beliefs about X  that just exist 
per se. The beliefs that exist per se are those that are implicit in the incoming 
information but which are not of relevance to the perceiver at that time.
For example, the statement 1 am sitting' conveys more information than just that I 
am in a sedentary position. It also gives us lots of negative information, for example, 
that I am not running, standing, or swimming. However, for the listener the semantic 
content of my utterance is simply one piece of the whole thing, and perhaps for them it 
means only that I am sitting. That the listener can extract the meaning from the 
information that I convey, means also that they are able to form beliefs about that
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information, thus meaning and belief formation have, for Dretske, the same level of 
intentionality. For Dretske if we can understand 'meaning' we can also understand the 
processes behind forming and holding beliefs.
From this account and the one in chapter two it is possible to see that in Dretske's 
hierarchy knowledge and belief have a higher order of intentionality than just being able 
to process incoming information. It is also clear that what we believe and the beliefs 
themselves are quite distinct even though their contents are often logically 
interdependent for it is only the beliefs that we have formed that show that we have an 
understanding of the information that we have received through signals from our 
environment Dretske would say that only through the formation of true beliefs, or 
beliefs that are appropriate to our circumstances, can it be seen that we have 
successfully selected the most relevant piece of information from the incoming signal, 
stripped away the unnecessary pieces, and extracted the semantic content Then, and 
only then, can I show that I have been capable of completely digitalising some selected 
piece of my incoming information.
5.3.3. Systems, environments and capabilities according to Dretske
Being able to reach only a first order intentionality is equated with any system that 
is capable of no more than processing information. These are simple systems with a 
very limited environment and only the capability to process information; they have no 
knowledge or understanding of the information with which they are dealing. Second 
order intentionality is associated with a system's capability to know something of the 
information it processes. The system, although still relatively simple, is capable of 
possessing epistemic states, but not of fully understanding that information. Finally, a 
third order intentionality is only achievable by systems that can process their incoming 
information, ignore some pieces of it and select others from which they can then extract 
the semantic concept that is most relevant to them and form beliefs. These 'belief-
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forming' systems are also capable of adapting their behaviour to suit their new beliefs, 
and altering their perception of events, past, present or future, to accommodate then- 
new or changed concepts.
It is possible to make a hierarchical stratification of Dretske's division in much the 
same form as Chomsky's, and this is done in the diagram below. In a similar way to 
Chomsky's the system that is capable of the top level of behaviour is also capable, as a 
matter of course, of accomplishing the tasks at the lower levels. So that anything that is 
capable of forming beliefs about selected pieces of information that it perceives is also 
capable of processing information, knowing what information it is and understanding it 
in full. A Turing Machine with no linearly bounded tape is capable of generating 
unrestricted grammars, but also of generating context-sensitive grammars, context-free 
grammars and primitive grammars. In Dretske's hierarchy there are systems that are 
only capable of processing information and nothing more, similarly in Chomsky's 
hierarchy the Finite State Machines can generate only primitive grammars and nothing 
more.
Capabilities Type of systemLevel of intentionality
Conceptualising 
information and 
forming beliefs
Genuine cognitive 
systems
Third level; 
Digital
Limited information 
processing
Thermostats, 
televisions, and 
dictaphones
Knowing - having 
epistemic states
Second level; 
Analog
First level; 
Analog
Figure 9
171
Both hierarchies are successful at showing that a relationship exists between a 
system's capabilities and its complexity of design and the extent of its domain,^ but in 
the next section I will put forward an argument to show that Dretske's stratification of 
mental states is prone to failure whereas Chomsky's hierarchy because it is about 
machine states, is not at risk in the same way. The following section contains four 
criticisms that I shall make concerning Dretske's proposal for a hierarchy of 
intentionality. The last two of these criticisms deal directly with why Dretske's 
hierarchy is unsuccessful.
5.4. A criticism of Dretske's work
The first problem lies with Dretske's concentric ring diagrams which I believe do 
not convey the information that he expects. Secondly, Dretske's use of the terms 
'analogue' and 'digital' is suspicious because he offers at least two incompatible senses 
of 'digital' and uses them synonymously. The third problem is that for levels one and 
three Dretske offers suggestions for the type of system that would best fulfil the 
capabilities, but for the second, or nomic, level there is no such possible system. 
Finally, Dretske claims that frogs, humans, and perhaps some computers' are 'genuine 
cognitive systems' capable of third level intentionality; and this is simply misleading.
5.4.1. Faulty diagrams
In this first criticism I shall argue that his diagrams are both logically and intuitively 
problematic. They confuse logically because they go against the Venn diagram 
conventions which are logical representations of sets of states of affairs. In a Venn 
diagram of logical implication P  then Q' becomes a large circle 'Q' with a smaller circle 
P ' contained in it, so that everything that is P is also Q. At the same time this states 
implicitly that not everything that is Q is also P.
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The logical implication of 
i f P t h e n Q / P - > Q
Anything that is P is also Q. The converse does 
not hold; for it is not the case that anything in Q 
is also in P unless Q -> P is also implied. This 
would mean that the relation of P and Q is one of 
equivalence and not one of just implication.
Figpre 10
In the following diagram^ Dretske's use of Venn-like diagram suggests that 
everything that is a quadrilateral is also a square; but this cannot be so for a quadrilateral 
might be a trapezoid or a rhombus, but it does not necessarily have to be a square. The 
problem is that to reach embedded information one would intuitively follow a natural 
progression inwards from the general informational signal to a particular piece of 
information, but Dretske's diagram appears to work the other way from the signal, 
marked as 'S', as a whole outwards through the analogue information and finally to a 
piece of information which is completely digitalised.
t i s  a  s q u a r e
t is a rectangle
t is a parallelogram
t is a quadrilateral
Figure 11
It seems then that his diagram is 'back to front' because if we talk of one piece of 
information as being embedded in another piece of information then the obvious thing
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would be for the most specific piece of information to be at the middle of the diagram 
which would be followed by a progressive movement outwards towards less and less 
specific information that is analogue in nature. This would mean that the diagram is 
revered and the analogue information of structure 'S' should be the outermost ring.
However, a problem arises here because Dretske explains that in the process of 
digitalisation the extraneous information is stripped away from the most particular piece 
that has been selected and we are left with the required concept, but, if the piece of 
information that we have selected and examined is the most particular piece there cannot 
be any more spurious information to strip from it.
That human beings are capable of making allowances for the message carrier is 
something that distinguishes them from voltmeters. Human beings have the selective 
capability to disregard the carrier of the information and also to perceive what level of 
influence the carrier has had over the message, and then they are capable of extracting 
the carrier and its influence from the message and finally leaving what is the most 
relevant or specific piece of information for them. The human understanding of 
information is represented by the outermost ring in this diagram yet Dretske states that 
as we understand we extract the semantic content and information is lost; why then is 
the outermost ring the largest and the ring within which all other information is stored, 
thus suggesting that no information is in fact lost.
Another problem is Dretske's use of the term 'embedded' when he speaks of two or 
more pieces of analytic information. The difficulty is simply that two pieces of 
information that are logically equivalent cannot be embedded one inside the other.
Again this can be demonstrated using venn diagrams, (see Figure 12). The best 
approach to this problem is to begin by stating three of the definitions that best define 
an analytic truth
1. the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject,
(Kant).
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2. it is possible to prove or disprove an analytic truth or falsehood by means of 
the definitions of logical laws, (Logical Positivists).
3. a statement is an analytic truth if it is true in virtue of the meanings of its 
constituent terms.
If the third definition is used with regard to the third level of intentionality, then an 
analytic relation is one of equivalence where both terms are intersubstitutive, salve 
veritate. In this case then the definition of one term can be swapped with the definition 
of the other, equivalent term. In Frege's example. The Evening Star is the Morning 
Star' it would make no difference to the sense, the reference or the truth value if I were 
to say. The Morning Star is the Evening Star'. Only the order of this statement has 
been altered by this reverse construction. Dretske's 'analytic' example would appear to 
be wrong in this instance because to be intersubstitutional both pieces of information 
have to be equivalent and with their being equivalent if follows that neither piece can be 
embedded in the other. Neither piece of information can be more specific or more 
unique than any other piece since there can be no use of comparatives in relations of 
equivalence.
I think Dretske would argue here that what is more significant is the notion of 
'relevancy', that is, the person selects a particular piece of information and 
conceptualises it, thus forming beliefs about it and this most relevant piece of 
information can be equivalent to another piece but the difference is that it is not relevant 
to that person. But this still leaves Dretske with the problem of diagrams that do not 
accurately represent what he wishes to say. In the diagram on the left the outer most 
ring is meant to represent the most specific piece of information that has been embedded 
in the initial structure 'S'; it stands in an analytic relation to other information.
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P = Q
Figurg IZ
This suggests that the diagram would have to look somewhat different I propose 
that each of the circles would have to overlap exactly if the information represented is 
logically equivalent in any of the accepted senses of analytic, or semantically equivalent 
in Dretske's sense. There could be no embedding of equivalent pieces of information 
one inside the other. The diagram, I would suggest, would have circles of equal 
diameter which would represent their equivalence of information content. The 
unfortunate consequence of this is that all the pieces of information would then look 
like one circle, as they would if the second diagram were looked at along the direction 
of the arrow.
To summarise, my objection to Dretske is that two equivalent things cannot be 
nested one in the other, and I believe that Dretske's use is misleading in both an 
intuitive sense and a logical sense. It does not seem possible for the reader to infer from 
Dretske's diagram of analytically nested circles only that the information in each circle 
is defînitionaUy equivalent This would need to be stated explicitly. In the same sense I 
believe it is misleading for him to confuse the notion of 'embedding' with the notion of 
being 'inside', for equivalent pieces of information can be 'embedded' by being 
logically defmitionally equivalent without one piece necessarily being inside the other. 
This notion is especially confusing when used in the context of analytic relations, as 
Dretske has done.
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Now I shall move on to offer a criticism of Dretske's use of 'analogue' and 'digital' 
which is, to say the least, idiosyncratic. The common use of the analogue/digital 
distinction is to signify a difference in the way that information is carried about 
particular properties. These properties can vary, so for the example of 'pressure' the . 
information about it is carried using a barometer, and for the example of 'temperature' 
the information conduit is a thermostat Dretske bases his use on this distinction, but, 
as he himself says, in a 'slightly unorthodox way'.
5.4.2. Digital and analogue
Dretske is not concerned with how the information being carried is encoded, but 
rather how the facts or information about variable properties, such as pressure and 
temperature, is represented. His information-theoretic use of the distinction can be said 
to mark 'the different way facts can be represented'.
A signal is said to carry the information that's is F  in digital form if there is no 
other information carried in the signal. More precisely, what is meant is that there is no 
other information that is also embedded in the s's being F. Any other information that is 
carried in the signal, but not that which is already embedded in s's being F, is said to be 
carried in analogue form and all signals carry information in both analogue and digital 
form. It is true of every signal that it carries more information in analogue than in digital 
form, and in the move from analogue to digital information a lot of peripheral 
information is necessarily lost The information that is carried in digital form is then, 
the 'most specific, most determinate, piece of information' that the signal carries. It is 
the semantic content of the signal and the only piece of information that is carried in 
digital form. Everything else is carried in analogue form.
Dretske illustrates his version of this distinction with the communication of a piece 
of information about a cup of coffee. The statement The cup has coffee in it' tells us 
only the most specific piece of information that there is coffee in the cup. This statement
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expresses 'all the information a signal carries' and is represented in digital form. An 
analogue representation of the fact that there is coffee in the cup might be a photograph 
of the scene. In the format of the photograph there is much more information available 
and no one piece is any more specific than any other piece.
Thus, for Dretske, a statement is a digital representation of the information being 
carried in a signal and a picture is an analogue representation of the same signal. "The 
information a picture carries in digital form can be rendered only by some enormously 
complex sentence, a sentence that describes every detail of the situation about which the 
picture carries information.' The old adage 'a picture is worth a thousand words' is 
very significant for Dretske, for it conveys his argument very clearly. It would need to 
be a very complex sentence indeed if it were to adequately describe the state of affairs in 
the picture. Dretske argues that what usually happens when we describe a scene is that 
we convey all the analogue information because the digital information is much more 
specifically what the scene would mean to me. The semantic content is that particular 
piece of information most relevant to the person looking at the scene or the piece that 
they extract from the verbal description that I give them. But it might be argued, and I 
believe more reasonably, that whenever I describe a scene to someone I wül give them 
only that information that has seemed relevant to me, that is information that has been 
digitalised. For if Tom were to describe the same scene to me he would give me 
different information, that is the information that he has in digital form that seemed 
most relevant to him. Similarly wimesses to an accident will always give differing 
accounts of the events that led up to the accident for they see things from their own, 
unique perspective.
Even if we accept that Dretske's use of the terms 'digital' and 'analogue' is 'slightly 
unorthodox' his use in this context remains misleading because he seems to want to 
mean two things simultaneously. In one reading 'digital' means 'all' and in another it 
means 'most particular'. 'Digital' in its most common usage means 'discrete packets' of
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information and Dretske's use could conceivably be interpreted in this sense when he 
says that it is the most specific piece of information that is digitalised. By selection and 
categorisation a particular piece of incoming information is extracted for attention, it is 
this piece that is the 'most particular' or specific and it is this piece that counts as the 
overall semantic content of the signal as a whole.
However, elsewhere Dretske states that the outermost ring is 'all the information 
carried by the incoming signal'^^ and that to form a concept we have to move inwards 
and strip away any irrelevant information; so it would then seem as though the 
outermost ring cannot be the most specific piece of information after all since it must, at 
least, be representative of the most general information from which the semantic content 
is extracted.
If more than one piece of information is carried in digital form then more than one 
piece could be the semantic content of the informational structure. This in turn suggests 
that the semantic content is not, in fact, unique as Dretske has argued. This means that 
the semantic structure is not the information that is carried in digital form, but that piece 
of information that has been completely digitalised and this then represents the 
outermost informational shell "in which all other information is nested (either 
nomically or analytically)".
The distinction that Dretske sets up might be better thought of as being between 
'digital' and 'completely digitalised', these are the 'all' and the 'most unique' pieces of 
information respectively. But this does not seem to be entirely plausible either since 
only a part of the information within the outermost informational shell is carried in 
digital form. The other part or parts are carried in analogue form and to get to the most 
specific piece of information we have to move outwards through the analogue 
information and the information that is stored in nomic and analytic form; but then to 
conceptualise that piece of selected information we have to move back inwards again
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through all the information that is nested there and choose what is relevant in our own 
specific circumstance.
But this is not all, for there is still greater confusion surrounding his use of 
'digital'. I shall explain. The idea of digital information is carried through the whole 
chapter as being the outermost informational shell and the semantic structure of the 
signal; but, just three pages from the end of the chapter there is a dramatic change 
which states that the semantic content is now the part of the signal that has been 
completely digitalised. So the outermost ring is no longer equivalent to digital 
information. The change was required because the definition of 'semantic structure' 
needed 'tightening up' since it was possible for more ihan one piece of information to 
be carried in digital form, in which case they would be analytic and nested within the 
outermost informational shell.
My third criticism of Dretske's attempt to stratify intentionality is this; Dretske 
establishes three levels of intentionality and for the first and the third he offers a variety 
of systems that are capable of achieving each of the two levels, but he offers no 
systems that are capable of second level intentionality. The systems that are capable of 
third level intentionality are also capable of first and second level intentionality, and 
those that are capable of first level intentionality are capable of only that, and nothing 
more. So presumably those systems that are capable of second level intentionality could 
have epistemic states and also be able to process information, yet still not be able to 
form beliefs about that information. I shall now examine the implications of the missing 
second level systems, the missing link in his chain of three levels of intentionality.
5.4.3. No systems equate with second level intentionality
The three distinct forms of intentionality are based on the amount and the extent to 
which information can be processed by different systems, but Dretske does not offer 
systems that correspond to each of the three levels. At the first level he proposes that
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simple mechanisms, such as a television, a dictaphone, or any conduit of information, 
can process information. At the third level he claims that frogs, human beings and 
perhaps some complex computers, are among those things that can cope with the 
elaborate process of selecting some pieces of information over others, extracting the 
semantic content from this perceived information and finally forming beliefs about it. 
However, he seems unable to posit any systems that can achieve the second level of 
intentionality but not the third. This poses a fundamental problem with the divisions he 
has drawn up. Either it would be a good idea to have only two levels of intentionality 
and equate level two with level three, or it would be advisable to have systems that are 
capable of more than level one but less than level three, and thereby justify the existence 
of systems that can have epistemic states but not go as far as to form beliefs about
them. 12
There are two possible reasons for Dretske's hesitancy in citing a system capable of 
second, but not third level intentionality. The first reason is that it is easier to say what a 
system can do rather than what it cannot, and the second reason is that it is very 
difficult, if not indeed impossible, to differentiate between different mental states 
because they are not things that are finite and measurable. I shall now look at each of 
these reasons in more detail.
Negative claims are difficult to make
In chapters three and four I examined the basis on which it is possible to decide 
what capabilities a system possesses and how we then set about ascribing mental states 
to that system. Drawing a limit to the capabilities of a system is a simple matter when 
dealing with systems such as thermostats for their capabilities are simple and 
refreshingly obvious. They can detect that the surrounding temperature is too hot, too 
cold or that it is just right, in which case it receives no signal from the environment. 
They respond by switching the heating system off, on or by remaining static. They are
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simple information processing units of which it is possible to say precisely those things 
of which it is capable and those things of which it is incapable. For instance, it is not 
capable of making tea, chatting about the weather or grooming the dog.
But the matter of what a system is and is not capable becomes increasingly more 
complex as the system itself becomes more complex both internally and in relation to its 
environment, that is, its perceivable domain extends so that those things it can respond 
to increase in number and variety. Thus when we come to examine the behaviour of, 
for example, a frog or a cat any judgement about its range of capabilities is going to be 
quite problematic. Observation and experience of my cat's behaviour tells me that when 
it miaows and rubs my legs with its head it wants food; this is not difficult, nor very 
interesting behaviour to attempt to interpret However, my cat seems to have learnt 
other activities, such as how to get me out of bed in the morning or lead me to the 
cupboard where the food is kept. What makes these more interesting behaviours is the 
question of whether or not the cat actually knows that pushing things off the bedside 
table will get me up, or that if it leads me to the cupboard I will know it wants food. It 
may be the case that my cat has made some sort of connection with me being vertical 
and ambulatory and its being fed. If we accept that the cat's behaviour is an exhibition 
of knowing behaviour, that is, that the cat does have epistemic states, how then is it 
possible to draw a distinction between its knowing behaviour and what would count as 
believing behaviour.
We have seen how difficult it is to ever tell when another human being possesses a 
state of one sort or another, even though in the case of other human beings we have a 
shared language with which we can speak of our mental states and offer confirmation 
or denial of any state that is attributed to us. How much more difficult it is then to tell 
that a system other than a human being, that does not have the shared human language, 
is occupying a particular mental state. All we have to go on in the case of any non­
human system is its behaviour and what we know of its physiology and
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neurophysiology. For some of the systems in Dretske's division of intentionality it 
would seem easier to gi\ e them the benefit of the doubt and make the positive claim that 
they are capable of third level intentionality, in which is subsumed the second level, 
than to say negatively of a system that it is capable of knowing things about its world 
but not of believing those same things.
Indeed "knowledge" has a definition as "justified true belief and in this sense 
knowing is also believing even if the individual does not actually go through the 
process of thinking, 1 know that it is raining, therefore, I also believe that it is 
raining". This definition cannot be inverted for I do not know everything that I 
believe. A simple example is just to turn the earlier proposition around so that it reads 
as, "I believe it is raining, therefore, I also know that it is raining". It is easy to see that 
this is inconsistent for knowledge claims are definitive, based on conclusive evidence 
and emphatic, beliefs, on the other hand, are often based on the flimsiest evidence 
because we want something to be the case and we will accept the first thing we find to 
back our belief up; often described as "clutching at straws". Saying "I believe" leaves 
one open to accepting the converse if it is proved, whereas saying "I know" suggests 
that your mind is made up and no new evidence will shift your opinion.
This can be shown using Venn-like diagrams:
Information in the world
Knowledge
Beliefs
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However, it must be asserted that the rings that represent these mental states do not have 
fixed borders except that the circle of "knowing* must always be inside a ring of "beliefs' or 
"believing'. Outside the ring of "beliefs' there will be more beliefs that are irrelevant to this 
particular piece of knowledge or in the form of information that have yet to be encountered.
That it is easier to make a positive claim than a similar, but negative one, links well 
to the second reason that I want to suggest for why Dretske does not offer systems that 
are capable of second level intentionality, it is this; the stratification he attempts to make 
is intended to differentiate between mental states of different kinds and this is a very 
difficult thing to do since mental states are not discrete, discontinuous entities. Indeed a 
lot of the confusion that is encountered in chapter seven of Knowledge and the Flow of 
Information is a direct result of the difficulties that are bound to be encountered when 
anyone attempts to force vague or fuzzy concepts into an explanatory structure that 
suits only those sets of things that are limited and distinct
Mental states cannot be measured like machine states can
In the Chomsky hierarchy we saw that he was dealing with machine states that are 
finite, limited, and thus measurable. The Dretske hiertuchy on the other hand deals with 
quite different entities, mental states which are not finite and measurable in the way that 
machine states are. In the case of a machine state the static state can be quantified, the 
input quantified and the output, whether determinate or indeterminate, also quantified. 
Everything about the.machine and its states is limited by its architecture and the function 
for which it has been designed. Its functions are already known or knowable.
Measurements can be quantified because they are discrete chunks of information, 
but mental states are not in such a specific form and it is for this reason also that I think 
Dretske has failed to suggest any system that is capable of knowing but not believing.
The difference between being a simple processor of information and being capable of 
doing something more with the information is plainly seen, but trying to calibrate the
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different stages of mentality that occur after the information processing is probably not 
even possible, except in a very primitive sense.
Again the problems of his peculiar usage of analogue and digital create difficulties 
for in its more common usage digital pieces of information are those discrete pieces that 
can be calibrated, whilst analogue information is in a continuous and unquantifiable 
form. In Dretske's explanation of perceived information the signal is analogue in form, 
which is fine because it is vast and unmeasurable, however the specific semantic 
content of that signal is said to be in digital form and thus a discrete piece of
quantifiable information; but Dretske equates being able to reach the semantic content of
1
a piece of information with third level intentionality and the ability to form beliefs about 
a world and, as has been argued, what something means and the mental state of holding 
a belief are not measurable things.
It is not possible for me to say with complete conviction that, "My cat knows there 
is food in that cupboard but it does not believe that there is food there", for it is not 
possible for me to draw a hard and fast distinction between those two mental states in 
any other system. Even in my own Case it is not easy for I can say about myself that "I 
know that there are people who believe and worship a God of some kind, but I do not 
believe in the existence of God", but I cannot say "I know there are people who 
worship a God, but I do not believe that there are people who worship a God" for it 
does not make sense.
I distinguish between the different mental states of other human beings on the basis 
of what they tell me using propositional attitude statements and through watching their 
subsequent behaviour. If they pray, attend religious gatherings and observe religious 
festivals then I can conclude that they believe in God. Nevertheless the difference 
between knowledge and belief states is still a very difficult one to set out, for, as we 
have seen briefly, what can be the difference between my knowing that something is 
the case and my believing that it is the case. In the Philosophical Investigations
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Wittgenstein says that when you are certain of something is it not just "shutting your 
eyes in face of doubt?"; and when you are certain of something you feel you know it 
for sure, that is, beyond doubt For the mental state of ’belief it must be much the 
same since a belief in God is really only a "leap of faith". It is, after all, simply a 
decision to stop doubting.
Another problem with knowing and believing is that to assert that I know 
something and at the same time deny that I believe in the same thing is to speak 
nonsense, but to assert a belief in something yet deny any sound knowledge of that 
thing is indeed sometimes very sensible. For example, I can say that "I believe with the 
particular cloud formation that it might rain", but I cannot say that "I know it will rain", 
nevertheless my belief might prompt me to carry an umbrella with me when I go out 
thus stacking the odds against me getting wet whatever happens.
The problem of distinguishing between a knowledge state and a belief state is just 
as difficult for concrete examples such as bus timetables or thinking that a particular 
public house serves the type of cider you like best. For example, I believe that on most 
of the occasions I have been able to catch a bus from the city centre to home at either ten 
minutes to the hour or twenty minutes past the hour, am I now in the position to say 
that I know a bus will come at these times? I think not, for often I have waited and the 
bus has not arrived. On each occasion that it has not arrived I have repeatedly gone to 
the timetable to check that the information I have is correct and that one is due, but 
although I 'believe' that a bus is due I would never say that I Toiow' that a bus will 
come. The same goes for the example of the public house, for although I 'believe' they 
stock the brand of cider I like I also know that some times when I have gone they have 
not had a delivery and this means that I can never say I "know" that they will have that 
cider when I go this evening.
Belief and knowledge states of my own are problematic enough, but when I try to 
distinguish between what counts as a belief and what counts as knowledge in another
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system, and worst of all a non-human system, I am doomed since our concepts for 
mental states are, as yet, hopelessly vague. The representations that organic systems 
have of their worlds are only ever approximations of reality which can never be entirely 
accurate for they are the function of all sorts of perceptual limitations. For instance, the 
fly cannot see the open window above it through which it can fly to freedom because it 
is limited by its perceptual apparatus. It is not possible for any system to reach the 
'perceptual phase' or 'finite point' of all knowledge, that is, for the system to know all 
that there is to know, because finite knowledge represents an ideal state of knowing, of 
knowing everything that is knowable of which only the omniscience of a god would be 
imagined capable.
It is easier to see the inaccuracy of an arithmetical approximation than to see the 
inaccuracy of our semantics that are based on the knowledge we possess or the limits of 
all our possible knowledge. With arithmetical and mathematical models we measure 
things that can be broken down into discrete chunks, and machine states are of this 
sort. In Events and Reification Quine proposes some individuating criteria that hold for 
physical events, "Physical objects are well individuated, being identical if and only if 
spatiotemporally coextensive". Mental states do not fulfil such spatial or temporal 
criteria and we cannot measure arithmetically those (mental) states that are continuous 
and only vaguely distinguishable from one another. And, inThe Individuation of Events 
Davidson says of the individuation of mental events or states that "We classify an event 
as mental 'if and only if it has a mental description, o r ... if there is a mental open 
sentence true of that event alone'. An 'open sentence "event x is M" is a mental open 
sentence if the expression that replaces "M" contains at least one mental verb 
essentially.'" Chomsky's hierarchy does not deal with events of states for which a 
mental description is possible, rather his hierarchy is one of absolutes where a 
straightforward set of machine states and tasks can be described and set out in a limited 
number of discrete steps.
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On the other hand the business that Dretske attempts, of distinguishing between 
mental states, is not one of absolutes but one that is best attempted using the strategy 
that taxonomists have adopted, which is to map clusters of points according to their 
similarities or overlapping characteristics. In this way it has been possible to say of 
something, say a slow worm, that it carries characteristics of both lizards and snakes, 
for it has relics of shoulder and hip bones that mean that it was once an animal with legs 
such as an iguana or a skink, but now these legs have proved redundant and it has 
become more like a snake. Thus from its characteristics taxonomists can confidently 
place the slow worm in the species: reptile.
At the beginning of chapter six I will make some suggestions for ways of dealing 
with vague concepts that are better than the present attempt which has been to stratify 
and form a hierarchy of them. For now I will look at the fourth, and final, criticism I 
will make of Dretske's division of intentionality and, more importantly, mental states 
and capabilities.
5.4.4. Genuine cognitive systems
Dretske distinguishes between systems that are simple conduits of information 
capable of only a first level of intentionality and 'genuine cognitive systems' that are 
capable of third level intentionality and also of first and second level intentionality as 
well. In this second category of systems he places 'frogs, humans and perhaps some 
computers', presumably all of which are capable of forming beliefs about their worlds. 
But I find his phrase confusing, for what exactly does he mean by a 'genuine cognitive 
system' and why does he include inorganic systems in this category, when 
Rosenschein goes as far as saying that systems such as these are logically only capable 
of a second level of intentionality, that is, having epistemic states.
In the category of information processors there are no organic systems of any type, 
only inorganic systems, televisions, thermostats and so on. These have a simple
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function, they react to a particular type of information signal in a particular type of way. 
Their activities are entirely dictated by their design. They can do no more for they have 
no flexibility to adapt to their environment, and can only do less if they are damaged in 
some way or without any power supply.
The other category of those things that are genuinely cognitive is an altogether more 
interesting one for there are systems in it that are made of silicon alongside those that 
are carbon based, for Dretske seems to be distinguishing, not between mental states and 
machine states, but between systems that process information and systems that form 
beliefs. Those that can form beliefs are also those that are able to select appropriate 
information whilst ignoring other unimportant pieces, storing other information for later 
use, understanding the information that has been selected, analysing it, conceptualising 
it and forming beliefs about it that will change the patterns of other beliefs that are held 
or form the basis of new belief structures. These are capabilities of which the simple 
information conduit is not capable.
It is this issue of 'belief that is significant for Dretske in the formation of a 
distinction between information processors and genuine cognitive systems. Being able 
to form and hold beliefs is a necessary characteristic of any genuine cognitive system . 
arid something of which simple information processors are not capable. I shall not 
argue with this for the moment; first I shall explain his position in relation to the 
'information-theoretic' account.
In his example he states that the curvature of the bimetallic strip inside an ordinary 
home thermostat is what registers any change in the temperature of the room. The 
degree of its curvature regulates the heat by touching a contact in the adjustable heat 
control in the room. The thermostat is dependent upon the strip which according to the 
information-theoretic account is a rather primitive heat detector. Thus for Dretske, "A 
belief is like the configuration of a bi-metal strip in a properly functioning thermostat: it 
is an internal state that not only represents its surroundings but functions as a
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determinant of the system's response to those surroundings".^’^ The second half of this 
sentence is of most interest for it proposes that a belief is not only the result of 
interaction between a system and its surroundings but also that it is the cause or 
determinant of the systems subsequent behaviour. It is safe to argue from their status as 
'simple information processors' that Dretske does not wish to claim, as McCarthy has 
before him, that thermostats have beliefs, for as he says in the footnotes of chapter 
eight, their "internal states have no appropriate semantic content".For the thermostat 
the curvature of the strip has no meaning yet it does determine its future action.
So for a system to show that it is capable of forming and holding beliefs there are 
three signs that it has to exhibit; firstly, there has to be a loss of information between its 
perceptual input and its conceptualisation, secondly, the beliefs have to be related to the 
system's environment by being formed as a result of it, and thirdly, the beliefs have to 
determine subsequent behaviour.
Human beings certainly exhibit all three of these characteristics but I am not so sure 
about other systems. For instance, it is certainly the case that cats and frogs ignore a 
great deal of the perceptual input from their environments, and that they select only that 
information from their environment that is of relevance to them; but surely this can be 
said of ants and flies for they too only seem to respond to the things that are of 
immediate relevance to them. But this might simply be because the ants and flies only 
possess the perceptual apparatus to respond to a very small part of, what for us is, a 
very large world. Cats, frogs, horses, weasels, and so on have a perceptual apparatus 
not unlike the human one so their world is more likely to be on a par with ours because 
of this. But it might also be because of their size, for we can see them react to things 
that we too can perceive. For example, I can see my cat's ears twitch when it hears me 
opening a can of baked beans which it has mistaken for a tin of cat food, but I am 
unable to see the movements of the fly's eyes when it watches me coming closer with a 
newspaper to swat i t  The noise of a tin being opened certainly does make my cat
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consistently behave as though it believes it is going to be fed but I am more inclined to 
describe this as learnt or conditioned behaviour rather than a belief that the cat 
possesses and stores up for future use to determine its behaviour.
It does not seem possible to say of non-human organic systems that they are 
'genuine cognitive systems' in the sense that they can form beliefs and use those beliefs 
in the way that human beings form and utilise beliefs. Yet it does seem possible to say 
that non-human organic systems are genuinely cognitive in the information-theoretic 
sense, set out by Dretske, for then it means only that they have internal states that 
represent their surroundings and also serve to help determine their future responses to 
their surroundings.
But Dretske includes not only organic, but also inorganic systems ('perhaps') in the 
class of that which is genuinely cognitive. This can be accepted but again in an 
information-theoretic sense for such a sense is heavily constrained by what the system 
has to be capable of doing. That is, in the information-theoretic sense the system does 
not have to be capable of as much as it would in the natural or realistic sense of what 
would count as genuinely cognitive. For instance, it would be hard to accept computers 
as 'genuinely cognitive' in any but an information-theoretic sense for such systems 
have finite, measurable states, they cannot perceive anything beyond their pre­
programmed domain, they cannot form beliefs as the result of analysing and 
understanding the stimuli to which they have responded in their environment, nor can 
they offer any subjective interpretation of the information they perceive, and finally, 
mitigating against all non-human systems, organic an inorganic, is that neither type of 
system can form beliefs about abstract concepts in the way that human beings can. No 
computer, except perhaps those in the realm of science fiction, for example, "Hal" in 
the film 2001  ^can ruminate over the mysteries of life, the problem of identity or the 
existence of God,
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5.5. In conclusion
It seems that the difficulty about what is, and what is not, genuinely cognitive is a 
problem that results from Dretske's not being able to offer a possible system that is 
capable of knowing but not believing. It is not possible to say precisely what counts as 
proof of cognition for the elements of cognition are mental states and they are not 
defined in the way that machine states can be. It is doubtful that 'some computers' are 
genuinely cognitive for the internal states and structure of the systems that we consider 
to be cognitive in any sophisticated way are quite, quite different That they might be 
artificially cognitive is something that is already accepted for machines can be designed 
to behave 'as-though' they have a particular type of mental state that equates with 
cognition of a specific kind.
Much of the problem about what is, and what is not, genuine cognition is also part 
of the long running problem about what counts as one type of mental state whilst not 
counting as another. That is to say, when does my 'liking' turn to 'loving', my 'hopes' 
to 'desires', my Tcnowing' to 'believing', and so on. The distinctions between one sort 
of mental state and another, or even the different levels of intensity of one particular 
mental state are difficult, if not ultimately impossible, to draw up. To attempt to 
distinguish between the mental states of different human beings is a vast task that has 
all the advantages of analogies between behaviours and a shared, descriptive language. 
To extend this distinction to look at the mentality of different organic systems is yet 
more complex for all we have to go on is the other system's behaviour since there can 
be no shared language. To move another step further and try to look for similarities and 
distinctions between mental states and machine states is yet more difficult because there 
is only the machine's already programmed behaviour from which we can draw any 
comparison, and this behaviour is itself the product of human creation. A sort of 'homo
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ex machina', which might suggest that machine actions and states be thought of 
indirectly as second-hand human actions and thoughts.
Every organism, human or non-human, has a mental life that differs from every 
other organism in form and content. For example, as a human being the content of my 
mental life is distinct from the mental lives of any other human beings, but the way I 
process, store and use information, that is, its form, is something that I have in 
common with all other human beings. It is likely then that this is also much the same 
for any commonality that I have with higher order animals. So that the form of my 
mental life and constituent mental states will be much the same as the form of the mental 
life and states of an orang utan or a chimpanzee, but that this commonality becomes less 
and less so as I compare my mental life with animals lower down the phylogenetic 
scale. Thus when I reach a comparison between the my own mental states and the 
machine states that accompany the computation of a machine there is very little 
similarity to be drawn, but still there is some and this will be a matter that I shall attend 
to in chapter six.
In chapter six I shall show that this commonality, or perhaps the significant lack of 
it, can be better shown in cluster diagrams than in stratifications and hierarchical 
arrangements. As mentioned earlier, diagrams of this sort are often used as taxonomic 
devices for deciding the category of one species or another. I will be using them in this 
context to express the overlapping nature of mental states and in which systems such 
states can be said to exist in some form or other. In this manner I will also show that 
there is some overlap between the capabilities that I possess as a complex human 
organism and the capabilities that a thermostat possesses, and that the theimostat is 
much more efficient and capable at what it is designed to do than I would ever be 
because my design and functionality is necessarily different from its.
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Endnotes:
 ^The section on Chomsky is taken from Krishnamurthy, E.V. (1983) Introductory Theory of Computer 
Science, Published by Macmillan Computer Science Series.
 ^A transition graph resembles a flowchart consisting of labelled circles that represent states and arrowed or 
directed lines that either loop or go on to another state or circle. The input state is indicated by an input 
arrow aiKl the final state by two concentric rings.
 ^Krishnamurthy, E.V. (1983) Introduaory Theory of Computer Science, section 5.6 ff.; Macmillan 
Computer Science Series
 ^Although I use a sentence of natural language to exemplify derivation this grammar is still very limited 
and can only be used to generate very simple, unambiguous sentences in natural language. It is still more 
suitable for generating propositions in a formal language.
 ^A full account of this hierarchy is set out by Dretske in chapter seven of Knowledge and the Flow of 
Information, (1981) Basil Blackwell.
 ^By the 'same sensory input' I mean reading the same article in a newspaper or looking at the same 
painting in an art gallery. I do not mean that they could ever have the same perceptions that would be 
identical fr’om every angle and with the same personal history, for this would have to mean that they were 
the same person which is logically impossible. Kant's theory of Incongruous Counterparts', {Critique of 
Pure Reason, 1787 Macmillan (1929)) gives credence to this view, but Fm sure that some of the 
contemporary studies that concentrate on twins and multiple births might suggest that two or more people 
that are bom together can have perceptions that are essentially the same.
 ^Chapter two, section 2.8.4. "Example of focusing and selectivity"
 ^By the 'extent of its domain' I mean here the amount and variety of interaction that any system has within 
its own enviroiunent
 ^Dretske, F (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, chapter 7, p.l77, Basil Blackwell
I am not claiming here that the analytic/synthetic distinction is tenable; I am only using it, as Dretske 
does, as a suitable descriptive term.
 ^^  Dretske, P. personal communication (Email)
As we have seen in chapter two Rosenschein does this when he assigns primitive epistemic properties to 
machines, but only those that can encode their knowledge in an appropriate fwmal language.
Gettier, EX. (1963) Is justified true belief knowledge?. Analysis 23.6, p.121-123; and also cited in four 
other places in (3ettier*s footnotes as "Theaetetus 201, and perhaps...3fcno 95", "Roderick M. Chisholm, 
Perceiving: a Philosophical Study, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New Yoric, 1957), p. 16." and "A. J. 
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Macmillan (London, 1956), p.34.".
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This is similar in kind to Wittgenstein's and Malcolm's argument against analogy for thinking that 
another person has mental states like mine, for they would say that I do not go through the process of 
thinking to myself, 'x is crying, and they resemble me bodily, and every time I cry I am unhappy, so x 
must also be unhappy', but I would argue that the process is there nevenheless and that it is something we 
grow up doing and leam to do implicitly, that is, without it being accompanied by a linguistic affirmation.
In this context I use 'fuzzy' to describe concepts that cannot be delineated from other concepts of the 
same kind, and the concepts of the same kind' are mental states'. No reference, overtly cn* otherwise, is 
being made to the area of fuzzy logics.
Wittgenstein, L (1958) Philosophical Investigations, Section H xi, p.224, Basil Blackwell
Dretske, F (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, chapter 7, p. 198, Basil Blackwell
Ibid. chp.8, p.261-262 (footnote 6)
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6. Illustrating vague concepts
6.1. Introduction
This chapter will have the following structure. As in the last three chapters I will 
begin with a statement of the problem area and then take a look at the specific question, 
or as is more relevant in this chapter, the particular issue that is to be confronted. I will 
then begin the main body of the chapter with a reiteration of the main conclusions so far 
and explain why these relate to the necessity for a more successful way of 
demonstrating the correlation between a system's internal states, whether mental or 
machine, and that system's complexity of architecture. Following this I wül move on to 
give examples of some of the alternative ways in which the relationship can be 
illustrated and that each of these, although limited in their own ways, is still better than 
the attempts to produce stratified hierarchies. I will attempt to show that no perfect set 
of axes exists within which the nature of vague concepts can ever hope to be adequately 
defined, from which I can only but conclude that it will never be possible to describe 
mental states in absolute terms.
In the next part of the chapter I wül look more closely at the recent work of Aaron 
Sloman for his work concentrates on design and the 'design space' in which different 
architectures occupy different points. Sloman argues that for a system to be capable of 
different activities it would need to occupy different points in the design space. Thus 
for a system to be capable of more complex things it needs a more complex design 
space. For Sloman the human being has a very rich and complex design space and it 
can be inferred from this that it also has a rich and complex repertoire of possible 
behaviours. But being rich and complex is not sufficient for the performance of 
complex behaviour for in addition to the design space we need also to look at what the 
system needs to sustain its existence in the environment it occupies. In other words, 
what it is that keeps the system alive and functioning.
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Three main conclusions will be derived, and along with these will be a number of 
lesser conclusions concerning the requirements of a system for it to be capable of 
exhibiting the behaviours that it does. The first of the main three conclusions will be 
that every graphical interpretation of a state of affairs is unique since it will always 
depend upon what is being examined, or ’plotted’ on a cluster diagram, and what the 
things being examined are to be measured against If I were to choose a different set of 
axes many of the systems would not appear at all and we would perhaps be looking at 
more specific information about fewer systems. This is one area in which further work 
could be carried out The second main conclusion will be that two dimensional 
representations are inherently limited and an increase in dimensions, and as a result 
accuracy, is absolutely necessary if it is going to be possible for us to establish any 
relationship between the mental states of a system, its complexity of architecture, its 
ability to adapt and its overall behavioural capabilities. There are just too many criteria. 
The third, and final of the main conclusions will be that by using the taxonomic method 
of description or display it has at last been possible to show a comparison between the 
differing capabilities of a wide range of systems, whether organic or inorganic; on the 
basis of this comparison an examination of machine states and mental states using the 
same criteria for each will have been made possible. This has distinct advantages over 
the hierarchical stratifications of mental and machine states that have been favoured by 
people such as Dretske in previous work. From the taxonomic representation of 
information it will be possible to deduce how likely it is that different types of mental 
states are present within systems that are essentially quite different from human beings.
In the final stages of the chapter I will concentrate on some of the other 
conclusions, with references being made not only to what a system does, but also to 
how it is capable of carrying out such actions. Which is to say, what mental states, 
other than straight-forward adaptability are required by a system for it to be capable of 
those actions that it needs for its continued survival.
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6.1.1. A statement of the problem area
Mental states are fuzzy in the sense that there can be no clear delineation of where 
one state stops and another state starts. They have no clear-cut beginning or end in 
space or time and for this reason it seems implausible to stratify mental states, setting 
them out in some sort of definitive hierarchical model. In chapter five I have argued 
against such ways of envisaging a relationship between a continuous set of mental 
states, and I have argued for the acceptance of such models for exemplifying machine 
states which can be differentiated.
In this chapter I will argue that it is still possible to draw a comparison between 
mental states and machine states, and although the area of commonality is always 
shifting and changing with the influx of more information and the creation of new and 
more complex machines, it remains a relationship that can be shown using a taxonomic 
device. Indeed it is certainly the case that using a taxonomic device, such as a cluster 
diagram, is beneficial because it permits a point that represents a particular type of 
machine to be shifted if that machine is, for example, redesigned to possess new 
capabilities or an increased domain. This is just the same for a living system that might 
adapt to its changing environment and develop, over some lengthy period of time, a 
different or improved capability. A second advantage is that the shifting of a single 
point does not affect any of the other representational points in the diagram, and nor 
does it call for the redefinition of other points or axes in relation to the changed status of 
the one altered point
6.2. What has brought us to this stage?
In this section I will briefly recall what has been said from chapters three to five to 
give some indication of how we have reached this stage. An analogy with the text can 
be seen in the art of weaving for the cloth can only be kept in good shape if the threads 
remain taut and even. This section brings the 'threads' of the argument together so that 
they are kept 'taut' and the pattern of argument can be seen to emerge.
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6.2.1. Chapter three - ascription
The notion of ascription was examined in chapter three and in particular how a 
human being actually sets about ascribing mental states to systems other than itself. A 
number of important points were brought together in the conclusion. The first was that 
ascription is usually made on the basis of at least two criteria, (i) that the behaviour of 
the other system is consistently human-like so that an analogy can be drawn with one's 
own behaviour, and (ii) that our apprehension of the other system's architectural 
complexity is such that we might think it feasible for it to have mental states. There is a 
third factor that is influential, but only to our ascription of mental states to other human 
beings, and it is that we share with them a language, through which we can proffer 
confirmation or denial of any ascribed state.
Thus the ascription of mental states is by no means simple for all of the criteria 
depend upon our subjective view of our world and the information we receive from it. 
For example, I might say of Rose that "She knows what she is talking about", whereas 
you might think she is deceiving us rather cleverly, and neither of us would be wrong 
in any strong sense for our opinions of Rose are based on our own personal, and 
ultimately subjective, points of view. There is no decisive view to have, for Rose might 
truthfully believe that she knows something when in fact she has only been lucky not to 
have been asked difficult questions, or you might know a lot more about the subject 
and feel that what she knows is only a paltry amount, or you might know nothing about 
the subject and feel envious of her knowledge. There are a great many possibilities 
when dealing with the mental states of another being and our own subjective 
judgements. That Rose might have one of any number of mental states, none of which 
can be pin-pointed with any high degree of accuracy, give us some indication of how 
confusing is the business of mental state ascription. Inevitably then, our claim must be 
that if another system does possess mental states only it can ever know for sure that it 
has them.i
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6.2.2. Chapter four - complexity
The original question of chapter four was "Given a specific task or competence, 
what is the minimum system that would be required to accomplish it ?". My enquiry 
began by looking at three approaches to the notion of complexity in relation to living 
and non-living systems, (i) the architectural complexity of the system, (ii) the 
complexity of the system's actions or behaviour, and (iii) the complexity of the 
relationship between the system and its environment
I concluded the first section by stating that a marked relationship could be seen to 
exist between the overall complexity of a system and its capabilities to perform certain 
actions. In just such a way then the capabilities of a computer are dictated by the 
combination of its architecture, the program that has been instantiated and the 
environment in which it is fixed. Machines of this sort have no flexibility to choose 
what information they wiU react to in their environment for it is all part of their pre­
programmed design.
Similarly the capabilities of non-human animals are also widely dictated by their 
environment, but when we look at higher-order animals we discover that they have the 
added capability of being able to choose what they will attend to in their environment 
Therefore they have the added advantage of being adaptable. From this selection they 
can choose how they will respond to the information, for example they might wish to 
run away, to conceal themselves or to fight Such a response as this might be the result 
of a specific genetic structure, and in some sense 'pre-programmed', but with animals 
such as monkeys and even cats, the possibility of a self-consciousness element to their 
judgements cannot be ruled out completely.
When dealing with human beings it is possible to say, but only with reference to 
my own experience, what they can and cannot do. I know that I am capable of 
processing vast amounts of information, selecting what are the most important pieces 
for me, responding to them and storing for later use what is not immediately required. 
And what is more, I can do all of this with myself at the heart of my judgements. I
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interpret all the information I receive subjectively so that any information I pass on to 
other people will have the addition of my own point of view with those pieces of 
information left out which I feel are irrelevant. As a product of my environment I can 
act in my own best interests, but as the self-conscious product of society I am also 
capable of subjugating my own interests in the interest of the continued survival of 
society as a whole.
To act in its environment any system has to be capable of processing information 
and this requires a certain amount of awareness. Such awareness is exhibited by all 
systems, from the most limited to the most flexible, by their capability to react to stimuli 
that are relevant to i t  But for a thermostat to respond to a rise in temperature indicates 
only that the system has a very limited range of actions and no flexibility to choose 
between relevant and irrelevant stimuli at all. So a simple awareness only shows that 
the system, like a thermostat, can respond to those aspects of its limited environment 
for which it has been designed or programmed.
Thus the complexity of a system was seen to relate, not only to the internal and 
external architecture of the system, but also to the degree of flexibility that the system 
has to respond to a variety and changeable number of stimuli within its environment. In 
the human system a better way of describing this 'flexibility' might be to say 
'versatility', for 'versatility' is usually associated with the idea of 'being able to turn 
one's hand to anything' and the human system is indeed capable of responding to a 
tremendous wealth of informational stimuli.
As a human system I am capable of many things, high-level awareness, the 
selection of relevant information, understanding that information and making self- 
conscious judgements involving it. I am also able to anticipate, to some degree, how 
other objects and states of affairs in my environment will be affected by my 
judgements, and to change my judgements, try to justify them to others or try to change 
the judgements of other people. I, and all other human beings, if my extrapolation from 
myself as an example of human sentience and experience is truly valid, are very 
complex systems indeed with a great many capabilities.
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6.2.3. Chapter five - stratifications and hierarchies
Chapter five began with a look at a Chomsky's hierarchical stratification of 
machines and their respective capabilities to recognise and interpret grammars of 
varying complexity. The sorts of capabilities that a machine can exhibit depend very . 
much upon its internal states or architecture and its auxiliary memory that stores and 
retrieves information. Thus a machine as basic as a Finite State Machine (FSM) has 
only a very limited set of capabilities, whereas an unbounded Turing Machine (TM) is 
capable of almost anything theoretically.^ A relationship can be seen to exist between 
the structure of a system, its link to its environment, or domain, and the things of 
which it is capable. The tasks are described as 'certain' because Chomsky defines them 
for us and they consist only of the recognition and interpretation of four different types 
of phrase structure grammar.
Chomsky does not deal with mental states so Dretske's stratification of 
intentionality, the mental states that correspond to the levels and the systems that are 
capable of achieving each level, was examined. It is an 'information-theoretic' 
account that examines which level of intentionality the system exhibits based on the 
quantity and extent to which it can process information. Dretske attempts to show 
that simple systems, that are capable of only simple information processing, can 
occupy first level intentionality and only the most basic of mental states. More 
complicated systems that can exhibit some understanding of their incoming 
information are correspondingly capable of a higher level intentionality and, 
therefore, also of possessing higher level mental states.
Many difficulties were encountered with Dretske's stratification. The main ones 
were that he finds it impossible to offer any system that can be said to Tcnow' yet not to 
'believe*, and that he gives only a faint idea of what is meant by his phrase 'genuine 
cognitive system'. I have argued that these two problems are inextricably linked 
because of the problematic nature of saying precisely what factors go to make up a 
mental state. For example, wherein is the difference between *knowing' and
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'believing'. My only certainty when it comes to mental states is that I have them, and 
by analogy it is feasible for me to conclude that other like systems also have them. It is 
not as feasible for me to presume that other non-like systems have mental states, so 
what I base my ascription on then is their behaviour being human-like.
This problem with defining and differentiating between mental states is such that it 
makes the relationship between capabilities and complexity easier to observe in 
machines for their states are fixed and measurable. Mental states are vague and 
unmeasurable, with indistinct boundaries where one overlaps with another making the 
discernment of a single type of mental state nigh on impossible.
If we accept that all living organisms have a mental life of some degree no matter 
how limited, each different species interprets its world in its own unique way, so that 
the form of the mental life of any one species will be different from the form of the 
mental life of any other species. Thus there is a difference in how each species receives 
and processes information and it is this that makes it possible for me to say of another 
human being that she "knows', 'wishes', 'hopes' or whatever, but not so likely of any 
other species that they have mental states that are identical to mine.^ However, when it 
comes to the content of each systems mental life it is something which is unique to each 
member of each species, for I can never have the experiences of another human being, 
or for that matter, another species. It is the content of my mental life that makes me 
distinct from all other human beings but its form that unites me with them.
A commonality or overlapping exists between my mental states and those of the 
other higher order primates, but it is a commonality that lessens as we descend the 
phylogenetic scale. When I go as far as to compare my mental states with those of a 
machine very little similarity can be drawn, but what there is increases as the 
machine becomes more capable and is able to perform tasks of which I had thought 
only myself and other human systems capable. Indeed there are many tasks that a 
machine is distinctly better at performing than a human system, and it is just this 
type of anomaly that Dretske's stratification fails to show. I shall now attempt to 
rectify this.
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6.3. The relationship between vague concepts can be shown
Throughout this thesis it has become clear that both the mental states that we can be 
said to possess or be 'in', as for instance "I am in a state of shock", and our concepts 
of what mental states are, that is, how we define them and the contexts in which we u% 
them, are altogether muddied and vague. Beginning with the notion of their recognition 
and ascription and right up to the problems of differentiating between them the area is 
consistently beset with problems. These problems are such that they diminish the real 
possibility of any coherent study being carried out. This being the case I would like to 
show that although the relationship between vague concepts is not clear cut like the 
division between machine states, all is not lost, for they can still be illustrated and 
discussed using cluster diagrams. Diagrams of this kind are capable of showing where 
any overlapping concepts or states are most likely to occur, and of thus creating a way 
of viewing mental states in a fuller context. What I mean by 'fuller context' here is that 
the concepts or states are placed in relation to others of a similar kind with which they 
might not usually be seen to bear any direct relation. But again it must be stressed that 
any relationship that is established will be constrained by the axes that we choose to 
use. Thus it is likely that were we to choose a different set of axes the same groupings 
or clusterings would not show up.
In the section that follows I will offer some examples of cluster diagrams that set 
out to show the relationships that exist between mental states and the systems that can 
be said to occupy them. Provisionally the two axes that I will use are architectural 
complexity and the limitation on the system's flexibility to behave, in broader terms, 
their range of capabilities. I will discuss the extent to which each diagram manages to 
fulfil the purpose for which it has been drawn up, how the representation might be 
improved and what conclusions can be drawn from attempting to exemplify vague 
concepts in this particular manner.
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6.3.1. A bit more about the concept of cluster diagrams
Cluster diagrams are usually two dimensional representations that are used to 
indicate the 'clustering' of objects or entities into groups on the basis of their bearing 
like characteristics. It is a strategy adopted by typologists and taxonomists that allows 
them to classify animals, for example, into a particular species or to show a succession 
between one type of species and another. Diagrams of this sort show a continuity 
between species that is not possible to see when that species is viewed as a section of a 
stratification or hierarchical arrangemenL The procedure is that individual types of 
entity are marked at points along a pair of axes and it is argued that those that fall most 
closely together are related on a basis of some overlapping characteristic or 
characteristics. In taxonomy these are most likely to become members of the same class 
or species, and where their is greatest diversity it is a very useful technique.
A good example that shows the necessity for this method of classification is among 
the beetle family, where the weevil group alone has over 40,000 different species. The 
weevils are grouped together on the basis of a 'rostrum' or protruding snout. Half way 
along the rostrum is a pair of antennae and at its end is a set of jaws. Most weevils are 
flightless, scaly and have a vegetarian diet. Their larvae are usually legless and feed and 
develop inside the food plants in which they have been laid. So these are the 
characteristics used by taxonomists to categorise beetles of the weevil type. Thus any 
beetle which possesses these characteristics, or at least the majority of them, wül be 
categorised as a member of the weevil family.
The idea of looking for the features that one thing shares with another bears a great 
simüarity to Wittgenstein's notion of 'famüy resemblances'. Wittgenstein uses the 
example of "games" and he argues that there is no one game, of which a thorough 
understanding would teU us that that is what it is to be a game.Which is to say there is 
no one single feature that aU games have in common that we could say that any time the 
feature arose then what we would be playing or partaking in was a game. The concept 
of 'game' is only something that can be grasped by looking at lots of different games
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and types of games and trying to pin-point their overlapping characteristics. So games 
such as Bridge or Backgammon have an element of competitiveness in common, 
whereas the game of "ring-a-ring-a-roses" is only played to have fun and no 
competition exists between the players. On top of this we also talk of the 'games' that 
people 'play' in relationships which further complicates the issue of what it is to be a 
game. The question we should ask is what are the elements of this kind of interaction 
that permit us to describe something as a game; our answer might be that the shared 
elements are those of enthusiasm, enjoyment or a desire to win. "One might say that the 
concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges.
Wittgenstein goes on to liken this to what happens when we look at some of the 
members of a family group and what allows us to recognise them as members of the 
same family. For instance, what makes it possible for us to say of Ian, the son of Jane 
and Barry, that he has 'his father's nose' or 'his mother's eyes'. The answer is that 
what we look for and pick out are the 'family resemblances' that exist between 
'members of a family'.^ Such resemblances are the commonalities of feature that 
somehow manage to bridge the uniqueness of every individuals DNA structure and the 
gap between different generations of one family making it possible for Ian to be 
recognised as 'his father's son'. They are not features that every member of every 
family shares for then they would be clones with no differentiation between them. So 
Ian's sister may also have her father's nose but have her grandfather's eyes and her 
mother's smile. In this way they can be differentiated whilst still being recognised as 
members of the same family group.
The same sort of family resemblances between objects or entities can be seen in the 
groupings of plotted points on a cluster diagram. Each diagram that will be shown will 
be followed up with a discussion of its merits and demerits.
In my diagrams different systems will be clustered together on a basis of their 
complexity of architecture and capabilities. These, it has already been said, are its 
constraints from which we can only ever obtain a limited picture of the true relationship 
between systems, but then in a two dimensional representation all things cannot be
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considered. I think I should emphasise at this point that these diagrams are intended 
only to give some idea of how a two dimensional cluster diagram can be represented so 
none of them should be considered as wholly accurate or final.
One of the main conclusions of this section will be that a two dimensional 
representation is too limited for what anyone requiring a concept of the mind could 
hope for, and that it would surely be better to look at the relationships using a three, or 
perhaps even four, dimensional diagram. Diagrams of this sort would themselves be 
limited but their big advantage is that they could contain a lot more information than we 
can now envisage on a two dimensional framework, but a lot more about will be said 
about this in section, 6.3.2..
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In this first diagram I have plotted the architecture or internal structure of a small 
number of systems alongside their flexibility to exhibit particular capabilities or sets of 
capabilities. At this stage the two axes have been left deliberately general but even so it 
is possible to see that a strong correlation exists between the two. The first thing to 
notice is that there are at least two rather general trends that have emerged. The first is
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that the inorganic entities, such as kettles, televisions, watches, and PDF's have 
become gradually more complex in design but only very slightly more capable, thus 
they occupy the lower to middle left-hand side of the diagram. A machine's flexibility is 
limited by the complexity of its design and the overall function for which it has been 
designed. So, as I mentioned in an earlier example, a thermostat cannot make tea nor 
groom the dog because it has not been designed to carry out these functions. Had it 
been necessary for it to possess these capabilities, as well as being able to detect subtle 
changes in temperature, it would have had a more complex architecture and internal 
control mechanism. However, it would no longer be an example of a commonplace 
thermostat
The second trend can be seen among the organic systems for they tend to move in a 
fairly continuous and non-arbitrary fashion from the lower left-hand comer to the upper 
right-hand comer. There is very little deviation from the central diagonal line which 
suggests that the respective complexity of each system is very firmly linked to its 
capacity to act with different degrees of flexibility to those systems that have different 
architectures. There is nothing in the bottom right-hand comer of the diagram nor half 
way along the bottom, but this mid-way point would be reserved for systems that have 
elaborate capabilities but very simple architectures. It is unlikely that this section of the 
diagram would ever have many occupants but there are some and they are those that are 
marked with an asterisk, the 'Fractals' and 'Cellular automata'.^ These are exceptions 
to the 'rule' for they share a special status, and it is this; they are each simple systems 
that have a limited flexibility but are yet capable of a great deal of complex activity.
' The Julia or Mandelbrot Sets are very simple fractal equations that can produce 
complex, recurrent pattems. Some of the more common examples of this sort of 
complexity can be seen in the edible flower of the cauliflower or on the fronds of any of 
the family of fems, such as Pteridophyta. A further example of a simple system being 
capable of immense complexity can be seen in the Fibonacci series of numbers. A 
series of numbers where the consequent is always the sum of the pair that precedes it
208
A natural example of this series can be seen on the coarse skin of the pineapple which 
descends and ascends in a spiral pattern.
Likewise, the "Game of Life" is an example of a simple cellular automaton that is 
capable of manifesting a great deal of complexity. The principles of the game are such 
that if one square, representing a cellular automaton, has no other square beside it 
nothing happens and it remains stable. If there is one other beside it the first square 
dies. If there are two squares beside it they both stay alive. If there are three around the 
first square then another square is formed and finally if one square is surrounded by 
four other squares the central one dies. Thus some squares are brought into life whilst 
others die by colliding with others or by being collided into. There are some 
arrangements of squares that have, at least, a temporary stability; these are the single 
square, the lozenge shape, four squares together forming a single bigger ^uare, and 
any number vertically or horizontally arranged in a line.
The following diagram shows a only small selection of the arrangements of squares 
that can be produced in the "Game of Life"."^  However, it is still possible to see both 
the simplicity of the cellular automaton and the complexity of a few of the hundreds of 
possible arrangements of cellular automata from what is an essentially limited diagram.
Life
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Fractals and cellular automata might be likened to ants and bees because although 
ants and bees have a fairly complex design and a small number of capabilities, their 
capabilities are increased many foltf when they become members of a colony or hive. 
As the cellular automaton increases in number so does the complexity of its possible 
arrangements; similarly as the bee works as part of a hive it develops complex social 
behaviour and it is the interaction with other automata or bees, respectively, that 
dynamically increases the flexibility of the entity's potential actions.
There are, of course, differences between the behaviours exhibited by ants or bees 
and the actions exhibited by the cellular automaton or fractal. One of the most 
significant is that we would be loathe to describe the action of the fractal or automaton 
as 'behaviour' in the the ordinary sense of the word, since it is clearly not the result of 
the system being in any particular mental state at any time, nor because of the simplicity 
of the system can it be the result of a complex internal physical process. In the ant or 
bee, and even in inorganic systems of greater complexity than-the fractal or cellular 
automaton, it is possible to say that the system behaves 'as-though' it understands, and 
for us attributing a mental state this is often all we demand as 'proof of its existence. If 
this is then combined with our apprehension of the cellular automaton as a very simple 
system it would be difficult to ever say of it that it acts with any mentality or even any 
simulation of mentality. Thus, even though the fractal and cellular automaton break the 
'rule' created by Figure 14 above, neither of them is likely to be attributed mental states 
on the basis of their action or of our apprehension of them. I will move on now to look 
at other areas of the diagram.
At the extreme top right-hand comer are human beings because they are, by general 
consensus, the most complex system of which we have a comprehensive, but still by 
far incomplete, knowledge. They have an extremely complex physiology, a complex 
social environment, complex relationships with other human beings and other entities 
whether organic, inorganic or altogether non-physical*, they possess language and are 
capable of creation using symbols and non-symbolically. On top of this they are 
capable of analysis, again using symbols, but also incorporating non-linguistic gestures
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such as facial expressions or remonstrating, for example, with a wagging finger or 
shaking head.
The position of human beings clustered alongside other higher-order primates is an 
interesting one for not only does it show that their architectural complexity closely 
resembles each other (as was previously stated in chapter four, section 4.2.1., ninety- 
eight percent of our DNA structure is identical), but also that they have a similar level of 
flexibility which means the other apes are capable of many of the things that human 
beings can do. They too have societies and complex social roles that each member must 
fulfil if they are to remain in the social group.^ Not too unlike the "initiation" rites that 
potential gang members have to undergo, or the work quotas that have to accomplished 
if the employee wants to keep his or her job.
What then are the behaviours of which the human being is capable but the other 
apes not; in other words, why is the human being at the far right top comer of the 
diagram a little way beyond any of its closest relatives. There.are the obvious 
physiological differences such as human beings stand upright, and from this 
accomplishment the earlier hominid eamed the scientific name Homo Erectus, or 
"upright man". They had hands that could be used in defence where they had no sharp 
teeth or claws, the same hands could also make precise tools to hunt and carve up the 
spoils of the hunt. These sorts of differences mijght be classed as evolutionary since 
these are the changes that set human beings on course to become the species we know 
today.
There are other differences which are much less tangible and it is these that we more 
commonly associate with Homo Sapiens, or "wise man". They are things like having 
differing levels of consciousness, the possession of high-level mental states such as 
self-awareness, being able to communicate in a sophisticated manner so that one can 
speak of oneself in relation to one's world and the world whilst logically upholding a 
distinction between the two, and being able to consider abstract concepts that are from a 
superphysical world and not a phenomenal one. However, as we have seen in chapters 
three and four it is difficult to state where and when mental states such as
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consciousness and self-consciousness start and stop. It would be asking for trouble to 
say, for instance, of a macaque monkey that it was unaware of itself for studies carried 
out around 1952/53 were able to show that macaques are capable of exhibiting 
extraordinary behaviours indicating quite a high level of awareness of both themselves 
and their surroundings.^® One of the monkeys, Imo, seemed brighter than the rest and 
quickly saw ways around the difficulties that she encountered, for example, when 
given a sweet potato to eat Imo took it to a nearby pool to wash off the remaining sand 
and dirt; the other monkeys soon followed her example. On another occasion when rice 
had been sprinkled on the sand, and the other monkeys were carefully picking the 
grains of rice from the sand, Imo took handfuls of rice and sand to the water and threw 
them in, there the rice floated and the sand sank enabling Imo to scope the rice from the 
surface. Again, possibly seeing the usefulness of her action, the other monkeys soon 
followed suit.
Indeed it is hard to say just what Imo's behaviour shows. It cannot definitely be 
said that it is self-conscious or the result of a high level of awareness of both 
environment and herself in that environment. But what is possible is to say that there 
must be some element of sophisticated interaction between Imo and her world. Pin­
pointing just what it is and what her actual mental states were is certainly a matter of 
continued debate. If the behaviour were exhibited by a human child it would certainly 
be considered to be the result of that child's prodigious intelligence. But there are three 
reasons why the child but not the macaque would be given the 'intelligent' benefit of 
the doubt; (i) we do not fully understand the mentality of the macaque, (ii) we do not 
credit it with the sort of intelligent behaviour we associate with ourselves or our 
children, perhaps because it would undermine our own superiority as intelligent 
beings,^ 1 and (iii) the macaque cannot explain to us why it does something for we have 
no shared language.
A second interesting issue that arises with this example is the matter of how the 
other members of Imo's social group were able to recognise her behaviour as a good or 
useful example to follow. It might simply be that they saw ÿhe was eating when they
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were not, or that she might have been one of the dominant females and a troop leader' 
whose behaviour would be emulated. Whatever it can be put down to there is an 
element of understanding and communication that must also be present among the troop 
the makes it possible for the other monkeys to realise that they should take any notice of 
Imo's example. It is, however, doubtful that we could with our present technology 
measure the extent to which the capability to understand and communicate is present.
Going back for now to Figure 14 some more information that can be gleaned from 
it is that human beings have an extensive and potentially unlimited range of capabilities. 
There are some things that they are physiologically incapable of achieving such as self- 
powered flight, running as fast as a cheetah, or inhabiting the ocean bed, but these are 
things that human beings have managed to overcome using their intelligence, 
adaptability and physical capability for building instruments and machines to do these 
things for us. Human beings can now fly, run and swim to the bottom of the sea 
although their efforts are still not self-powered. No other system has yet shown that it 
is as capable of overcoming obstacles to its progress as the human being.
The other systems in the diagram are more obviously limited; the inorganic system 
by its design and the organic system by its physiology. Internal physiology and 
architecture have developed with the needs of the species as objective. An example of 
this might be the difference between bees and ruminants, such as cows or antelope. A 
bee does not have to digest its food twice in the way that a ruminant has to, but a 
ruminant does not have to function as a worker in a complex social hierarchy building 
cells, tending the larvae and feeding and cleaning the queen. They have different needs 
so they have a different structure with the flexibility to carry out vastly different tasks.
I shall now briefly look at how this diagram might be improved and then move on 
to examine another diagram which has been modified only slightly.
There are two main areas of concern in this diagram, the first is its lack of accuracy, 
and the second is that it has been possible to plot only a few systems. The latter of these 
two difficulties can be overcome by increasing the size of the diagram to allow for all 
the necessary information to be included, but the diagram would quickly become of
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immense proportions. The other alternative would be to choose only those systems that 
are representative of a certain degree of complexity and a certain amount of flexibility 
and plot only those. This is what has been done in a very limited way in this diagram.
The former problem, that is, the failure in the accuracy of the diagram and the 
information it carries, could undoubtedly be improved by the axes being drawn more 
precisely so that degrees of complexity or particular capabilities might be stated 
explicitly. This, too, could be rectified by simply increasing the size of the diagram and 
adding in new gradations of the axes. However, the issue of accuracy is more likely to 
be improved by the addition of a third dimension which would allow points to be 
plotted more specifically, whilst also increasing the amount of available information. 
The result would be a three dimensional cluster diagram, that might be theoretically 
positioned in a fourth dimension of time as well.
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In Figure 16 only one slight modification has been made and that is the addition of 
dashed lines to more accurately indicate the points where architectural complexity and 
capabilities meet So at the point where the highest level of architectural complexity and
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the greatest flexibility of capability intersect we find "human beings'. Again closest to 
human beings are others of the higher order primates. The rest of the diagram also 
remains the same with inorganic systems occupying the middle and lower left hand-side 
and organic systems taking up the central diagonal from the bottom left to the top right 
All the same successes and failures that hold for the first diagram hold for this one 
and there is one added difficulty which has been brought about by the introduction of 
the dashed Unes. There is now the implicit suggestion that anything that is capable of 
the behaviour indicated by the intersecting of the two lines, upon which, or close to 
which, they have been plotted, is also capable of any of the behaviours that fall within 
the domain of those lines in the rest of the diagram.
So if we take cats as our example we can see that they are within the second set of 
dashed lines, indicating that their capabilities are still limited but that they have quite a 
high degree of flexibility in their repertoire of behaviours and a complex architecture. 
They are not, it seems, as complex as whales but they have a greater flexibility or range 
of possible behaviours then the whale. The position of cats on the diagram also tells us 
that they are more complex and more flexible than birds, colonies of ants, hives of 
bees, chameleons and many more. This may or may not be the case, but what is also 
suggested by their position is that they are capable of all the behaviours that the less 
complex and less flexible systems are capable. In reality this is not the case and again it 
is a problem brought about by the limitation of the axes, the choice of criteria upon 
which systems are to be plotted or measured, and the introduction of the lines that make 
the suggestion possible.
Another obvious example of this type of failure can be seen if we compare the 
capabilities of a thermostat with the capabilities of a human being. It is undisputedly the 
case that human beings are vastly more capable than a thermostat but when it comes to 
discerning subtle changes in the temperature of a room the thermostat, unless faulty, 
will win hands down against a system that has limitations in that particular respect.
It may simply be that it is too difficult to look at each system's architectural 
complexity as a whole. For a cat may be capable of better night vision than a canary but
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the night vision of an owl must be at least on a par with that of the cat So that the 
problem could be said to have been brought about by general nature of an 'architecture' 
criterion that makes no allowance for a specific aspect of architectural complexity that 
offers a particular species or member of a species, in this case the cat and the owl, a 
capability that another member of the species or a different species altogether does not 
possess.
Indeed to compare the complexity of a cat with the complexity of a horse or a 
human being might simply be perverse for they each have different functions, needs 
and levels of capability, flexibility and adaptability. One solution might be to plot 
classes of animals, such as mammals, birds, fish, invertebrates, and insects, and then 
in the same diagram also plot different types of inorganic system, for example, serial 
processors, neural networks, simple binary switches, video recorders, and so on. A 
comparison of this sort might be feasible, and perhaps even favourable if there were 
also the addition of a third dimension against which the system's adaptability to survive 
within a changing environment could be measured.
I shall look at one more two dimensional representation before moving on to 
construct and examine a three dimensional model of the relationship between 
architecture, capability and adaptability.
There is a change of form in the third diagram. No longer are there any axes against 
which the systems can be plotted. Instead there are a number of rings that vary in size 
as an indication of the complexity of the system. Thus the larger rings belong to more 
complex systems than the smaller rings because the system's represented by the larger 
rings have the potential to possess more mental or internal s t a t e s . 2^ The outermost ring 
represents all the mental or internal states possible for all types of systems. This might 
also be described as the largest 'state space' for it is the space in which all possible 
states are contained. The overlapping of the rings indicates where there might be some 
coincidence of mental states, for example, that all systems can be aware to some extent 
of their environment. Or that every system is capable of at least some degree of 
intentionality, (at least according to Dretske).
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It is a diagram that is difficult to understand because a lot of its information is 
carried implicitly and not stated explicitly as it was before on the axes of the other two 
diagrams. We have merely a vague idea about the complexity of the system which is 
founded only on the size of the ring in which the system is contained; and no mention is 
made of capability except that we can extrapolate from a system's having a wide range 
of possible mental states that it is also capable of exhibiting many different types of 
behaviour.
One of the overall problems of Figure 17 is that it seems to be attempting to present 
too much information at one go and the result is that all the information it carries, which 
is in fact an immense amount, becomes blurred. This diagram carries no more 
information than either of the other two but their method of representation was plainer 
than this which is simply designed to show overlapping relationships between 
categories of things.
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In the other two diagrams systems are plotted as points on a graph with no mention 
of overlapping states, except to say that those systems that are clustered together are 
more likely to have similar states, or commonalities between their internal states, than 
those that are dispersed in other areas of the diagram. In fact it might be argued that less 
information is carried in this diagram than in either of the other two, but I would 
counter this by saying that the difference is not between the level of information 
content, but rather between two ways of carrying information, explicitly and implicitly. 
In the figures 14 and 16 the information is stated explicitly, whereas in the this diagram 
the information is present in a more implicit form.
But there is another problem; and it is this: because we in fact know very little about 
mental states it becomes almost impossible to say where any commonalities of mental 
states really do occur. The suggestion then is that the information that the diagram 
carries in explicit form, that is, the very obvious overlaps between different systems, is 
so vague that it ceases to be informative. After all the most important aspect of a 
diagram should be that the information it carries is explicit or up-front and this diagram 
does not contain very much explicit information, and that which it does contain is 
dangerously over-generalised, running the risk of telling us nothing of either use or 
interest
Again, because of vagueness of the diagram I am compelled to conclude that any 
attempt at plotting individual instances of a species would not be a wise thing to do with 
the limitations of space in the diagrams and the need, at this stage to establish some 
overall picture of the relation between different systems, their possible mental states and 
their behavioural capabilities. In the next diagrams it will be more sensible, from a 
perspective of increasing the available information and accuracy, to compare classes 
and types of systems. Too much information has to be deliberately left out if only one 
Of two examples from a particular class or type are plotted. So that, subtle differences, 
for example, in architecture cannot be reported because of the lack of space and the 
overwhelming number of species and members of those species which we might 
choose to examine.
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In the next section I will look at the advantages of a three dimensional 
representation. It will be a cluster diagram in the style of diagrams one and two but with 
the addition of an axis to ascertain the 'adaptability' of the system to respond to change. 
So now, classes of organic systems and types of inorganic systems will be plotted 
alongside their capabilities, architecture and adaptability. This new procedure has the 
potential to increase the amount and accuracy of the information that will be offered.
6.3.2. A three dimensional model
Although in this section it is my intention to achieve a greater degree of accuracy, it 
should be said that the representation is still by no means complete, and the reason that 
this representation, and indeed no representation of this sort can ever be complete is 
because no perfect set of axes exists against which information can be measured. No 
perfect set exists because the information we are looking for will always depend upon 
what it is to be measured against and we are limited with the spatial structure of the 
diagram to measure at most three spatial dimensions, and if it is then plotted through 
time, one temporal dimension as well. For this reason some information will always 
have to be omitted or generalised to fit the axes that we wish to be present.
Now to the question of what such a representation would look like. I have said that 
the ascription of mental states is a product of the apprehended complexity of a system 
and its ability to behave in what we consider to be a human-like way, now what we 
want to look at in this same context is the relation between complexity, capability and 
adaptability. Capabilities are what are implicitly ascribed when mental states are 
attributed. For instance, if I say of Arthur that "He believes that the idea of curved 
space is open to fundamental misconceptions" I am ascribing to him a great many 
complex capabilities. Not least of these is that he can understand what I am saying and 
form beliefs about it. For each different system the environment and that system's 
behaviour will change thus the capabilities that are attributed to it will also change. Thus 
the best way to start to build up a three dimensional representation might be to begin by
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altering the the two dimensional axes so that 'complexity' and 'adaptability' are 
measured first and 'capability' is then superimposed as a function of them.
The diagram will take on the following appearance because I am arguing that 
capabilities are a result of the system's complexity and its ability to adapt to new and 
continually changing stimuli within its environment:
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It can now be argued that capabilities are dynamic whereas adaptability and 
complexity are static things that are either present within a system or not Of course, a 
proviso must be added, and it is this; 'complexity' and 'adaptability' are two 
characteristics that are present in some machines. The former is necessarily related to 
our understanding of different kinds of machines, for I am sure that not so long ago a 
thermostat would have been counted as a complex machine, but with our technological 
advances it has been relegated to the realms of simplicity itself. The latter, that is 
'adaptability', is something that has been incorporated into Parallel Distributed 
Processors or "Neural Nets" so that they can exhibit learning behaviour and thus adapt 
to changes in their environment. This is not to deny that the thermostat is adaptable, for 
it is, but its ability to adapt is extremely limited for it has only a three possibilities, 'on', 
'off or 'no change'. Because of its simplicity and the strict limitations set on its ability
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The next step is to begin to superimpose the third dimension of capability as a 
function of the two already present axes. One way to do this would be to outline each 
of the separate groups of crosses and draw columns from the edges of the outline to the 
X or bottom axis thus producing a type of three dimensional bar chart A second method 
would be to select a couple of crosses from each grouping and make them three 
dimensional by again drawing them as columns to the bottom axis. This would make 
the 'bars' thinner and more easily differentiated from each other. A third possibility 
would be to divide the diagram up into, for example, 144 squares, and to then plot the 
positions of every cross within those squares. This could then be plotted into a three by 
three matrix and when processed mathematically a three dimensional diagram formed.
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Circling the crosses and creating columns quickly becomes unfeasible on a diagram 
of this size for the lower levels then become unreadable as columns. For example, 
when trying to create a column from the class of invertebrates there is no room available 
in which to make the encircled class three dimensional. In other words, the species that 
lie along the bottom axis, the simplest systems, cannot be raised to a sufficient level of 
complexity to show up as points on a three dimensional diagram. Similarly for drawing
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to adapt the thermostat would be positioned in the diagram above at the very bottom left 
hand comer where the two axes interconnect
Entities such as fractals and cellular automata would have a more obvious presence 
on this diagram for they, being simple yet very adaptable, would be half way along the 
adaptability axis and in the lowest position on the complexity scale. Again they appear 
as exceptions for they sit outside the general trend of the graph which follows the
central diagonal line leading from the lower left comer to the upper right comer.
— ) If we move on at this stage to plot a number of different species alongside some
inorganic systems on the new set of axes we should get a diagram that would conform
approximately to the following, where the general trend is becoming more apparent.
X Human beings 
^  X Other primates 
X /  X and monkeys
Complexity
Amoeba, ____
Thermostats, etc
/x * Mammals
XX
/  Reptiles
Bâds
/  x ! x  
P D F S , , / ' '  Insects
/  X
/  xxx*
/  XX \  Invertebates
X xx^Fractalsetc.___
Adaptability
Figure 19
The different species and systems will remain in approximately the same positions 
as they did in all of the previous graphs even though one of the axes has been changed. 
That there is very little difference in the respective positions of the clusters is mainly 
due to the fact that the term "flexibility" also contained the implicit meaning of 
"flexibility to respond to changes in the environment" and thus being capable of a great 
many things, now the term "adaptability" explicitly covers both notions whilst leaving 
"capability" to be examined as a separate issue.
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columns in relief from a selected set of points to the bottom axis would be workable on 
a much larger diagram but on one of this size too much information is unavoidably 
omitted. Drawing a grid or framework into which the points are plotted, or indeed 
which could be placed over the existing points is some sort of "mid-way" method 
between these two possibilities and Rgure 20 shows the beginning of just such a 
procedure.
Although this diagram is still only two dimensional the addition of the grid or frame 
permits us to see that each of the crosses or points occupies a specific value that can be 
measured to within a tenth or a hundredth of a decimal place. For instance, the values 
for each of a selection of points in their respective classes would be as follows:
Susan'sPoints = Table[{LabeIText["Human Being", (1.0, 1.2}],
Point[(1.2, 1.2}],
LabelText["Primate", (1.05, 1.06}],
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
LabelText["Mammal", (0.97, 0.97}],
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
(1.18, 1.15}], 
(1.12, 1.17}], 
( 1 . 1 2 , 1 . 1 2 } ] ,  
(1.09, 1.12}], 
(1.15, 1.05}],
( 1 . 1 1 , 0 . 8 6 } ] ,  
(0.99, 1.0}], 
(1.08, 0.95}], 
(1.03, 0.98}], 
(1.07, 0.9}], 
(1.0, 0.94}], 
( 1 . 0 2 , 0 . 8 8 } ] ,  
(0.99, 0.91}], 
(0.93, 0.90}], 
(0.94, 0.97}],
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LabelText["Reptile", {0.8, 0.78}],
Point[{0.86, 0.74}],
Point[{0.81, 0.81}], etc.
Using these co-ordinates it is possible to plot this graph^^  ^although still only in 
two dimensions, to a much higher degree of accuracy using a mathematical tool such as 
Mathermtica.^^ The clusters of points will be used by Mathematica to form the more 
accurate graph as seen in the diagram below:
1 . 2"
0 . 8"
0 . 6
0 . 4
0 . 2
Human B e in g
Primage 
• HiuAnal
• J t a p t i l e
, B l r d ,
I n s e c c s
• V e rc e b r a c e s
POP'S
In tre rc e b ra c e s  
Amoeba, T h erm o sca cs e t c .
0 . 2  0 . 4  ' 0 . 6  0 . 8  1 1 . 2
Figurg U
The next step in the procedure is to add a third dimension that can be estimated and 
plotted in the diagram, thus bringing the points into relief. This new dimension will be 
the capability of a system as a function of the complexity and adaptability of that same 
system. To enable us to remain within the extent of the other two axes, still using the 
same system and range of measurements, I will take the mean or average of the other 
two axes, as representative of the value of a system’s capability. This being the case 
we can see using only a couple of possible data points that human beings, for example, 
would have a capability value of 1.2 since the values of both their x and y axes are 1.2 
also; and a reptile with x = 0.86 and y = 0.74 would have a capability value ofz =
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0.80. Thus with three sets of axes our diagram shows a more definite and by now 
wholly determined relationship between the complexity, adaptability and capability of 
each of the systems. Our representation now looks like what Kevin Kelly has described 
as a Possibility-Space Notation. His diagrams are very similar to. the following one and 
he uses them for essentially the same reasons; it is "a visual notation to render a 
simplified conceptual view of complex things".
• •
•  •
0
Eigwr? M
The third dimension has been introduced but the diagram is still very unclear. What 
we need to do is give Mathematica a function with which it can relate the points of data 
to every other point and also in relation to the rest of the possible points, though not 
explicitly estimated, covered by each of the three axes. This has been carried out in the 
next diagram and the difference is remarkable. The diagram now shows a more clearly 
focussed and purposive distinction between different types of systems or species. 
Indeed the diagram now begins to resemble a mountainous region with, it would seem, 
human beings having climbed to the apex of this, what could perhaps be described as, 
"evolutionary mountain". So human beings occupy the peak position because of all the
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systems we know or create the human system is the most complex, with a complex 
physiology and a complex social environment As a species human beings have adapted 
extremely well within a dynamic environment for they have made full use of their skills 
at communication and co-operation to share and successfully complete tasks. Instead of 
being dictated to by their environment human beings have learnt to a large extent how to 
control their environment to best suit them.
With greater resolution the dimensions and scale of the diagram are more evident 
and what we have really does look like a range of mountains with one prominent peak 
and a number of smaller hills with their own lower peaks. The most dominant of the 
peaks is where the greatest complexity, the healthiest adaptability and the largest 
number of capabilities come together as being characteristics of the human system. As 
each of these three characteristics diminish we move down the range to reach other 
simpler and less capable systems indicated by the lower peaks.
Figwre. 23
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Next on the range, in fact still on the same 'mountain' of the range and just below 
the highest point occupied by human beings, are the other members of the higher order 
primates. There are a great many of these, ranging from apes such as chimpanzees and 
gorillas, monkeys such as macaques and gibbons, and lemurs such as the sifaka and 
indri. Of these three the apes are most often described as 'anthropoid' because of their 
many similarities to human beings. They are the closest living relative of the family 
'Homo Sapiens' and because Of this they are capable of many of the things of which 
human beings are capable. For example, their faculties of perception are largely the 
same as those of the human system, as are their facial expressions with which they 
register intentions of, for example, friendliness or aggression. Indeed, as we draw our 
lips back over our teeth in a smile to let another person know that we mean no harm, so 
too a young male chimpanzee will employ a similar facial expression to convey to the 
dominant male of the troop that he does not intend to threaten his position in the 
hierarchy. Of course, there are notable exceptions to these rules when it comes to 
human beings, and one need only look to Shakespeare's Hamlet for the evidence: 
Hamlet: 0  villain, v ü l^  smiling damnèd villain!
My tables - meet it is I set it down
That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain.
In this short section one great difference between humans and other apes can be 
seen to exist, and it is this, the human ability to deceive. For human beings can behave 
in one way that gives the impression of meaning a particular thing when in fact it is 
their intention to double-cross the other person who accepts their behaviour for what it 
is. This deceptive behaviour is not something that the other primates have acquired for 
their societies run on a much less complex basis where actions have a "face" value and 
are taken to mean what they state.
In terms of complexity and adaptability there are other differences that occur 
between human beings and the rest of the primates and these for the most part tend to 
be things such as the extent to which our society and our interactions with one another 
have evolved. So that our society, as human beings, has become a great deal more
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complex than those of the other primates. One of the biggest distinctions can be seen in 
our ability to fonn language and use it as a shared tool, for it is this that has made it 
possible for us to conceive of ideas, discuss them with other people and transform them 
so that they can be put into practice. The complexity of our ideas reflects the complexity 
of our society and the sorts of knowledge we possess. Our knowledge can be 
expressed by us as individuals but is more likely to be expressed as a very small part of 
a larger whole which is our society and culture. Putting our ideas into practice is a 
reflection of the immense creativity of mankind and our creativity is just one very tiny 
aspect of our wide range of capabilities. It is true that chimpanzees are also being 
creative when they make tools but their tools are, as yet, very limited and it seems that 
there is no obvious element of abstract thought present in the process. However, this is 
not to say that their needs, and consequently their tools, have reached the end of their 
evolution, for we cannot ever know that What it is possible for us to know is that it is 
at very best unlikely that their, and our own, evolution will now be at its end.
The rest of the diagram shows that a differentiation exists between all of the other 
species on the grounds of complexity and adaptability as well. The general trend is that 
the simpler the system the less adaptable it will be and the fewer capabilities it will 
possess. This is certainly the case even if considering only one variable, that of changes 
in temperature, and looking at the differences in the capabilities of mammals and 
reptiles. Mammals can adapt to even quite extreme changes in temperature, continuing 
to hunt, forage, and even play. They have the capacity to wake up quickly becoming 
alert and active in a matter of moments to any possible predator or prey. Reptiles, oh 
the other hand, do not adapt easily to changes in temperature. They favour warmer 
climates than most mammals because they need the sun to keep them warm and they 
have no fur that they can fluff up to retain body heat When the temperature drops 
reptiles, such as marine iguanas become lethargic so that the food they have eaten can 
be used to maintain a general bodily homeostasis. Similarly in the morning when the 
temperature is low the iguanas wake up only slowly trying to use up as little energy as 
possible and being slowly rejuvenated by the warmth from the sun. Even when the
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weather is hot enough much of their day is spent either feeding or basking in the sun. 
They do not need to play and learn by that method to defend themselves against 
attackers for they, have very few natural predators.
The flow of the diagram steadily continues approaching the bottom left-hand comer 
where the systems have the simplest architectures, occupy the simplest environments 
and exhibit the simplest behaviours. Such systems do not need to be very adaptable to 
continue to exist in their environments for very little is required of them. The 
thermostat, kettle, television, sea-cucumber and amoeba need only to be adaptable 
within their range of necessary functions.
One of the more interesting sections of the diagram can be seen around the 
intersection of % = 0.25, y = 0.25 and z = 0.25. This is where Parallel Distributed 
Processors cause a blip in the trend or flow of the organic systems in the diagram. 
PDP's are complex, but not strikingly so, for they have a more complex architecture 
than any other inorganic systems, but are only barely as complex as any of the 
members of the invertebrate family. Their environment is quite complex and they are 
capable of learning which enables them to adapt to new information that will be the 
cause of subsequent changes in their actions. Being capable of taking in information, 
and selecting those pieces that are most relevant to it, is a significant feat for an 
inorganic system to be able to accomplish and it is this 'accomplished' capability that 
has caused the POP to interrupt the trend of the diagram, thus bringing an inorganic 
system into the relief of having a significant third dimension.
However, their range of possible actions is still quite limited for there is a lot of 
information in the world to which the POP cannot respond. But this can also be said to 
be true for a great many more complex entities since all systems will be restricted by the 
natural limitations of their perceptual apparatus. However, on the grounds of 
complexity a distinction can still be maintained between PDP's and other systems for 
the more complex a system is the fewer will be the restrictions on its perceptual 
capabilities. So that a reptile. Such as our marine iguana, possesses a much more
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capable perceptual apparatus and there is much more in its environment to which it can 
respond.
At this stage it should be remembered that as we are talking broadly in terms of the 
complexity of architecture and environment, the adaptability to incoming stimuli, and 
the capabilities that are afforded to a system, the information we have will remain quite 
general. But this is no bad thing for it has got our "picture" of other systems into a 
more realistic perspective enabling us to answer the question "Where do we go from 
here?".
The next stage will be to consider some of the work carried out by Aaron Sloman 
that deals with the "design space" of the system. This work is of particular interest 
because Sloman emphasizes the need to look at the whole system if we are to have any 
hope of ever having a full understanding of the inner working, both physical and 
mental, of that system. He maintains that a great many of the drawbacks or obstacles 
that have been encountered by work carried out by Artificial Intelligence are due to an 
overwhelming concentration on the very small aspects of the system whilst continuing 
to ignore the system's architecture as an interacting, interdependent whole.
6.4. Design space
In his inaugural lecture to the University of Birmingham^® Aaron Sloman argues 
that to make any progress in understanding the mind we first need to know two things; 
(i) what an intelligent system would need to be able to do for it to function and be 
described as intelligent, and (ii) what various mechanisms can already do that make us 
believe and attribute intelligence to them. Once we possess an adequate understanding 
of these two things we ought to be able to discuss mental concepts, such as 
'intelligence' and 'consciousness' more successfully than we do at present
The particular approach that Sloman proposes is a "design-based" one that looks at 
the mechanisms and architectures of a system as part of the space of all possible 
designs. Such an approach "requires understanding which features are important for 
which capabilities, and how the capabilities would change if the design were
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changed".The idea being that if we understand what capabilities a system possesses 
by its being designed in a particular way then it might also be possible to know how 
those capabilities would alter if the system's architecture or internal mechanism were to 
be changed in some way.
To begin with we know that between species there is a great deal of functional 
variation that is brought about by the vast differences that exist in the architectural, 
environmental and behavioural complexities of each distinct system. We also know that 
among the same species a great deal of functional variation exists because of the great 
complexity or 'richness' of their architectures. This is especially, and certainly more 
obviously, the case for human beings.
Many of the functional variations that exist between and among species or systems 
are brought about by the fact that the system possesses a potentially changing 
architecture. That is, an architecture that is dynamic in the sense of being able to adapt 
to incoming information that it has not experienced before. Thus in the diagrams above 
anything that is both complex and adaptable and showed up in the third dimension wiU 
have a dynamic architecture and be capable of adapting to suit changes that affect it 
within its environment. Sloman argues that one of the capabilities that changes through 
learning is perception; for example, our ability to recognise and interpret three 
dimensional shapes and different sorts of motion. I would go a stage further and add to 
this that, as higher order primates, all the capabilities of the human being have, and still 
continue to, change through learning which allows for adaptations in both our 
architectures and internal mechanisms. For example, as has become necessary we have 
become bipedal and an arch has developed in our foot to make running easier. We have 
developed binocular vision because with the absence of teeth and claws as weapons our 
only advantage was to see the predator or prey advancing from a long way off. So the 
internal architecture of the human system has adapted quite strikingly to changes within 
its environment. And other systems have also evolved and adapted for each of them has 
had to fit into an ecological niche in which it has been possible for them to survive.
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On the more immediate scale changes in the environment will not bring about 
alterations in the architecture of the system; however, on this scale changes can be seen 
within the system's internal mechanism. One good example of this might be the 
secretion of adrenalin by the endocrinal organs when the organism is lightened or 
excited thus causing constriction of the arterioles, dilation of the pupils and acceleration 
of the heart. It is also known to concentrate the mind on the object that is the cause of 
the excitation. A second example, is that of the emergence of capabilities that are 
unexpected just as connectionists argue that intelligence or even consciousness wül be 
an emergent property that arises out of the creation of a complex enough parallel 
machine.
So neither the architecture nor the mechanism of any complex system, that also has 
the ability to adapt to changes within its environment, can be said to be static. Its 
internal mechanism must be capable of changing to aid its survival and it must be 
capable of assimilating these changes into its overall architecture if they are going to 
continue to be necessary in the future. In this way the internal states of a system are 
always going to be in some degree of fluctuation, although for the systems chemical 
changes these may for the most part be measurable. However, when it comes to 
emotional states, that may to some extent coincide with the lack or secretion of certain 
chemicals in the body, we find that they are much more difficult to measure for they are 
similar in form to mental states, such as 'knowing', 'believing', and 'wishing'. Their 
essential vagueness and intangibility does not deter Sloman for he talks of "Hierarchies 
of Dispositions''^^ and I foresee that he will have problems similar to those experienced 
by Dretske and others who have tried to stratify mental states. I shall look more 
carefully at how Sloman attempts to make his dispositional divisions.
6.4.1. "Hierarchies of Dispositions"?
In this instance Sloman is primarily concerned with the human system and he 
claims that two sorts of dispositions exist, those that are long term and hard to change 
and those that have only a short term existence and are episodic or transient in nature.
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Of the first type he cites personality traits and attitudes, which I suppose to be 
dispositions of the following kinds of nature "happy-go-lucky", "conscientious",
"sad", or whatever, all of which make up the underlying nature of the system.^i The 
episodic dispositions are things such as moods, beliefs, desires, and intentions which 
can change from one moment to the next depending on the social context of the 
individual.
Superficially the hierarchical division seems to be fine except that surely it is not 
realistically possible to make the two types of disposition appear so distinct for the long 
term dispositions are necessarily made up of a mass of interweaved and interacting 
short term dispositions. In turn the short term dispositions must also be strongly 
influenced by the firmer more lasting personality traits that may even seem to have been 
inherited from a parent or other relative, as in "You're just like your father!". If there is 
any overlapping between the dispositions their distinction will start to blur and they 
become the sorts of states that we have already found it hard to discuss because we 
cannot define or describe them and the hierarchical tools that have so far been used in 
an effort to define them have been seen to be of little use.
Later Sloman decisively announces the need for a new vocabulary or conceptual 
framework for discussing mental states and processes and the commonly ill-conceived 
notions of 'consciousness' and so on. Only here do I find myself beginning to agree 
with him. He argues that our vocabulary for such states will improve alongside our 
understanding of the relevant mechanism, and I agree that this cannot but be so for the 
more information we have the greater will be our understanding and with an increased 
understanding we will develop an enhanced vocabulary with which to handle our new 
knowledge. However, I do not agree with him that it is an understanding of the 
system's mechanism that will yield this fuller and more useful vocabulary. There are 
other things that are also necessary; firstly, to look at the system's overall architecture, 
secondly, to examine the rôle that the system plays in a wider and more universal type 
of architecture, and thirdly, to look at the reasons that a system has a particular form or
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architecture and then look at what it is capable of doing because of that architecture that 
other systems are unable to do.
There are, it seems then, a great many things that are omitted in Sloman's 
consideration of how the architecture and mechanism of a system relate to the proper 
functioning of a system, but perhaps one of the more interesting aspects, that I have so 
far rather purposely overlooked, is his emphasis on a "design space" in which different 
systems with different architectures occupy different points. I shall now look at in more 
detail.
6.4.2. Dispersal across the design space
Sloman argues that if a system is to have a number of different capabilities then it 
needs to occupy a multiple of points in the "design space". The implication of this is 
that if a system can only carry out simple activities it will only need a simple design 
space and correspondingly if it is to be capable of more complex things its design space 
will need to be more complex.
Trees? Robots?
Microbes Chimps? People?
Figure 24
Human beings are capable of carrying out a rich and complex array of tasks and 
Sloman infers from this that they also occupy a rich and complex design space. So far 
so good, for I too would agree that the macaque is capable of a good many things and it 
too will have a rich and complex design space similar in many ways to that of the
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human being. Likewise almost at the other end of the scale an invertebrate, such as the 
sea-cucumber is capable of very little; in my diagrams it occupies the lower left-hand 
comer and in Sloman's design space it has only a very simple area.
Another interesting aspect of this work is that Sloman concludes that the richness of 
a system's complexity is not enough for it to be capable of exhibiting complex 
behaviour, Sloman also demands that we look at what the system needs to sustain its 
existence in the environment it occupies. This is most likely to be its ability to adapt and 
respond to change in the most favourable way for its own survival, thus making it a 
dynamic system.22
While similar in some respects, the general approach of Sloman's work seems to be 
quite different to mine for he is interested in the engineering aspects of designing a 
functioning mind. His proposal is for an explicit investigation into architectures and 
mechanisms on an individual basis, whilst I propose that we ought to first establish a 
structure from which we can start our investigation on a more global scale looking at 
systems and their interactions rather than individuals. Nevertheless, by travelling along 
different routes we have drawn many similar conclusions, for example the importance 
of the sustenance of the system, concentrating on the system's ability to adapt to 
changes when necessary in order for it to survive. These I will now discuss in section
6.5, the final part of this chapter.
6.5. Conclusion
I will now draw together the main conclusions of chapter six and briefly discuss the 
capabilities of a number of different systems whilst also looking at what mental states 
are required by those systems for them to be capable of their own particular sets of 
actions.
The three things that have emerged as being of great importance. The first 
emphasised the uniqueness of every chosen axis or set of axes for whatever 
interpretation we make of something it will always depend upon what we chose to 
examine or measure it against. Thus the information that we have obtained about the
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presence of mental states has depended upon our looking at them in connection with the 
complexity of the system and its environment, its adaptability within that environment 
and the capabilities that arise from the degree to which the system is complex and 
adaptable. Had I chosen to examine these systems in relation to their use of language, 
their ability to use tools, or their ability to form and act as part of a social group, the 
picture would have looked very different Indeed many systems would not have made 
much of an appearance, for example, neither thermostats nor PDP's form social groups 
and because of the immensity of their size and a need for large quantities of food each 
day just to sustain them, orang utans have to live a solitary life.^ So orangs too would 
not have appeared on a diagram that set out to investigate systems in relation to their 
ability to form social groups. Thus the criteria by which we choose to define a thing(s) 
are very important since even members of the same family can be excluded from their 
own family description if a new set of axes or even a slightly different definition is 
employed. A good example is the whale for it can be defined as a fish if the criteria are 
that it dwells in the sea and swims with the aid of fins and flippers, however, if the 
criteria are that it is warm blooded and produces milk with which to feed its young, 
then it is defined successfully as a mammal and not a fish after aU.
The second conclusion to be drawn from all of this is that two dimensional 
representations are limited by their size and subsequently by the quantity and accuracy 
of the information that they can provide. The simplest way around this is to increase the 
number of dimensions thus enabling information to be plotted, not only in relation to 
two sets of interrelated axes, but now in a much more complex tripartite relation. Just 
as Schubert's "Unfinished" Symphony while sounding good when played on one 
piano, sounds superb when played by a whole orchestra in a good auditorium. The 
music becomes enriched with an increase in participation by other members of the 
orchestra so that different sections will be brought alive by the strings, the woodwinds 
and so on. In much the same way the information has become enriched in the new 
diagrams by the addition of another dimension that can offer more information and a 
fuller perspective of what is already there implicitly. For the amount of information I
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am trying to portray, that is, that a relationship exists between mental states, 
architecture and capabilities, increasing the dimensions is absolutely necessary.
The third conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that using a taxonomic 
method we have been able to show a comparison between the differing capabilities of a 
wide range of systems of both the organic and inorganic varieties. It has meant that at 
last it is possible to compare and contrast the differences between the complexity, 
adaptability and capability of a number of systems and that these systems can have 
different forms and different functions, so that the capabilities of a cat or a lizard can be 
compared with the capabilities of a thermostat or a more sophisticated machine such as 
a POP.
Complexity was examined earlier and found to exist in many subtly interacting 
ways, architectural, behavioural and environmental. These have been brought together 
into a single entire concept of complexity that has made our task of drawing systems 
together on a basis of their overlapping similarities a lot easier. Working through these 
diagrams and amending them as I have gone along it has become possible, using the 
same criteria for each, to look at and compare machine states and mental states. This 
had not been possible before because mental states are vague and not easily 
differentiated whereas machine states are easily defined and quantifiable. Thus it was 
possible to differentiate between and stratify the states and functions of a machine, but 
not to do a similar thing with the mental states of a living system. Using this method we 
now know that for looking at vague concepts such as mental states cluster diagrams are 
a great deal more useful than the less flexible form of representation offered by a 
hierarchical stratification.
At last we are in a position where we can say with a greater degree of confidence 
which mental states are necessary for system to occupy a particular position in relation 
to other systems on the diagram. I shall bring this chapter to a close by examining this 
issue.
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6.5.1. Which mental states are necessary for which capabilities?
Human beings are the most capable systems that we know. They occupy the top 
level of the all of the cluster diagrams, whether the diagrams are two or three 
dimensional. The question to raise now is "What has elevated human beings above a l l . 
other systems to this level?". Well, it is certainly a matter of "complexity" as we have 
seen in chapters four and five, and such complexity is not just a matter of our being 
internally complex organisms with complex architectures and mechanisms, but is also 
an issue when we consider the complexity of our societies, our often very different 
cultures and the sorts of complex behaviours we exhibit daily just in the course of 
living.
On top of this we are extremely adaptable when it comes to analysing new 
information and adjusting our own behaviour, and even sometimes the behaviour of 
others, in accordance with new information. Our perceptual field is vast and we take in 
a lot of information that is superfluous which we then ignore or store for later use. We 
try to understand the information that we have selected for attention and from this new 
knowledge we can form new beliefs, feel satisfied that we have more evidence to 
maintain our old beliefs or bring our old beliefs into alignment with the new 
information.
So because of our immense complexity and our ability to adapt and survive we find 
ourselves to be capable of a great deal of interesting and useful behaviour. We have 
splendid perceptual skills with which to take in information about our world. We can 
understand, make judgements, store our new information as increased knowledge, and 
form beliefs about it with which we can deal with the world in a more sophisticated 
manner than we could before.
Our existence is largely-egocentric, as, it must be said, is the existence of all other 
animals. One question that still looms large is whether other animals know that they 
exist in the sense of having themselves at the heart of their judgements, that is, whether 
or not other systems are self-conscious. Monkeys such as Imo would certainly seem to
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exhibit signs of being self-conscious, and monkeys and apes are so close to mankind 
on the phylogenetic scale that I would feel uneasy about denying that they possess a 
self-conscious existence. Likewise for other mammals and even reptiles and birds. The 
task of attributing self-consciousness as a mental state becomes more difficult as the 
behaviour exhibited by the species in question becomes less and less human-like. Thus 
when we arrive at systems such as fish, insects and invertebrates it is more difficult to 
attribute self-consciousness because the behaviours these systems exhibit are so far 
from those that we usually associate with human self-conscious behaviour that we 
begin to doubt they really are self-conscious after all. It is not a problem to attribute 
consciousness to such systems because they are reasonably complex in their 
architecture, environment and behaviours, and on top of this they are capable of 
adapting to survive in their changing environment. They must be capable of perceiving 
their worlds, taking in, selec^g and processing information and responding to it in the 
way that will enhance their chances of survival. That they can form beliefs is unlikely 
and for insects with short life spans completely unnecessary.
When we arrive at the cluster diagrams for systems that are not alive but which can 
exhibit human-like behaviour, for example. PDF's, we again find ourselves in a 
quandary about whether or not these systems ever could be, self-conscious. It is true 
that they exhibit learning behaviour, but that they can form beliefs from this newly 
learnt information remains at least, highly questionable and at most, extremely 
doubtful. They may be able to simulate a process of belief formation, but this is not 
forming beliefs in the human sense where all previous experiences, the present 
environment, the possibility o f the future outcome and the individual's personality 
come into play. It is true that PDF's are adaptable, and in possession of an impressive 
array of capabilities, but on the scale of living systems they are still very simple, so it is 
extremely unlikely that they can form beliefs from the information they receive, process 
and store in data-banks as "knowledge'. Whether or not they could ever form beliefs is 
still an open question.
239
Some sort of continuum of lower order mental states can certainly be seen to exist 
among simple systems, for example, thermostats, invertebrates, fish, video recorders, 
and progressively right up to complex systems such as, weasels, antelope, and human 
beings, for they can all process information and to some extent refer to former states. 
The continuum for storing knowledge or data can also be seen to exist in some of the 
more complex and adaptable systems, but it starts much higher up past the level of 
amoeba, televisions and thermostats. However, the continuum ceases when we reach 
higher-level mental states such as being able to form beliefs, being self-conscious, 
being able to attribute mental states to other systems and ascribe meaning to symbols. 
Human beings are capable of these things, and when it comes to forming beliefs and 
being self-conscious, we might find that other higher-order primates and perhaps even 
some of the other mammals are just as capable; but when it comes to the ascription of 
meaning and the formation of language, being social animals capable of attributing 
mental states by examining relevant behaviour and forming analogies with our own 
behaviour, then human beings are the most capable, adaptable and complex of all 
systems. Being the only system that we know to be capable of all these complex 
behaviours has enabled a fundamental distinction to be made between our mentality and 
the putative mentality of machines, and it is the interruption of the continuum that 
makes human beings distinct from all other systems.
Endnotes:
 ^My knowledge of my own mental states is also fraught with difficulty. For instance, I frequently 
come across woik that I have written and I have completely forgotten that I ever knew anything about 
i t  Or sometimes it is only when in an argument with someone that I realise my beliefs about an area 
of politics are particularly fervent. So I do not have anything like a ccxnplete knowledge of my own 
mental states. Thus it can be argued that the notion of "privileged access" is also a very dubious one. 
However my mental states are the only ones of which I can have direct first-hand knowledge so in that 
sense they are the only ones I can ever really know. The mental states of others I take on trust, 
experience and analogy with my own mental states.
 ^I say theoretically' for TM's are not used in the construction or interpretation of formal languages 
because an FSM or a Push Down Machine (PDM), that is capable of recognising context-free 
gmmmars, can carry out these tasks easily. Ncx is the TM used fta" generating or interpreting natural 
language for even sentences with ambiguous meanings can be coped with using a TM with a tape 
restriction because it is sensitive to context.
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 ^Once again we are back to Nagel's argument that it is not possible to know the mental states of 
another system fw one cannot imagine what it would be like to be that other system.
 ^Wittgenstein, L (1958) Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell, paragraph 71
 ^ Ibid. paragr^hs 66,67 ff.,
 ^The phrase "cellular automata" was brought into being by Joseph von Neumann. He believed that 
fundamentally life was logical and the food' of this logic was information, so that theoretically for von 
Neumann there was no reason for a machine not to have life. "Cellular automata” are his mathematical 
formulations of this machine life.
 ^The "Game of Life" was developed by John Conway towards the end of the 1960s. His intention was 
to show that from a simple but random begiiming a pattern and complexity would quickly emerge.
 ^Example relationships with "non physical" entities can be seen all around and are fairly wide ranging, 
but two ccxne to mind quickly, the first is the imaginary playfriends that children have, and the second 
is praying to a deity to help us in a time of crisis. Neither of these are physical entities of which 
tangible experience is possible.
 ^A noted exception to the social' rule is the orang utan for it spends most of its life alone only 
coming together with another orang utan for brief periods to mate. More is said about the solitary habit 
of the orang utan in section 6.5.1.
Attenborough, D. (1979) Life on Earth, p.181-183, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd
See also section 3.7., chapter three.
This diagram is based on the venn diagram tradition since it is about the relationships between sets 
of things. However, it should not be mistaken for an actual venn diagram because it is not about the 
logical relationships of set theory; it is simply about recognising where overlapping mental states are 
likely to occur.
The complete set of points and Mathematica's lay-out is included in the Appendix 4.
Mathematica is a brand name for a computer generated mathematics application.
It is important to remember that the values attributed to the points have been based on where each 
system lies on the diagrams with regard to the chosen set of axes. Each diagram has been discussed at 
length with colleagues and friends so that my choice of positions for the clusters would not seem 
spurious. However, if a different set of axes had been chosen the clusters would have been arranged in a 
different way and if a different range of measurements had been chosen the values of the points would 
have changed. The outctxne of this is that these diagrams are intended only for discussion for they have 
no strictly, empirical or mathematical basis; but in its favour it should be said that with the addition of 
the third dimension, and a grid upon which the points can be given values, a more informative 
representation is achieved from which it is easier to deduce the presence, or at least the likelihood, of a 
systems having mental slates.
Kelly, K. (1992) "Deep Evolution, The Emergence of Postdarwinism", Whole Earth Review, p.l6
Shakespeare, W. (1604) Hamlet, Act I, Scene V, lines 106 - 108(inc.). Penguin Books, 1969.
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"Silicon Souls, How to design a functioning mimT, 18 May 1992. Taken from the seminar paper. 
Ibid. p.6
20 Ibid. p. 19
21 Underlying dispositions of the personality are certainly not something new for they wwe current as 
early as Chaucer's time in mediaeval England. The four categories on which personalities were always 
based were Phlegmatic - water, sanguine - air, choleric - fire, and melancholic- earth. Of course, the 
divisions into the four elements went still further back to the time of the ancient Greeks.
22 It is less likely to be whether one type of system, the organic, needs food and water whereas another 
type of system, the inwganic, needs silicon chips and electricity!
23 "The great red-haired orang of Borneo and Sumatra is the heaviest uee-dweller in existence. A male 
may stand over one and a half metres tall, have arms with a spread of two and a half metres and weigh a 
massive 200 kilos." Attenborough, D. (1979) Life on Earth, p.285 - Animals such as these only come 
together with another of their kind in the mating season.
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7. Conclusion
7.1. Introduction
Having now covered the groundwork I will begin to draw the threads of my 
argument together in this chapter by reiterating the conclusions that were derived in 
each of the previous chapters. Having completed this I shall move on to examine which 
characteristics we accept as being essentially human, and as far as we know belonging 
to no other system. To follow this up I shall examine the advantages that these 
characteristics offer the human system enabling it to take up, and so far remain in, a 
position of intellectual dominance within the world. Of these characteristics there are 
three that I will set out at some length.
The first is that the human system is the only system we know, as yet, to be capable 
of creating and arbitrarily assigning meaning to symbols. I shall argue against the 
proposal that symbols have an intrinsic meaning by virtue of the fact that they are 
symbols. Secondly, the human system is flexible enough to select the piece of 
information that is most important to it from its perceptual input It has also the 
flexibility to form beliefs about the information, to influence the beliefs of others, to 
store the information for later use and so on. Implicit in this selection of the most 
relevant piece of information is the choice of what information is to be 'selectively' 
ignored. Related to this is the third characteristic, that the human system is capable of 
subjectively interpreting the pieces of information that it selects for particular attention. 
Human beings can see the world from their own point of view and are able to express 
their interpretation of their world using propositional attitude statements. The nature of 
mental states means that we do not, and perhaps cannot, know if any other system is 
capable of seeing the world in quite the same manner, and, if Wittgenstein is right, if 
another system could express itself using a language it would be impossible for us to 
understand what it was saying because its language would be about its relationship to 
its world. Each of these three characteristics will be discussed in much greater detail
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before I move on to examine what sort of architectural, behavioural and environmental 
requirements are necessary for such a highly developed and complex cognitive system 
to exist and behave in the ways that it does.
This chapter will be brought to a close with some reflections on why it is 
impossible^ for me to have direct knowledge of the internal states of any other system. 
I can only have awareness of my own subjective states and all other behaviour must be 
'as-though' the system knows or 'as-though' it understands. Thus when we talk of the 
experience or ascription of mental states we realise that we occupy an asymptotic tine? 
for although I have direct experience of my own states there are still problems with 
'privileged access' because I cannot ever know all my mental states, and even though 
other human being would seem to display self-consciousness their self-consciousness 
is one of which I can never have any direct experience at all, nor they of mine. Thus, 
we are "destined to describe an asymptotic curve, which approaches but never reaches 
the limit"3, the "limit" being our full understanding of self-consciousness, whether our 
own or that of other people. However, the reason we think that some human 'self- 
conscious' behaviour, such as the use of propositional attitude statements, is more 
likely to indicate a manifestation of self-consciousness in another person is due to the 
fact that we can imagine what it might be like to be the person behaving in that 
particular way. On the other hand the reason we are less likely to think of the machine 
or sea-cucumber as possessing self-consciousness is because it is impossible for us to 
ever fully imagine what it would be like to be a machine, a bat, an amoeba or a sea- 
cucumber and behaving in the way that they do. On top of this each of these systems 
occupies their own very limited environment, within which it is doubtful that they 
exercise subjective judgement.
Quite simply it is more realistic for me to guess at the mental states of other human 
beings, and that their 'as-though' behaviour is a reflection of their possessing mental 
states that are nearer in kind to the mental states that I, myself experience, because they 
are more like me than any other kind of system. Thus, all the mental states that are 
made manifest by other systems are similar in kind (to a degree that varies depending
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upon the system) to mine, although there is no way that I can ever know their mental 
states as mine. Thus I can only ever be sure that I have self-consciousness, and that it is 
highly probable that other human beings have self-consciousness because we have so 
much in common, for example, our physiology, our social behaviours such as the use 
of language, physical mannerisms, and so on. That I have self-consciousness suggests 
that it is highly likely that other human beings have it too and that all of our conjectures 
about mentality in non-human systems will go on being hopelessly inaccurate because 
of the elusive and seemingly boundless nature of mental states.
7.2. Drawing the conclusions together - what has been achieved?
In the previous chapters I embarked on an attempt to answer the question, "When is 
it justifiable to say of a non-human system that it has mental states?". The search for 
justification was based on which mental states can be accepted as preceding and 
permitting particular actions in a variety of systems, both human and non-human, and I 
started by offering a critical review of some of the most relevant parts of the wealth of 
literature in the areas of philosophy, artificial intelligence, and cognitive psychology. 
This was, to some extent, 'scene setting' for it meant that some of the problems that are 
discussed and disputed in the theories of mental states and inientionality could be aired, 
explained and criticised whilst at the same time giving a clear indication of the direction 
that the thesis was going to take.
This account of mental states and inientionality then led up to a more detailed 
examination in chapter three of how we come to recognise the occurrence of different 
mental states and how we then go about ascribing them to other systems. These 'other 
systems' included other human beings, non-human animals, machines such as 
thermostats, televisions and POP's and lower order organisms, such as amoebae and 
sea-cucumbers. I concluded that the ascription of mental states depends upon our 
apprehension of two things in the other system, (i) that it behaves in a consistently 
human-like way so that an analogy with our own behaviours and mental states is
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possible, and (ii) that the other system is considered to be a complex enough system for 
it to be capable of possessing the level of mental states we are ascribing to it.
The actual business of ascribing mental states to another system can be carried out 
in two different ways. The first is by using language in the form of propositional 
attitude statements to describe X's behaviour, for example, that 'X believes that Y' or 
that X  knows that Y'. When ascribing mental states to another human being the person 
to whom the states are ascribed can offer corroboration or denial of the ascription by 
herself using a propositional attitude statement to say Yes, I believe Z . The second 
method of ascription is behavioural and it takes place, often without the awareness of 
the ascribing system, when the system doing the ascribing perceives that X' possesses 
a set of internal characteristics and then behaves in a particular way to that system; the 
'poking and fiddling' approach.
Thus it became clear that the ascription of mental states is by no means a simple 
procedure for all of the criteria depend upon our subjective view of the world and the 
information we perceive, select and attend to from it But if ascription is a difficult thing 
to do with any degree of certainty why do we do it at all? Well, one of the main reasons 
is that it is a useful predictive tool that facilitates interaction and communication between 
human beings and what we perceive to be other 'intelligent' systems. So that even if the 
system, whilst exhibiting signs of mentality, is still known to be inorganic, it is 
probably best, or at the very least useful, to behave towards it as one would towards a 
human being that is known to have a brain and a complex mental life.
With the ascription of mental states turning out to be such a complex process I 
examined three notions of complexity in relation to ascription in chapter four. The first 
one was that a system would have to have a fairly high degree of architectural or 
structural complexity for us to think that it could act in a way that is sufficiently 
'human-like' and that would 'persuade' us that it ought to be ascribed mental states. 
Following on from this the second notion was of the complexity of the system's actions 
or behaviour, for simple behaviours would not inspire the ascription of high level 
mental states and the more complex the behaviour the more likely we are to ascribe
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complex mental states. The third notion was that behaviour is a complex relation of 
architecture and environment, so that the internal design of the system and its 
environment afford the system a variety of capabilities, some of which will be more 
complex than others.
I concluded that a positive relationship exists between the overall complexity of the 
system, that is, its complexities of architecture, behaviour and interaction with the 
environment, and the system’s capabilities to perform certain actions. If we then look at 
a computer its capabilities are constrained by a combination of its architecture, its 
program and the environment in which it is fixed. A similar state of affairs exists for the 
capabilities of non-human animals and it is only when we reach the higher-order 
animals that we notice that they possess an additional capability, that is, they have the 
adaptability to choose what information they will attend to in their environment and 
from this selection they can decide how to respond to the new information. This self- 
conscious element of behaviour is certainly one of the most complex aspects of the 
capabilities we know to be possessed by human beings.
Two of the other complex capabilities that human beings possess are (i) the ability 
to survive in a complex social environment, and (ii) the ability to create, use and adapt a 
shared language within that society. Thus as self-conscious, language-using systems 
human beings are capable of both thinking and acting in their own best interests but 
also, if the need arises, of subjugating those personal interests for the wider benefit and 
survival of their society.
From these conclusions it was possible to see that the system's complexity related, 
not only to the internal and external architecture of the system, but also to the system's 
degree of flexibility to respond to the wealth of continually changing stimuli that 
surrounds it in its environment Human beings occupy the most enriched environment 
and they can do a lot. They have a high-level of awareness, they can select the most 
relevant information from their environment, understand it and follow this up with self- 
conscious judgements about it. They can also describe what information is irrelevant 
and ignore that. It is also possible for them to anticipate how other aspects of their
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environment will be affected by their judgements, and to either change those 
judgements or justify them. Thus, it was concluded that human beings are very 
complex systems indeed with a huge repertoire of capabilities.
Looking at the possible ascription of mental states to both human and non-human 
systems led to an examination of the way in which the internal states of the different 
kinds of systems are described. Chomsky deals only with machine states and his 
example demonstrates that machine states are definable, limited and calculable. 
Dretske's hierarchy deals with mental states as they are applied to both machines and 
living systems and his example serves to highlight (although this is not really his 
intention) the indefinability and vagueness of mental states.
Both hierarchies are necessarily limited; Chomsky's because it goes no further than 
machine states and Dretske's because he does not manage to fulfil his commitment and 
complete the hierarchy by giving us a system that is capable of accomplishing first and 
second level intentionality but not third. Dretske fails because he tries to define and 
stratify things that cannot be examined in such a forced and contrived way. The 
difficulty of the indefinability of mental states means that the relationship between 
capabilities and complexity will be easier to locate in a machine than it will be in a living 
system. With mental states being vague and non-quantifiable it is going to be nigh on 
impossible to distinguish between any of the higher-level mental states. There are many 
examples where this is the case and one might cite the difficulty of drawing distinctions 
between 'love' and 'infatuation' and, of course, between 'believing' and knowing'.
There were other problems as well, for in a hierarchical stratification the 
positions of the systems are fixed and invariable so that anomalies such as a 
thermostat's being altogether more capable than a human being at detecting slight 
variations in temperature could not easily be shown. So most systems occupy rather 
contrived positions on a hierarchical model which suggests that a more adaptable 
model is necessary before a realistic picture of the relationship between the 
capabilities, architecture and environment of different systems can be shown. In
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chapter six this idea was followed up and I offered examples of some of the many 
alternative ways in which this relationship can be shown.
The new way of showing this information incorporates the idea of cluster diagrams 
taken from taxonomy. At least three things emerged as being highly significant Firstly, 
the choice of which axes should be used, that is, which criteria offer the most accurate 
way of defining and identifying the presence of mental states. For instance, that I chose 
to examine mental states in connection with the complexity of the system and its 
environment, its adaptability within that environment and the capabilities that arise from 
the degree to which the system is complex and adaptable, undoubtedly meant that other 
possible information became peripheral or was even excluded altogether. So the criteria 
by which we choose to define a set of things are very important since even members of 
the same family can be omitted if a slightly different definition is employed. Secondly, 
the sort of representation offered in a hierarchical construction is only two dimensional 
and even in the less constrained cluster diagram a two dimensional representation is 
extremely limited. A limitation of this kind means that the quantity and accuracy of the 
information being presented is always going to be adversely affected. The only way to 
overcome this is to increase the number of dimensions, and perhaps even the size of the 
diagram, so that more information can be included and the accuracy of that information 
is enhanced by the introduction of another set of defining criteria. The third, and 
perhaps most significant conclusion, is that it is now possible to examine vague 
concepts such as mental states by using cluster diagrams, and because it is already 
possible to examine the determinate states of a machine, it is now possible to draw up a 
comparison between the complexity, adaptability and capabilities of human and non­
human systems so that machine states can be discussed alongside mental states. So we 
can now discuss the possible manifestation of mental states in non-human systems.
In the sections that follow I shall respond to the original question of how justifiable 
it is to ascribe mental states to non-human systems.
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7.3. The advantages of the human system
There is nothing very new in claiming that human beings are more complex, more 
adaptable and more capable than any other mechanical or carbon based system (though 
it is recognised that these are not mutually exclusive), however, an examination of what 
are the necessary prerequisites that have brought about this state of affairs of high-level 
complexity might well yield some interesting and significant results. One of the 
fundamental requirements is that the human system must possess a rich and varied 
mental life with the capacity to form mental states as simple as those required to process 
incoming information and as complex as those through which it is possible to form 
beliefs about their worlds. What is also apparent in human beings is their capacity to 
create and use a shared language to discuss their beliefs and to describe an, otherwise 
unreachable, inner life of feelings and intentions. I shall now look at this ability in 
greater detail.
7.3.1. The creation and ascription of meaning to symbols
Within the area of the ascription of meaning there is an important division; it is 
between, on the one hand, the creation of a symbol and the subsequent ascription of a 
meaning to it (when this is carried out for sets of symbols and we then create strings of 
these symbols we have the logical beginnings of the development of a symbolic 
language**) and, on the other hand, the ascription of meaning to a non-symbolic state of 
affairs, or the interpretation we offer for a specific behaviour or type of behaviour that 
we believe is a symptom of a particular state of mind. This second type of ascription, of 
mentality on the basis of perceived behaviour, has been quite roundly dealt with in 
chapter three so little more will be said about it here. Instead I wiU concentrate on the 
first kind of ascription, that of assigning a meaning to a symbol or set of symbols.
The written word or symbol was created for the purpose of communicating between 
human beings in a more effective way, and by their creation and use the form of 
communication changed so that it could be made through time from one generation to 
the next, no longer relying merely on the vagaries of the spoken word that could be
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misheard or misinterpreted. There can be little doubt that the spoken word preceded the 
written word and it was only with a demand for more information that the need arose 
for the spoken word to be transferred to a written form and this need was accompanied 
by a need for symbols.^ Then came the ascription of meaning to tliose symbols for a 
symbol cannot be said to have a meaning by virtue of its being a symbol, which is to 
say, symbols have no intrinsic meaning. In fact a symbol only becomes a symbol when 
it is symbolic of something and that meaning is then designated arbitrarily to the symbol 
by its creator.
The ascription of meaning to a symbol can then be due to one of at least three 
possibilities. Firstly, tiiat there is some aspect of our representational system and our 
ability to behave intentionally that is intrinsic to us as human beings; Searle's position. 
Secondly, that there is no intrinsic meaning present in any symbol, but that our ability 
to systematically interpret symbols and symbol strings is intrinsic. This suggests that a 
symbol's meaning is ultimately embedded in some non-symbolic representation; 
Hamad's position. And thirdly, that the meaning we ascribe to any symbol depends 
upon the interaction we have with our environment, so that my language, the meanings 
that are ascribed to my words and my environment are inextricably linked. I maintain 
that this last alternative is the one that is most probable for it does not rely upon the 
meaning of our symbols or their formation and interpretation being in any way intrinsic 
to us.^
Rosenschein agrees with this for although machines are quite obviously capable of 
manipulating symbols only the programmer is capable of assigning any meaning to the 
symbols.^ And, for Rosenschein, if the creator of the program wishes to assign a 
different interpretation to the same symbols the machine will have a different sort of 
knowledge.* So the process of meaning ascription is arbitrary as long as each meaning 
is consistent with the others. Thus the meaning of the symbols is very important for the 
description of the machine's internal state, or what might be described as 'mental state' 
in Rosenschein's more limited and purely logical sense. Indeed Rosenschein 
recognised the importance of the environment and created the Situated Automata
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approach where the state of the machine is a direct result of the limited interaction it has 
with its environment Then when we ask the question "What does the system know'?" 
we can answer that it knows' the information that has been instantiated by the 
programmer plus the things that it has reacted to in its environment and even though 
the things it reacts to have been dictated to it by its program there is a sense (again a 
very limited sense), that because it has been affected by these things it Tmows' or is 
'aware' of their existence.
Another way of saying this is that a symbol only becomes a symbol when it is 
about some object or state of affairs in the world. Searle would agree with this but he 
would add that as the ascription of meaning must come from outside the symbol 
system, and as only human beings have yet proved capable of such ascription, human 
beings must have some intrinsic characteristic. This characteristic, he would go on to 
argue, is their own mental content or internal semantics. So intentional states must have 
their own intrinsic or self-attributed content and it is this element that he claims is 
missing from any computational simulation of human mental states. As proof he adds 
that an application in a machine will continue to run regardless of the fact that the 
machine understands nothing of the symbols or program that has been instantiated in it.
From the work that has been carried out in this thesis I would not wish to dispute 
Searle's claim that the machine does not understand the program that it has running, but 
I would say the machines lack of understanding is due to two things. Firstly, the fact 
that we have only a limited notion of what understanding is and how any manifestation 
of the mental state of 'understanding' should be discriminated from another mental 
state, for example 'recognition', and identified is not at all clear. And, secondly, that 
the attribution of vague mental states to things that operate on the basis of states that are 
by nature discrete and definite, is simply wrong-headed and perhaps even a matter of 
some vanity.9
No, my argument with Searle is with his idea that human beings somehow have 
intrinsic intentionality, that is, that the human representational system has its meaning 
intrinsic to it  Hamad also challenges Searle on this point but I believe Hamad's
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argument is brought down by the fact that he still argues that because symbols are 
interpreted systematically by a machine, or for example, the individual in the Chinese 
Room, the form that the interpretation takes must be intrinsic to the system.
Hamad argues, and I agree, that the symbols in a formal symbol system only have 
meaning when they stand for things in the world. Meaning of this sort cannot be 
intrinsic to the system since any meaning is going to be based on what the symbols 
mean for us. So the interpretation depends on the fact that "the symbols have meaning 
for us, in exactly the same way that the meanings of the symbols in a book are not 
intrinsic, but derive from the meanings in our heads''.^® The symbols in any book will 
only have a meaning when we know the language they are written in and we can 
attribute a meaning to them. Hamad describes this as a "merry-go-round’' because the 
attribution of meaning to one symbol always depends on another symbol, and for him 
the only way to get off \his"merry-go-round" is to ultimately ground the meaning of a 
symbol in some non-symbolic representation. But these non-symbolic representations 
will themselves have to have an intrinsic meaning if we are ever to get off the "merry- 
go-round" . The example given by Hamad is of a 'zebra', which he argues we know to 
be the combination of essential and necessarily unvarying features of the two symbols, 
'horse' and 'stripes'. The naming, he says, is immaterial once we have the composite 
meaning, so that the combination of 'horse' and 'stripes', the 'zebra', could have any 
name but it would always have the same composite meaning. In fact Hamad would 
probably want to argue that it is the 'naming' aspect and nothing else that is influenced 
by society and our environment, while I would argue that it is the semantics of our 
symbols and symbol systems that are grounded in inter-pcrsonal exchanges.
Hamad goes one step further in his argument saying that the individual who has the 
meanings has them in 'isolation' when he or she is combining 'horse' and 'stripes' to 
form the new concept of 'zebra', but this seems to be very curious notion for it seems 
impossible to ask what is going on in the mind of the individual when he or she has 
meanings in isolation from any social or linguistic interaction. That an individual 
exists to have these 'isolated' meanings is surely indicative of an environment in which
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he or she must be existing and in which his or her thoughts can be had; thus, the only 
feasible solution to the problem seems to be that there can be no difference between 
what Hamad describes as 'intrinsic meaning' and what would elsewhere be described 
as the individual giving what he or she perceives a 'subjective meaning' or 
'interpretation'.
So Searle says that the meaning of any symbol is intrinsic to us as part of our 
representational system, and Hamad says that symbols come to have a meaning once 
they are used compositionally in meaningful syntactic ways, and that there is a 
difference between intrinsic meaning and extrinsic meaning, for the former is in our 
heads and tlie latter is attributed from outside. This is a very difficult idea for Hamad 
maintains that we go through the perceptual phases of recognition, discrimination and 
identification, after which we reach a representational level at which categorisation takes 
place where a meaning, but not necessarily a name, is attributed to them. Finally 
Hamad argues that the meaning of a symbol is grounded in non-symbolic 
representations that are formed into meaningful and syntactical strings of symbols that 
can then be interpreted systematically and it is this interpretative ability which is 
intrinsic to the system.
But what can be the nature of Hamad's non-symbolic representations? It is not at all 
clear for they might be like Wittgenstein's 'objects' or 'things' in the Tractatus that can 
be shown but not said,^2 or even like his 'family resemblances' in the Philosophical 
Investigations, that can be described and examples given to show the inter-relations but 
nowhere can the overlap between two things of similar type be explicitly stated.
Another possibility for non-symbolic representations is that they might be like the 
Platonic 'Forms', where for example, the essence 'horseness' or 'tableness' can be 
sought The nature of a non-symbolic representation is certainly not immediately 
obvious which makes Hamad's brave leap from symbolic representations to non- 
symbolic forms of representation seem altogether odd and perhaps even futile.
However, there is one redeeming feature in Hamad's theory and that is that it 
appeals to the individual's world so that any assignment of meaning to a symbol will be
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made on the basis of the referent of the symbol already existing in some form in the 
world of the person doing the ascribing. Searle also says this but then carries on to say 
that the meanings we ascribe are an intrinsic part of our representational systems and it 
is here particularly that I have a grievance with his theory, for I would argue that the 
environment, or context, in which the human being lives and breathes is all important 
for making meaningful ascriptions to the new symbols that he or she has created, and 
also for the assignment of new meanings to old symbols. If the meanings were implicit 
in the human representational system the interpretations of every situation ever 
encountered would be identical for every culture and plainly this is not so. Our 
languages are different, our cultures are different, for example, to the American Indians 
the natural world talks but to the Americans in New York city it is money that talks.
The same things have different degrees of significance to different cultures which 
suggests that the social and cultural environment of the individual is the most important 
part of the ascription of meaning to symbols, and that there are such vast degrees of 
variation in meaning for the same things casts doubt upon there being such a thing as an 
intrinsic representational system.
For a symbol to be symbolic it has to represent some state of affairs that exists, 
either intentionally or actually, in the world of the person doing the ascribing else the 
symbol could not be said to be truly 'symbolic'. However, it is true that this 
'something' can be either physical or abstract in nature, since the environment of the 
individual includes the world of phenomena that exists externally as a world of 
'appearances' and the world of noumena that exist as a form thought or intellect, the 
'things in t h e m s e l v e s ’. 3^ Examples of phenomena in our world are prolific, for 
example, trees, biscuits, cats and so on; but giving examples of noumena is not so 
easy, perhaps, a number in pure mathematics^^, or the feeling of anxiety or envy.
So because we live in a shared world in which there are things that we want to talk 
about a need for communication first arises. Then by representing these things 
symbolically and ascribing a meaning to those symbols the information that we want to 
pass on can be conveyed in a sort of shorthand. As in chapter four, section 4.2.2.,
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paragraph 10, when I said that no behaviour can take place in a vacuum, so too our 
ascription of meaning to symbols is a form of linguistic behaviour and it cannot be 
exercised without the presence of an environment. Thus our interaction with our 
environment sets limits to the creation of language and the ascription of meaning to our 
words, for it is not possible to talk of things of which we have no concepts for we 
would have no words and hence no way of describing them. It is certainly true that we 
devise mythological characters that do not exist in our world but such beasts are made 
up of a collection of the parts of other beasts that do exist (or at least have at one time 
existed) and of which we have logical and linguistic conceptions. For example, the 
griffin is a conjunction of a lion's body and an eagle's beak. Indeed most of the 
examples of beasts in the genre of Science Fiction bear this out for they rarely look like 
anything other than oversized beetles or other hideously enlarged insects!
There is no need for us to rely upon the meaning of our symbols or how they are 
formed and interpreted being intrinsic to us for we have seen in the previous chapters 
how complex, adaptable and altogether capable the human system is in comparison 
with all other systems and species, and it is because the human being possesses such 
capabilities that it is able to develop by seeing how something could be done better, 
creating where there is a need, utilising all facilities and surviving against all odds. The 
development of language is only one example of the great wealth of human capabilities 
but it is surely one of the most impressive and distinctive. It is not that I doubt that there 
may be something in the structure of human DNA that gives us the propensity to 
understand how symbols can be made to stand for things and how those symbols 
should then be manipulated in language so that their meaning can be obtained, but I do 
maintain that none of the creation of symbols, the ascription of meaning to them or their 
manipulation could have been carried out without the existence of a social environment 
in which these symbols have a use. After all it is only within a social environment that 
any linguistic communication would even be n e c e s s a r y . ^ 3
With language I am able to describe the feelings I have and express my 
intentionality in a definite and determined way that can be understood by other people
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who share the form of language that I use. I can express myself and advise other 
human beings of my intentions, I can also understand more readily how they feel about 
a state of affairs since we are in possession of a shared method of communication. 
However, when this method fails, as for example, when I am in the company of 
someone who comes from a different culture and speaks a language that is foreign to 
me, I have to rely upon their facial and bodily expressions to convey to me their 
wishes, beliefs, and so on. Without the use of a shared language I am more likely to 
misunderstand the other person and ascribe to them states of mind that they do not in 
fact possess. So we can see that a shared background or environment and the use of a 
shared language that has been derived from the same cultural environment is the most 
reliable method of communication with another human being. Other non-human 
systems communicate with one another in a much less sophisticated manner than do 
human beings who have a shared language and background, for other systems do not 
employ anything as complicated as symbolic representations or notation to convey their 
meaning.
The ability to create symbols, to arbitrarily assign meaning to those symbols, to 
then form those symbols into strings that are syntactically correct and semantically 
interesting, and finally to use those strings with the intention of communicating 
information to another human being is just one of the advantages that human beings 
have over any other system. That there is a need for language at all must surely be a 
simple reflection of the complex nature of the human beings environment, architecture 
and subsequent behaviour.
In the next section I will examine a second advantage that human beings possess, 
that of being able to select which is the most relevant piece of incoming information for 
them, understanding that information and using it in ever changing environment, whilst 
also being able to selectively ignore that information that is not of interest or use. 
Because we face problems experiencing the states of another system we cannot say for 
sure that any other system understands its environment to the same level of 
understanding that human beings understand theirs, thus it is impossible to say whether
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or not other systems know' or 'believe' the events and states of affairs that are taking 
place in their worlds. The abilities to select information, understand it, elevate it to the 
level of knowledge from where beliefs can be formed about it will be assumed to be 
advantages that belong in full solely to the human system.
7.3.2. The ability to select information for attention
Being capable of the creation, ascription, formation and employment of symbols 
and strings of symbols is certainly one of the most impressive of all human abilities and 
one that is not shared by any other non-human system. In this section I will look 
specifically at what other human capabilities can be inferred from this sophisticated use 
of language.
Any system ranging from the low-level thermostats and amoebae to the high-level 
organisms such as mammals, monkeys and human beings are capable of processing 
information. They are capable of responding to specific things in their environment but 
the flexibility to choose which things they will respond to varies quite significantly 
between species. For example, a thermostat can only react to one thing in its 
environment, and that one thing is any change in the temperature of the room it is 
monitoring. If it detects any variation it can act accordingly by turning the heating on or 
off. In circumstances where there is no change in the room temperature it will do 
nothing. It is capable of no more than this, and is only capable of less than this if it is 
broken or disconnected. Human beings, and perhaps a great many of the higher-order 
systems, can respond to any of the things that they perceive in their environment. They 
have the flexibility to select what is of most interest and attend to it whilst perhaps 
retaining some of the other perceptual input as stored information that can be attended to 
later when it might be more relevant Thus it is that the flexibility to select that which 
will be attended to and that which will be ignored is one of the characteristics that sets 
human beings, other higher order primates and some of the other more capable systems 
apart from the simpler ones that have a fixed environment in which they can only attend 
to a specific set of things.
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However, it is also true to say that we cannot be certain that any other non-human 
system can select and ignore information in just the way that human beings do, but 
having watched my cat playing by actively seeking a ball that it wants to play with or 
wait in ambush of another cat, or watching a group of chimpanzees taking turns 
scrutinising a leaf and each of them looking serious as they do so and then simply 
tossing it aside, it would seem that there is much in their environment that they choose 
to ignore and at particular times there are things that are given special attention at the 
expense of everything else. Naturally, there are times in the existence of even the most 
complex and capable species when they are not given any choice about what they can 
respond to, such as being in imminent danger and needing to get away, but at times 
such as these, without the element of choice, the response becomes an intuitive or ’gut’ 
reaction and not something about which there can be any deliberation at all.^^
In the main the more complex, more adaptable and thus more capable systems also 
seem to possess the flexibility to choose what things they will respond to in their 
environment Therefore the nature of the system's e n v i r o n m e n t ^ ^  also of great 
importance. The thermostats environment is fixed and extremely limited. Although it 
can perform a greater range of functions the video recorder still has a limited, fixed 
environment It is only when we reach the level of PDF's that machines become 
slightly more capable because they have an environment with fewer limitations and 
more possibilities. As a result the PDF is more flexible but there is still an order in 
which it will perform whatever functions it has to carry out for after all it is dictated to 
by a binary machine code. Indeed even when we examine non-human animals it is 
difficult to establish areas where there is much flexibility in their choice of what to 
respond to and what activity to carry out next Animals, such as, protozoa and sea- 
cucumbers have limited environments and in fact it is only when we reach the level of 
the high level mammals that there seems to be much flexibility at all. By and large the 
behaviour of non-human animals is dictated by their physiological needs and it is only 
when we observe an animal playing, which does not seem to be a goal-directed
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behaviour, that the element of choice seems to enter into their repertoire of 
behaviours.^*
The environment that human beings occupy is vast and unlimited for not only can 
they select the things in their world that they will attend to, but they can also think about 
a state of affairs when it is not immediately present, that is, in reflection, or they can 
speculate about the existence of an omnipotent creator, or aspects of natural philosophy 
plus much, much more. So the choices made by any human being will include things 
that are within, but also without, its perceptual domain. Understanding the amount of 
flexibility that human beings possess is made possible by their use of many shared 
languages that enable each person to know to at least some degree of certainty the form 
and content of another human beings mental life and mental states. Human beings can 
share their experiences and thoughts through discussion and similarities between 
someone's professed mental states and their observed behaviour can be implicitly 
drawn up as a parallel or analogy with my own mental states and my own behaviour. It 
is only when the parallel cannot be drawn, for instance, when someone claims to be a 
caring person and then berates people claiming social assistance for being lazy, that we 
begin to question the integrity, or even the sanity, of that person.
So when it comes to selecting what things will be attended to and what things will 
be ignored there first needs to be an environment in which an alternative is possible.
For the thermostat and video recorder this is not the case. For a PDF the environment is 
enriched for it can learn from the information it receives but it still follows a course of 
events that is dictated by its design and program specification. In the non-human animal 
world the environments are, by and large, richer with more diversity but the system still 
attends to those things that it needs to satisfy a physiological need. It is only when we 
reach the higher order mammals that the element of choice begins to play a more central 
rôle in their behaviours. However, it is still only when we talk of human behaviour that 
we can say for definite that here is a system that chooses the things in its environment 
to which it will respond. Human beings frequently behave in ways that are not dictated 
by any physiological, and certainly not logical, necessity, indeed what any human
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being chooses to respond to is more often a matter of that individual's subjectivity. For 
example, I choose what I will read in the newspaper because I know what is of interest 
to me, in a similar way when I look out of the window I look in the direction from 
where I expect someone will arrive and only if something dramatic enough to overrule 
my choice occurs will I attend to something else. The choice that a human being makes 
is not necessarily dictated by physiology nor logic, and is often a the result of their own 
subjective nature that they decide to follow one course of action rather than another. It 
is this, the individual's, element of subjective interpretation that I will explore in the 
following section.
7.3.3. Subjective Interpretation
The choice of what actions we, as human beings, pursue is largely our own 
decision, a matter of our own subjective choice. The decision ceases to be our own on 
occasions either when someone else tells us what we should do, for example, the 
person in charge at work, or when we are driven by a physiological need to find food 
or water or the urge to satisfy a sexual n e e d . ^9 Perhaps what is more interesting is that 
of the information we choose to attend to we can offer a subjective interpretation and 
that this interpretation will be unique to each of us as an individual. The uniqueness 
criterion is fundamentally due to the fact that no one else can ever have had my 
experiences and that all of the experiences in my history are personal to me.
It is simply that I see things from my own point of view, no matter how open 
minded I am |2o The T' is present in all of my judgements because everything I decide 
to do will affect my life in some way. I do not live passively in my environment for 
everything that I choose to attend to and even the things I choose to ignore have a 
meaning for me, and I cannot fail to ascribe one to them. In the case of the things I 
choose to ignore the meaning is likely to be cursorily applied because I know the thing 
has little or no relevance to me. The things I choose to attend to might have no meaning 
for me as yet for I may know nothing about them and be actively seeking more
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information by attending to them, but they are things that I believe will have relevance 
for me so already they have a meaning in the sense of being 'meaningful' to me.
Just as human beings are aware of their informational input so all non-human
»
systems must be too else how could they survive. Even a machine is aware in a very 
limited sense of input from its environment, if it was not it would simply be a collection 
of bits with no function. The difference between human beings and other systems is 
that they are self-consciously aware of the information they receive through their senses 
and they interpret it in relation to themselves. That I am capable of seeing myself at the 
centre of the judgements that I make about the information that I receive, and that I can 
describe this relationship between myself and my environment using prepositional 
attitude statements is an indication of the great distinction between me, as a human 
being, and all other non-human systems.
The immensity and variation in the human environment is again significant for not 
only does it offer us a great wealth of information from which we can choose that 
which we will attend to and that which we will ignore, but it also means that any 
behaviour we exhibit or we observe can have any number of interpretations, for the 
interpretation we assign to any behaviour is heavily influenced by the context in which 
that behaviour is performed. For example, were I to see someone sitting alone and 
crying I might think that the person is obviously very sad and in need of consolation, 
whereas, were I to see the same person exhibiting the same behaviour but this time in a 
theatre, watching a production of Sheridan's "The Rivals", I would be more likely to 
think that they are enjoying the play and that their tears are tears of joy. So three things 
that are significant are, (i) the vastness of the human environment, (ii) the infinite 
number of possible human behaviours and (iii) our ability to interpret everything 
subjectively.
Indeed with our subjective interpretation of events being able to stretch into the 
realm of abstract concepts and ideas means that I can ask myself questions about my 
existence, the infinite nature of the universe, whether there really is an after-life and so 
on. At first it may seem an odd idea but the environment in which abstract thoughts are
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aired and considered is also very important for their interpretation. For example, if I 
attend a lecture on "The mind as a control system" given by Aaron Sloman as part of 
the proceedings of a Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference, I am more likely to 
listen to what he says even though I may disagree whole-heartedly with what he is 
saying; however, if someone stands up on a soapbox at Hyde Park Comer and tries to 
tell me that it is possible to build a machine that, with the addition of a "chemical soup", 
could respond to information and have emotions just like a human being I would be 
more inclined to think of that person as over-optimistic, if not plain crazy.
The possibility of abstract thought in other systems cannot be ruled out on the basis 
that because I do not share a language with any other system I cannot ask them, and 
they cannot tell me, if they think of things other than the physical information they 
perceive from their environment Chimpanzees do exhibit a marvellous curiosity about 
their worlds and with their being so close to us genetically it might be that they too 
wonder about their existence. I would be loathe to rule this out completely. But it may 
be idle optimism on my behalf for we have no evidence that they do, nor even that it 
would seem interesting for them to do so.
So here we have at least three things that separate the human system from all other 
non-human systems; firstly, the creation of symbols and ascription of meaning to those 
symbols with the subsequent use of a shared language that has shared meanings; 
secondly, the flexibility to select the piece of information that is most relevant to the 
individual at any one particular time; and thirdly, the ability to interpret the information 
that has been selected in the individual's own subjective manner. The human system is 
without doubt one that is capable of complex cognition and I shall now look at what 
sort of architectural, behavioural and environmental requirements are necessary for 
cognition of this sort to be possible before rounding off with my response to the 
question posed at the beginning of the thesis.
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7.4. The requirements for complex cognition
What characteristics would a system need to possess for it to be capable of complex 
cognition such as that carried out by human beings; well for a start it would need to be 
conscious of itself in relation to its world, so initially it needs, at least, to be self- 
conscious. A second characteristic is that it needs to be capable of selecting the most 
appropriate piece of information from the wealth of incoming stimuli that are 
bombarding its perceptual field at every moment of the day. On top of all of this the 
system needs to be capable of subjectively interpreting the selected pieces of incoming 
information, and this requires a great deal of flexibility from the system.
For the inierpreiadon to take place the system needs to be capable of creating 
symbols and ascribing a meaning to them. This meaning has to be fixed in the sense 
that it can be shared with other users of the same symbol system without there being 
any loss or substantial variation in the interpretation of the symbols. This last 
requirement is arguably the most important for it is only through the possession of it 
that any system would be at all capable of expressing its self-conscious capabilities, the 
subjectivity of its judgements, and discussing information with other like systems and 
from those discussions and other incoming perceptual information forming beliefs 
about its world that will enable it to adapt and survive.
As a human system I have these capabilities with which I can recognise that my 
thoughts and experiences are my own. I can also speak about my experiences with 
other human beings who use the same language that I do. It is even possible for me to 
understand, to a limited extent, the actions of another human being with whom I do not 
share the use of a language and this is more strongly suggestive of the basic 
commonalities between my mental states and those of another human being. I can 
understand myself and others like me, and I can offer an interpretation of the behaviour 
of other types of system.
So for another system to be capable of complex cognition it needs to be capable of 
understanding the information that it receives and forming knowledge or belief states
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from that understanding. As mental states are, by nature vague it is impossible, so far 
in our knowledge of the world, to say exactly what criteria would have to be fulfilled 
for us to recognise the form that understanding behaviour would take in a non-human 
system, or to differentiate between a knowing' state and a 'believing' state. Indeed as 
we have seen this latter example is difficult enough to settle in the case of human beings 
where we are in possession of a great many more of the facts.
7.5. Conclusion - so when is it justifiable to say of a non-human system 
that it has mental states?
Throughout this thesis we have confronted a great many difficulties involving 
mental states for they are vague entities that make it difficult for us to recognise their 
presence, differentiate between them and identify them absolutely. Therefore, it is 
difficult to ascribe them and differentiation of them is only possible on the basis of 
perceived complexity, adaptability and capability. It is because mental states cannot be 
identified and differentiated in the same way that machine states can, that it is not 
feasible to try and show them in the form of stratified hierarchies. In the cluster 
diagrams of chapter six it was possible to show that the human system is the only 
system that is capable of occupying a state of 'full blown' self-conscious awareness, 
and that although lots of other systems can occupy states of varying levels of 
complexity, none, but the human, language using, system is capable of the full gamut 
of known mental states.
There can be no doubt that it is a useful practice to ascribe mental states to both 
human and non-human systems for, as Dennett has argued, it allows us to more readily 
predict their behaviour and thus ourselves behave in accordance with what we anticipate 
they will do. Therefore, in the sense of being a useful thing to do the attribution of 
mental states to non-human systems might be argued as justifiable. However, if we 
stand back and ask is it justifiable, in the sense of can we say with any degree of 
certainty that these other types of system have mental states that are identical in kind to 
those that we ascribe to other human beings, then, after a lot of deliberation, I would 
have to come down on the side that maintains that it is not.
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So it is that a distinction has been drawn up between two senses of 'justifiable', the 
first is having a (good) reason for doing 'x', and the second is being able to show that 
'x' is conclusively the case. Each of these senses has its own precise application and 
use and it is in this area that our problems have been seen to arise, for often the 
language we use to describe and ascribe mental states is used thoughtlessly resulting in 
the niisappropriation of mental state terms.
Even when dealing with human beings the ascription of mental states is fraught 
with difficulty. Eventually we have to decide which is the most sensible way to 
progress in our ascription and that is to first look at the other person's behaviour, 
compare it with my own behaviour and the mental states I would have that would 
accompany it So it is simply a matter of optimistic analogy that is encouraged by the 
fact that other human beings look like me, talk like me, and act like me, so why should 
they not think like me as well. Any interactions I have had with other human beings 
have always been on a basis of ascribing meaning to their actions and so far this has 
been successful and there is no reason to think that my ascription will not also continue 
to be so. Thus it would seem realistic to assume that there are a great many 
commonalities that exist between my mental states and those of other human beings and 
that my certainty about the ascription of mental states to other human systems is indeed 
vindicated.
However, the character or nature of the mental states possessed by other non­
human animals is not so easy to identify and pin down. We compare their behaviour 
with our own behaviour and the mental states that would accompany our behaviour, 
then we attribute to them these mental states and this may, quite simply, be completely 
mistaken. But it is all that we have to go on for we can not locate a mental state and 
analyse it in the way that a brain state can be isolated and examined. A brain state is 
necessarily something physiological and mental states are not, at least as far as we 
presently know.21 Until we can share a language with another living system our 
theories about their mental life can be nothing but conjecture, and there is no certainty in 
conjecture.
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When it comes to machines, such as personal computers and PDF's, we are more 
inclined to say of them that "they know what the symbol means" or that "they 
understand the task they are carrying out", but there are two reasons for this; firstly, 
they carry out tasks that human beings would otherwise have to do and they do so 
quickly and efficiently; and secondly, the usual type of interaction we have with a 
computer is carried out using a language that we understand. The computer gives us 
information in a language that we recognise and use so the computer and I seem to 
possess a shared language, and this is very misleading for it encourages us to attribute 
to the machine all of the mental states, and at least some of the capabilities, that we 
would otherwise only attribute to another human being with whom we can carry on this 
advanced level of communication. If we look more closely at the machine we quickly 
realise that any of its seemingly well-versed interactions are simply the product of 
human programming labour and that the machine does not understand us or the 
interaction we are engaged in after all.
To use the language of the mental, that is Fodor's 'mentalese', to ascribe mental 
states to machines is to over extend its use and it is done, not because we fail to 
understand the nature of machine states or that we fail to see that they, machine states, 
are different in kind to mental states, but rather that we understand so little about mental 
states that we are prepared to proffer their manifestation in even the most unlikely 
places in an effort to understand them more fully. Furthermore, it may be that we 
ultimately discover that this earnest ascription of mental states to non-mental systems 
has only furthered a misunderstanding of the nature of mentality and mental life.
Thus, I can only conclude that the ascription of mental states to machines may be a 
useful exercise that allows us to predict the outcome of any interaction that we may 
have with them, but really what we are doing is comparing two systems that are, by 
nature, more dissimilar than we usually seem prepared to admit. For the attribution of 
vague and non-quantifiable mental states to a system that has internal states that are by 
nature tangible, definable and measurable, seems just too much like anthropomorphism 
and the desire to play at being some sort of omniscient being that is capable of creating
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things in our own likeness. If this 'likeness' includes our faults as well, and with the 
capacity for intelligence it may well include a desire for competition and dominance, 
then we enter into questions of the morality of bringing such a being into existence. But 
this is another question that could be raised in another thesis.
Endnotes:
 ^ I am here assuming that ESP has not yet been shown to work, but I am not maintaining that it 
would be impossible for it, or some form of Mw technology, to allow me to gain direct access to the 
mental states of another system, and vice versa.
 ^See also section 3.6.1., chapter 3.
 ^Miller, J. (1992) Trouble in Mind', Scientific American, Special Issue - September 1992, pg.l32
A "symbolic" language as opposed to a non-verbal form of language such as, "body" language and 
facial expressions both of which can be as expressive, perhaps even more so, than an ordinary verbal 
form of communication.
 ^I do not wish to argue that this is the only reason that written language developed for many other 
factors were also influential. Indeed one well known example is that of people wanting to pass down 
stories of great adventures, or even of cautionary tales, to the generations that were to follow and the 
easiest and most lasting way to do this was through the written word.
 ^Of course, there are other possibilities such as Plato’s theory that before our birth we have all 
possible knowledge which the shock of birth makes us forget and the rest of our lives is spent 
remembering things rather than having to learn everything from the beginning each time.
 ^ See Chapter Two, section 2.7.1.1. and following.
 ^It should be remembered that "knowledge" in Rosenschein's sense is limited to a logical encoding in a 
formal language. See chapter 2, section 2.7.1.2.
 ^The creation of images in our own likeness, that is, with human-like intelligence, is very much like 
the Christian view of God creating man in his own image.
Hamad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem, p.339, Physica D 42
Ibid. foomote 2, pg.336.
Wittgenstein, L. (1961) Traaatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.1212 and 5.62. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul
Kant, I (1787) The Critique of Pure Reason, p. 257 - 275 (incl ). Translated by Norman Kemp 
Smith (1929).
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Numbers in the sense of pure mathematics are not numbers in the Fregean sense, because he 
describes numbers as objects' for any number can be the reference of a singular term. This description 
means that, for Frege, numbers are no longer abstract terms but things that can be referred to and 
discussed in much the same way as we would discuss a hwse or the score of an aria.
15 See chapter two, section 2.5.1.2., for how a private language' is of no use for there could be no 
shared meaning and no communication. Also for a lengthier exposition read Wittgenstein, L (1958) 
Philosophical Investigations, and in particular paragraph 293.
15 In the previous example of, the thermostat, I used the word 'react' instead of the word response', 
therefore, I would propose that a reaction is an action that has the element of choice taken out
1^  In cognitive science the system's environment is described as its 'perceived domain', for the limit of 
any system's wwld is distinguished by what it can and what it cannot perceive. This notion of 
perceived dtxnain' could be questioned in the case of the human species for they are also capable of 
abstract thought and creating concepts of things that exist outside their world, Kantian noumena' or 
'diings-in-themselves'. (See also section 7.3.3.)
1® It has been proposed that pla>ful behaviour in animals is goal-directed because it acts as practice for 
future confrontations with both prey and predator. I do not wish to argue with this view except to say 
that playing is a much less direct method of goal attainment than seeking water or food. The immediate 
goal of play is to expend energy and release tension, the indirect goal is to be prepared when a predator 
appears or there is prey in sight,
1^  I am aware of the moral tensions involved with the addition of the physiological need to fulfil a 
sexual drive, or of eating taboos, but here it is used merely as an example of a physiological drive and 
nothing more.
20 Sec also section 4.3.4.1., chapter four for a full account of the notion of subjectivity.
The nature of mental states is something that could be investigated in further work on this area. For 
example, if non-human animals have nothing but physiological drives it would seem most likely that 
the mental states tfiat accompany them would be what I have described as brain states that can be 
isolated and analysed.
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Appendix 1
Mediaeval Aristotelianism
A great deal of the work of the Mediaeval Aristotelianists, through the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, was concerned with how the mind takes in information from the 
world and is then capable of processing and understanding it Theology was given a 
scientific use, as a form of knowing; and as with the notion of God being something 
not phenomenal yet something toward which we could direct our thoughts and 
propositions, there was the origination of the notion of the intentional inexistence of 
objects. It was no longer necessary for every object of a statement to be a physically 
existent thing. Out of theology had grown a system within which it was possible to 
make belief statements about abstract entities.
Aquinas 1225-1274
The work of Thomas Aquinas is a fine example of the work of Mediaeval 
Aristotelianism for he tried to draw together the notions of theology and reason. He 
attempted to combine Aristotle's work on philosophy and logic with Christian doctrine 
and western ways of life. In Summa Theologiae he introduces the idea of reason and 
revelation as a means to knowing God. He offers five reasons for God which include 
both reason and revelation, and how through the human intellect it is possible to 
conceive of God.
If we regard the essence or soul as something that animates the physical body then 
all living things have a soul; vegetative in plants which is responsible for nourishment 
and growth, sensitive in animals because they are capable of sensation and rational in 
human beings since they are capable of rational activity. We are aware of material 
things external to us so we can not be entirely material ourselves. The human soul is 
capable of the sensitive and vegetative soul activities in its being able to understand
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concepts and reflect upon logic, mathematics, metaphysics and God. Rational activities 
have no bodily counterpart. (The physical counterpart may be the rule base upon which 
computer programs are modelled or even neurophysiological changes in brain states 
that may one day be mappable.) For Aquinas this meant that there was an aspect of the 
human "being' that did not have a comparable bodily activity and this would have to be 
immaterial and capable of surviving after the physical death of the body.
This rational part of the body contains the intellect and the will. The former is the 
power through which we attain knowledge, and the latter is the power through which 
we make choices. A well tuned intellect will be able to say what is good and what is not 
good. The will can only act in accordance with the intellect and being able to choose is 
the means to achieving that good. It is not the will as a means to an end that we are 
interested in, but rather that Aquinas considered that human beings were able to act 
freely.
Essentially a free act is one done out of a combination of reason and will, and the 
fact that we have a liberty in our choices is dependent upon the type of knowledge that 
we possess. Animals have a different sort of knowledge because they 'do not judge of 
their own judgements, but follow the judgement imprinted on them by God'. Human 
beings are able to judge their own actions through their powers of reason and their 
choices are guided by an understanding of the means to an end and the anticipation of 
that end. Unlike animals, human beings are the cause of their own judgements and 
actions.
"...the intellectus agens, the mind's concept forming power, is likened to a light that 
enables the mind's eye to see the intelligible features of things, as the bodily eye sees 
colours"; "...when we frame a judgement in words, our use of concepts is compared, not 
to seeing something, but rather to forming a visual image of something we are not now 
seeing, or even never have seen."; "...it is a main thesis in Aquinas's theory of knowledge 
that what our understanding grasps primarily and most readily is the specific nature {quod
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quid est) of material substances, in spite of his holding that the senses are in no way 
cognizant of this nature," - P.T. Geach, Mental Acts, 2nd Ed. [Derived from the Summa 
Theologica of Aquinas]
John Duns Scotus 1265-1308
Duns Scotus put together a reaction against the combined work of Thomas Aquinas 
and Augustus. He saw the will as being more important than the intellect in the 
pursuance of the concept of God. He drew a sharp distinction between faith and 
reason.
The free-will of the individual is of the most importance to the 'being' of the 
individual; 'the will commanding the intellect is the superior cause of the action'. The 
intellect being the cause of the willing is subservient to the intention itself. At this time 
the will was seen as something that was self-orientated and selfish and Aquinas had 
tried to overcome this by asserting that the intellect was superior to the will.
However, this was contrary to Christian theory and Scotus attempted to overcome 
this by suggesting that the will had two ends; the first was for the good or advantage of 
the self, and the second was for the achievement of a more general justice for all things. 
In the second instance things are valued for their own sake and not because they benefit 
the individual. Because the will allows one to do something other than what is solely 
for the individual's advantage it is in this sense a truly 'free' will.
Appendix 2
/
Intensional language
Briefly, the argument put forward in the discussion of intensional language, i.e. 
those that express prepositional attitudes like 'belief and 'suppose', is that it is not 
possible to substitute one term of a sentence for another whilst maintaining the truth- 
value of the sentence. W. V. Quine sets out two sorts of belief statement that are
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feasible, namely 'transparent' and 'opaque'. The 'transparent' sense is that in which it 
is possible to substitute a term but it is not possible to say whether the truth-value has 
been changed. For example, it is possible to say truthfully of John that 'he believes that 
Hesperus is the Morning Star', but it is not possible to say that 'he believes that 
Phosphorus is the Morning Star' for although we are aware of an identity relation 
between Hesperus and Phosphorus we cannot be sure that John is also aware of that 
relation.
Substitutions that are 'opaque' are those in which the truth-value is altered. On the 
whole Quine claims that the terms in prepositional attitudes statements are not 
intersubstitutive, salve veritate; which is to say that they are 'referentially opaque'. 
'Quantifiers and Prepositional Attitudes' in The Ways o f Paradox (New York: Random 
House, 1966), pp. 183-94.
I
Appendix 3
System architecture
For architecture I mean the internal structure of the system and the physical 
constitution of what houses it. So by 'physical constitution' 1 mean whether the system 
is organic or inorganic. Organic systems are those made of flesh and blood, and 
inorganic systems are those that are made artificially. The latter are otherwise described 
as 'artifacts'.
A broad physical difference, like the external make-up of different systems, allows 
us to draw an obvious, superficial distinction. The differences in physical 
characteristics can become infinitely subtle Having a look at the outside of a system can 
often give us important information about the structure of the innards.
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Complexity classes
There are two sorts of problem to face, those for which there is an algorithmic 
solution and those for which there is not. It is the former case with which I have most 
interest because I want to find out what computer resources are needed for their 
execution. Complexity theory investigates this whole area of computational resources. 
Of the latter case, non-algorithmic problems, it might be feasible to think of them as 
states that are, as yet, impossible to implement in anything other than a organic system; 
and then their implementation is something that is intrinsic to the system rather than 
something that needs to be instantiated from outside.
The resources that are most important are time, memory and hardware. The general 
terra 'time' used to describe the period it takes to execute an algorithm, and 'memory' 
is the amount of storage required for the algorithm. Memory becomes necessary if 
partial results are required again later in the execution of the algorithm so that the old 
computation does not have to be worked over again. The 'hardware' element refers to 
the amount of actual physical mechanism (e.g. the processor) that is needed for the 
successful running of the program. In sequential machines it has been found that 
memory can be traded off for processing time.
Algorithms are designed to accept relevant input data and process it, so the 
resources that the algorithm needs will vary with the size of the input data. It is possible 
that different algorithms, using different levels of resources, can be used to solve the 
same problem. It is probably best and most interesting to use the algorithm that needs 
fewest resources. Quite often it happens that when one resource is reduced another may 
have to be increased. Again this is a 'trade-off situation and the choice of resources 
must suit the specific application.
Asymptotic Behaviour
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The amount of resource that an algorithm uses depends upon the size of the input 
data. For example, the more digits there are in a calculation the greater the time taken to 
perform the whole calculation. Sometimes with an increase in the number of digits a 
term in the function that expresses the amount of resources may begin to dominate other 
terms. This sort of action is called the asymptotic behaviour of the algorithm. 
Ultimately it is this behaviour which governs the feasibility of a particular algorithm.
With the execution time at n the execution time of the algorithm is proportional to 
the number of characters of input data. It is easy to see from this that twice as much 
input data will mean twice as much running time. This amount of time is generally 
required because the algorithm must, at least, scan the data, (unless, of course, the 
problem is very trivial). Running on log n is only possible on a parallel computer (see 
below) because it can examine many parts of the data simultaneously.
Exponential and Polynomial Algorithms
Related to asymptotic behaviour we have exponential algorithms. These have 
asymptotic behaviour of where c is a constant. These kind of algorithms are not of 
much use unless the size of the input data is very small. The other kind of algorithms 
are Polynomial and are those where the behaviour is nP- They are feasible for most, 
but not aU, practical input sizes.
It appears that at a first glance the only feasible algorithms are those that can be 
executed in a polynomial amount of time. Complexity theory tries to make more clear 
the distinction between feasible and unfeasible algorithms. Certainly we can expect that 
certain properties will obtain for the operation of feasible algorithms, and this seems to 
be the case for those with polynomial time (sequential) algorithms. If we were to 
combine two feasible algorithms the new algorithm will, predictably, be feasible. These 
sorts of properties are called closure properties and they hold for polynomial 
algorithms.
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To estimate exactly the amount of time that an algorithm will take it is necessary to 
know something about the internal structure of the computer that it is being run on. All 
sequential computers have related execution times, which means that each can simulate 
the other without any significant time loss. So any polynomial algorithm that can be run 
on one (sequential) computer can also be run on any other (sequential) computer. So it 
is reasonable to talk of polynomial algorithms independently of any specific computer. 
This is the sequential computation thesis; claiming that all feasibly computable 
problems are the same for all computers. (It holds for all computers known to date.)
The amount of resource that an algorithm uses is expressed as a function of the 
input size. But for a given input size there are any number of different inputs; in these 
cases different algorithms may well use different amounts of resource to deal with the 
varying types of input data. It is possible for an algorithm to test the input data and 
perform certain actions that depend upon the outcome of the test.
Worst Case, Average Case and Standard Deviation
As mentioned different amounts of resource are needed for different functions and 
the amount of resource depends upon the amount of input data. In some cases it is 
vitally important to know the largest amount of resource that an algorithm might use on 
a particular given input size, ie to be aware of the longest time it will take a computer to 
respond in a certain circumstance. This is called the worst-case complexity of the 
algorithm. There is also average-case complexity where it is best to know the average 
that is used over all the inputs of a given size. Finally there is standard deviation when 
the knowledge required is what are the chances of an algorithm remaining close to the 
average behaviour of a given input
Upper and Lower Bound
All of the above have been considerations of algorithm complexity in relation to 
some specified resource. It is also worthwhile talking about the complexity of problems
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in relation to the resource. In this instance we are concerned with the complexity of the 
best algorithm being used to solve a particular problem. Being the best algorithm is not 
always as easy a matter to resolve as it may at first seem since in many cases we are 
only dealing with the best algorithm so far discovered. This is called the upper bound 
on the complexity of a problem. In some cases it is possible to show that there is a 
lower bound on the amount of resources that an algorithm uses to solve a certain 
problem. The better the algorithm the lower the upper bound.
Recurrence Relation
A good way of devising the best possible algorithm for solving a problem is to 
divide it into smaller and smaller problems. This leaves only the smaller problems to be 
solved. The algorithm sorts through the first half of the problems and then sorts 
through the second half, the two halves are combined in time n proportional to a 
constant c mentioned earlier. This procedure is called a recurrence relation; which is a 
sort of divide and conquer technique. The solution of such a procedure will express the 
resource usage in a very clear way.
NP-completeness and NP-hard
With arbitrary value inputs for a problem there seems to be no straightforward or 
for that matter, quick method of finding a solution. However, once a method is 
discovered it is relatively easy to check that the it is right. It can be seen to be the case 
that for every problem there is an algorithm that can be used for verification in 
polynomial time as long as we have a proposed set of values and a proposed solution. 
Overall the solution is the most difficult aspect of the problem to overcome but when 
found it appears to be obvious.
Problems with a very fast algorithm are called NP. All feasible problems will be in 
NP since it is possible to both verify the solution of a feasible problem in polynomial 
time, and to find the solution in the first place in polynomial time. However, the set of
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NP is not interesting solely for this reason, it also contains a great many open problems 
yet to be solved. Open problems are among the hardest because if it was possible to 
find an algorithm for one it would be possible to find an algorithm for all. An NP 
problem in the 'open problem' category is called NP-complete. Following from this it 
would seem that they are all computationally equivalent because any polynomial 
algorithm devised to solve one could be used to solve all the others. If it can be shown 
that any one of these NP problems is unfeasible it will be an NP-complete problem and 
this will mean that all NP-complete problems are unfeasible.
All feasible problems have fast algorithms and it is widely accepted that NP- 
complete problems do not have fast algorithms so the tendency seems to be to believe 
that they are unfeasible. Any problem that can be reduced to an NP-complete problem is 
described as NP-hard since it is going to be at least as hard as they are. An NP-hard 
problem can only be solved in polynomial time if P = NP, where P' is equal to the set 
of problems that can be solved using a temporally bound Turing Machine.
Parallel Computers
In the main complexity theory is concerned with sequential time and memory as the 
two most important resources. There are now two new, and equally, important 
resources that have been introduced with the advent of parallel computers, they are 
"parallel time" and the number of processors needed for the successful execution of the 
algorithm. Parallel time is the time taken to execute an algorithm by a number of 
processors operating in unison.' (A sequential computer has only a single processor.)
One of the distinguishing features of parallel computers is that they contain a huge 
number of processors, (perhaps as many as one million), which is similar to the 
memory contained in sequential computers. All of these processors work at once on 
one aspect of the problem in the larger algorithm. This means that the algorithm can be
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executed in a much shorter space of time; maybe even in real time in a manner not 
dissimilar to the activity of the brain.
Synchronic: ty
Another distinction that can be made between parallel and sequential computers is 
that parallel computers act synchronously, ie they perform their computations in 
unison. Because they are working at the same time communicating between computers 
is generally made easier.
The parallel computation thesis states that all parallel computer designs are related in 
their computational abilities. Which is to say that given a particular number of 
processors an algorithm can be simulated on another parallel computer in roughly the 
same amount of time. So parallel computations can happily be considered 
independently of the computer. Of course, this cannot be considered to be a distinction 
between them and serial computers since their computations can also be considered 
independently of the computer.
As far as the relationship between memory resources and time used for a 
computation is concerned, a small amount of memory in a serial computation is 
proportional to the amount of time it would take on a parallel computer.
It has been mentioned a couple of times that computations on a parallel computer 
take less time, but this is not always the case. It will always depend on the computation 
that is being executed. Some tasks are still more suitable for serial computers and 
would as a result take more time to do on a parallel computer, if they could be done at 
all. The question to ask is can the task be divided into subtasks that are relevantly 
independent and if it is then it is suitable for parallel distributing system. If the 
computation calls for a great deal of communication between the smaller and smaller 
machines then it will take a lot more time on a parallel computer. The optimal status for 
an algorithm on a parallel computer is for a computation to have high localised work
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that can be done independently of other parts of the distributed net thus calling for low 
communication between the parts that are doing the individual computations.
Financial Outlay
It has been assumed that not only do more processors mean less time but that they 
also mean more cost, again this is not always true. More processors can often mean 
less expense if we are talking in terms of the power of the processors. Something with 
one processor that is very powerful is going to cost a lot more than a parallel processor 
with a hundred processors that are weaker. In fact a parallel processor can mean less 
initial financial outlay with more processing power than one large shared vax.
To execute a program a sequential computer needs time proportional to n to enable 
it to add together n numbers. A parallel processor can execute the algorithm in time 
proportional to log n but it needs n processors. For the quickest sequential algorithms 
time proportional to nlogn is needed.
Appendix 4
Propositions that express belief
When we talk of propositional attitude statements the examples that spring to mind 
are usually of belief statements. There is a special category of problem inherent in 
propositions that express beliefs and I will look briefly at how Dennett deals with it. 
Then I will move on to examine Dennett's proposed answer to the difficulties we 
encounter overall when using propositional attitude statements. And, in keeping with 
his recommendation to adopt the intentional stance, we will see that he agrees with the 
continued use of propositional attitude statements both to describe and predict the 
behaviour of others.
The difference between de re and de dicto beliefs is that the former are literally 
beliefs that are held of or about something (which can be an object or a state of affairs).
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and the latter are beliefs that are held of or about a proposition. De re beliefs are usually 
more specific than de dicto beliefs. For instance, and staying with Dennett's (now 
outdated!) example (p. 168-169), "Bill believes that the captain of the Soviet Ice Hockey 
team is a man". This type of belief is de dicto because it is not held first hand about the 
thing, but instead is about the proposition itself, and it is the 'that' relation which is 
crucial to our understanding of the proposition as a whole. "Bill believes o/his own 
father that he is a man"; in this proposition the 'of relation is important, and since Bill 
has first hand knowledge of his father, that is, of the object in the proposition, the 
belief is de re.
Dennett disagrees with the maintenance of the de re/de dicto distinction. The 
distinction has taken other forms, examples are, relational and notional, and general and 
specific. If it is possible to make these distinctions clear then it is also possible to see 
that the criteria for de re belief are very loose. I do not intend to go into this in great 
detail because it is not directly relevant to the thesis; suffice to say that Dennett 
concludes that although it is possible to isolate a subset of beliefs that fit the de r,. 
criteria they are of no theoretical interest to psychology.
Dennett concludes that we have to abandon 'Russell's' Principle: It is not possible 
to make a judgment about an object without knowing what object you are making a 
judgment about. This will enable us to clarify a number of other linguistic distinctions 
which have previously been shadowed by the importance that the de re/de dicto 
distinction has assumed. Two of the four conclusions in the "Reflections" section are 
firstly, that no stable distinction exists between de re and de dicto beliefs, and secondly, 
that the Russellian principle ought to be abandoned in the hope of opening up areas for 
fresh enquiry.
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Appendix 5
Is ascription just-the over-extension of metaphors?
The ascription of mental states and intentionality to non-human systems has been 
criticised on a number of fronts, and not least of all by those who say that ascription is 
simply an over-extension of the metaphorical use of words. I would like to discuss this 
criticism now before moving on to give a summary and conclusory note of the main 
points that have been made in this chapter.
A metaphor is used as a figure of speech when we want to talk about something as 
being that which it only resembles. In this sense, then, the use of human intentional 
terminology to describe the behaviour of non-human systems is justified for it only 
suggests that the behaviour resembles that of a human system and not that they are both 
identical. It is, as Searle say, a "simulation" of human behaviour and not a 
"duplication".
Other examples of simulation and duplication, or real and artificial, are diamonds, 
rubber, works of art, and so on. Artificial things become difficult to accept as artificial 
when they seem identical in nature to the real thing, for how then can any distinction be 
made between the real and the fake? If we look at all the physical properties of an 
artificial diamond, that has been made in a laboratory, and discover that essentially it is 
no different from the real thing that has been mined then the only way to maintain a 
distinction is to look again at the properties and see if anything has been overlooked or 
not included. One way to maintain a distinction is to include in the list of properties, the 
genetic or historic criteria, for how a thing came about Thus, the distinction would be 
that one diamond had been made in a laboratory and the other has been created 
naturally. Their respective genetics now make them distinct
For an organic system it might well come down to their history being the only 
property that will eventually make their mentality absolutely distinct from the mentality
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exhibited by inorganic systems. Even now we hear functionalists arguing that the 
human mentality is only just a function of the requisite mental states and no more, so 
that every aspect of human mentality is, in principle, programmable and it is only a 
matter of time before we have a fully functioning artificial brain. If that day ever comes 
the carbonists will have to plead history as a property of mentality, and draw their 
distinction from there.
It is fairly accurate to speak of the metaphorical use of descriptive terms for mental 
states for with metaphors the comparison between two things is implied rather than 
explicitly stated. But when we say of a thermostat that it knows' when the temperature 
has dropped we are using the simile 'as-though' which if read in full would be: 'the 
thermostat has switched the central heating on as-though it knows that the temperature 
has dropped'. To use 'as' and 'like' is indicative of the use of simile but because of the 
compression and implicit nature of the comparison between human and non-human 
mentality we must be dealing with genuine and accurately used metaphors.
That it might be an over-extension of the metaphor would only be possible if the 
use of such language is restricted to organic systems of the human type, and as we have 
seen this is not so because we have for as long as we care to remember used the same 
language with much perceived success to describe the behaviour of non-human 
animals. We use mental is tic language as an interactive tool with all manner of non­
human systems for it makes it possible to make sense of our environment; and within 
the comparatively recent context of AI it allows us to grasp new inter-disciplinary 
concepts without having to create and learn a whole new lexicon.
Appendix 6
The points and plots for a two dimensional diagram using Mathematica
LabèlText[String_, Point_] := {)
LabelText[String_, Point_] :=
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Point[{0.25, 0.26}],
LabelText["Amoeba, Thermostats etc.", {0.04, 0.04}], 
Point[{0.09, 0.075}],
Point[{0.03, 0.075}],
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Point[{0.64, 0.62}], Text[FontForm[Insects, Italie, 7], {0.55, 0.47},
{-1, 0}], Point[{0.62, 0.42}], Point[{0.61, 0.5}], Point[{0.56,
0.55}], Point[{0.56, 0.5}], Point[{0.53, 0.5}], Point[{0.57, 0.39}],
Point[{0.53, 0.41}], Point[{0.52, 0.46}], Text[FontForm[Vertebrates,
Italie, 7], {0.4, 0.26}, {-1, 0}], Point[{0.43, 0.24}], Point[{0.41,
0.29}], Point[{0.39, 0.23}], Point[{0.37, 0.23}], Point[{0.37,
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Point [{0.195, 0.11}], Point[{0.21, 0.16}], Text[FontForm[PDP's,
Italie, 7], [0.12, 0.22}, [-1, 0}], Point[[0.205, 0.23}],
Point[[0.25, 0.26}], Text[FontForm[Amoeba, Thermostats etc., Italie,
7], {0.04, 0.04}, { -1 ,  0}], Point[{0.09, 0.075}], Point[{0.03,
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0.075}], Point[{0.01, 0.06}]}
S h o w [ G r a p h i c s [ { S u s a n s P o i n t s } ] , { A x e s - > A u t o m a t i c ,  A s p e c t R a t i o  >1 }] 
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